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Ρ Ο R E W O R D 
One of the tasks of the European Atomic Energy Community 
(EURATOM) is to establish uniform safety standards to protect 
the health of workers and of the general public. The Basic 
Standards for the Protection of Health against the dangers 
of ionizing radiation, which were adopted as a Directive by 
the Council of Ministers of EURATOM pursuant to this mandate 
in 1959» contain the essential principles for effective 
radiation protection in the Community. As well as establishing 
maximum permissible exposure and contamination levels, to which 
workers and population may be exposed, the Basic Standards 
provide a framework for the creation of an effective system 
for medical and physical surveillance of workers. 
According to Article 2, the Directives apply to the 
production, treatment, handling, utilization, possession, 
storage, transport and elimination of natural and artificial 
radioactive materials and to any other activity involving 
hazards from ionizing radiation. 
Among all these factors, the transport of radioactive 
substances consitutes a special case. Owing to the dynamic 
nature of this factor, it is of paramount importance to the 
Commission to know whether the principles of radiological 
protection embodied in the EURATOM Basic Standards are 
really effective in this area and are able to guarantee 
adequate protection for the health of the population and 
personnel. The Commission therefore felt it appropriate to 
approach Dr. Pailla, Head of the Bureau for Radioisotopes, 
Transport and Environmental Radioactivity of the Comitato 
Nazionale per l'Energia Nucleare, who has particularly 
extensive knowledge of matters concerning the transport of 
radioactive materials, and to entrust her with a critical 
investigation into problems of radiological protection in 
the transport of radioactive materials. 
Dr. Pailla, together with her co-workers, Dr. C. Paloci 
and Dr. A. Susanna, have done excellent work, not only in 
dealing with the problems relating to this subject and in 
subjecting national and international regulations to a 
detailed comparison and analysis, but also, wherever possible, 
in drawing conclusions and presenting interesting proposals 
for better application of the provisions of the EURATOM 
Basic Standards to the transport of radioactive materials. 
Dr. P. RECHT 
Director of Health Protection 
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PREFA CE 
The basic standards of the Commission of the European 
Community establish the standard regulations for safety 
and health of populations and workers against the hazards 
from ionising radiations. These are binding for the six 
community states by acceptance within the scope of the 
specific judicial structure of each state. Hence they 
are commonly called Euratom Directives. 
Standards come under five titles, dealing respectively 
with definitions, scope, maximum permissible doses with an 
adequate safety factor, maximum permissible exposure and 
contamination, and the basic principles of workers' 
health supervision. 
Article 2, title II states that they are applicable 
to the production, processing, handling, use, holding, 
storage, transport and disposal of natural and artificial 
radioactive substances and to any other activity which 
involves a hazard arising from ionising radiations. 
Explicit mention is made of transport activity for whidi 
consequently the directives must be taken as valid in 
their totality, as issued at the time. 
Practical application to transport activity has 
however given rise to some confusion. F°r this purpose 
and in order to provide the most detailed account 
possible of the problem, this study has been carried out. 
- 10 -
The v/ork is classified under four sections dealing 
respectively with the following subjects: 
Section I : Scope of the basic standard^ 
Sectxn II : Apnlication of the basic standards in the 
community states; 
Section III : Comparison between the basic standards and 
the international standard. 
Section IV : Conclusions and nroposals. 
During the course of this study a particular dis-
cussion was centred "round those aspects of the basic 
standards which were considered of narticular interest 
for the field of transport of radio-active materials. 
These are: 
1) information, authorisation and inspection; 
2) controlled area and protected area; 
3) classification of workers employed on the transport 
and of the population affected by it. 
Regarding other aspects of the standard on the 
other hand we have not singled out specific problems 
affecting their application to transport. For example, 
the maximum permissible dose levels or concentrations, 
methods of physical and medical supervision etc, are 
directly applicable to the field of transport also, 
while in the case of the three subjects quoted above, 
atitomatic application did not appear possible. 
In section I however it is considered useful to discuss 
the "philisophy" of the scope of the standards to trans-
port within the field of the three separate subjects. 
- 11 -
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In section II an analysis ivas carried out of the standards 
of the six states as regards inclusion in the national 
legislations. In section III we have compared the 
standards with the recommendations issued by the other 
international organisations. In section IV concrete 
proposals have been made for adapting the standards so as 
to provide easier application to the field of transport. 
The four sections are supplemented by three 
appendices which, while they can be read independently, 
also form an integral part of the study, supplementing 
it with information useful to people interested in this 
field. 
The first and second of the appendices (appendix A 
and Β) are essentially technical insofar as they compare 
the standard specification for the transport of radio­
active materials, the first (appendix A) the various 
international standards, and the second (appendix B) as 
in force in the six states. The third appendix (appendix C) 
deals with the specific Italian experience in this sector. 
It was felt that this could provide particular points of 
interest particularly since it has been the subject of 
numerous studies. 
Λ fourth appendix, which would have appeared to be 
very important, concerning the number of persons affected 
by the transport of radioactive material s3both workers 
and those interested in transport in various ways, in 
- 12 -
addition to forecasts of the expansion of the sector 
had to be dispensed with. Unfortunately exhaustive 
information regarding this was not available in the 
community states. 
In addition we have not dealt with postal trans-
port for two basic reasons. Firstly international 
agreement by the Universal Postal Union (U.P.U.) for 
admission of radioactive material for postal transport, 
although stipulated, has not yet taken force in the 
community states. The other reason is that the 
problems which this may give rise to from the standpoint 
of radiation protection are much more diverse than other 
means of transport and therefore should form the subject 
of individual study. 
In addition to Doctors C. Faloci and A. Susanna, the 
co-authors, Doctors F. Lucci and F. Nocera and Mr. A. 
Roselli, specialists in standardisation and particularly 
transport standardisation, have participated in this study. 
I wish to thank all of them, in addition to 
Messrs. Recht and Eriskat of Euratom, who, having proposed 
this study, have provided me with a valuable opportunity 
to study a problem which has been felt for many years in 
Italy. While working on this subject I have collected 
much information which, if I may say so, has meantime taken 
on great importance in the six community states for 
radiation protection problems associated with the trans-
port of radioactive materials. 
Lidia Failla. 
13 
SECTION I 
SCOPE OF THE BASIC EURATOM STANDARDS 
SECTION I 
SCOPE OF THE BASIC EURATOM STANDARDS 
Ir-1. INTRODUCTION 
The directives of the Commission of the European 
Communities which form the basic standards relating to 
health and safety for population and workers against 
the hazards of ionising radiations explicitly include 
transport of radioactive substances within their scope 
(article 2, title II). 
This section provides a critical analysis of the 
scope a priori^in the field of transport, of these 
directives. This will therefore involve theoretical 
considerations^arising either from the particular form 
of their reception in the community states or from 
considerations resulting from comparison with the 
international recommendations in the field of health 
and safety of populations and workers from ionising 
radiations, with reference to transport. 
The text refers to the text of the directive 
2 February 1959 (G.U., C.E. no.11, 20 February 1959) 
amended by the directive 5 March I962 (G.U., C.E.no.57» 
1962) and the directive 27 October I966 (G.U., CE.no. 
216, 26 November 1966). These directives will be 
indicated synthetically as basic standards. 
- 15 -
1-2. TRANSPORT OF RADIOACTIVE SUBSTANCES 
In the course of general goods transport, three 
phases may be distinguished, namely loading, unloading 
and transport properly speaking from the place of dis-
patch to the de s t ina. t ion, which is cla-ssified in ac-
cordance with the means employed, whether air or 
surface, which is in turn divided into sea, land or 
mixed. The loading and unloading phases are differen-
tiated on the basis of the means employed (conveyor 
belts, crane, manual), with the resulting differences 
in the time during which the workers remain in the 
vicinity of the packages. This is important if the 
packages contain radioactive substances. It should 
be noted, however, that the persons performing the 
various operations are not usually the same, with the 
exception of road transport, in which case the drivers 
of the motor vehicles frequently are the same. It 
should also be pointed out that rail, sea or air 
transport presuppose prior and subsequent road transport, 
which renders the latter particularly important. 
This brings out the importance of establishing 
to which group of persons must or should be allocated 
workers for transporting radioactive material, according 
to the classification set out in the basic standards. 
The particular features of transport of radioactive 
substances is such that the methods for performing it 
form the subject of specific recommendations on the part 
- 16 -
of international organisations, primarily the IAEA 
(international Atomic Energy Agency). 
1-3. EURATOM CLASSIFICATION OF WORKERS AND POPULATIONS 
Title 1, section 2 of the basic standards defines 
as "occupationally exposed persons" those who, in a 
controlled area habitually carry out work which exposes 
them to hazards due to ionizing radiations. In the 
special groups of the population, still according 
to title I, section 2, there is a distinction between: 
a) persons who, by reason of their work, are occasion-
ally in the controlled area but who are not considered 
as "occupationally exposed persons"; 
b) persons handling equipment emitting ionizing radia-
tions or containing radioactive substances in quantities 
such that the radiations emitted do not exceed the maxi-
mum permissible dose for this class of person; 
c) persons habitually in the vicinity of the controlled 
area and who, for these reasons, may be exposed to radia-
tion exceeding that established for the population as 
a whole. 
Workers employed in the transport of radioactive 
substances, considering that application of the basic 
standards explicitly provide for them, must therefore 
be entered among "occupationally exposed" workers or 
classified in one of the three "special groups of the 
population". 
- 17 -
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With the exception of the special group provided 
for under item b), to which apparently they cannot 
be assimilated, in so far as their work does not in-
volve manipulation of equipment emitting ionizing 
radiation or containing radioactive substances, 
workers employed in the transport of radioactive 
substances must be classified in groups whose defini-
tion presupposes the existence throughout of the 
"control area". Consequently, the problem of the 
solution rests on the definition of such a zone within 
the scope of the basic standards. It is necessary, 
therefore, to discuss the existence or otherwise of 
the "controlled area " in the field of transport of 
radioactive substances. 
1-4. CONTROLLED AREA AND PROTECTED AREA 
Title I, section 2 of the basic standards defines 
as "controlled area1· a given location in the space where 
there exists a source of ionizing radiation and in which 
occupationally exposed persons may receive a radiation 
dose greater than 1.5 rems annually. 
Now referring to such definitions either for oc-
cupationally exposed persons or special groups a) and 
c) of the population, it is evident that the basic 
standards run into tautology. This is particularly 
evident in the case of the binomial controlled area-
occupationally exposed person, since it is impossible 
to establish a classification for occupationally exposed 
persons without previously defining what is meant by 
- 18 -
controlled area neither is it possible to speak of a 
controlled area without having defined what is meant 
by occupationally exposed person. 
In order to dispense with tautology, therefore, 
it is essential to make the two concepts independent, 
which can be achieved, for example, by substituting 
the expression person for the expression occupationally 
exposed person. This substitution can be applied al-
ready in this study and moreover, it will be convenient 
to so refer, both since it does not change the basic 
concepts and because, on the other hand, it is analo-
gous with what has been laid down by the concept of 
"protected area", which is defined as "any area 
surrounding a controlled area where there is a permanent 
risk of the maximum permissible dose for the whole 
population beeing exceeded", and is not in any way 
associated with the existence at the position of a 
particular class of person. 
1-5. CONTROLLED AREA AND PROTECTED AREA IN THE TRANS-
PORT OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS 
In order, therefore, to discuss a priori the scope 
of the basic standards in the field of transport of 
radioactive materials, a careful examination should 
be made, after accepting substitution of the expression 
"occupationally exposed person" by the term "person" 
- 19 -
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in the definition of "controlled area, the significance 
of this definition when referring to the transport 
operation. 
The Euratom definition of controlled area implies 
in fact the simultaneous verification of two circum-
stances, namely the presence at a given position in 
the space of a source of ionizing radiation and the 
possibility that "persons" may there take up a radiation 
dose greater jthan 1.5 rem annually. 
The first circumstance, that is to say that the 
controlled area is a given position in the space in 
which there is a source of ionizing radiation, is in-
dubitably verified. Indeed, particularly when dealing 
with a mobile area such as the platform of a road 
vehicle or railway truck, the hold of a ship or the 
baggage space of an aircraft, this is always a given 
location, instant by instant, in which there is a 
source of ionizing radiation represented by the package 
or packages containing radioactive substances. 
The second circumstance, that is to say in a 
certain position there exists the possibility that 
"persons" will receive a ra.diation dose greater than 
1.5 rem annually can also be verified, depending on 
the intensity of irradiation from the packages the 
aode (tine and distance) during which they remain 
in the vicinity of personnel. According to the IAEA 
recommendations^ ', the maximum permissible irradiation 
in a. single transport is for example 50 mR/h at 1 metre 
from the load. For this type of load, therefore, 30 
hours sojourn at 1 metre distance without screening 
is sufficient to receive a dose of 1.5 rem. 
It is therefore impossible, at any rate in principle, 
to exclude the fact tha,t, in the case of transport also, 
the presence of a controlled area as defined in the 
basic standard can be represented. There is, however, 
a problem of formulation which has to be discussed. 
It should in the first place be remembered that 
transport activity, from the technical standpoint, 
can be considered as compieted» once transfer of a 
merchandise has been ca.rried out from one given place 
to another. This means that each individual transport 
can be considered in itself, which means that every-
thing resulting from carrying out the transport, 
once this has been completed, has no reason for being 
considered further. It should therefore be possible 
to state that, assuming the existence of the controlled 
area for transport of radioactive materials, this may 
exist only during the period of time between loading, 
transport properly speaking and unloading at the con-
signee's premises, and that, once transport has been 
completed, the controlled area no longer exists. If 
indeed, the same carrier performs another transport, 
it will be necessary to consider a fresh controlled 
area which would be, in almost all cases, different 
- 21 -
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from the preceding. 
Consequently, considering this interpretation as 
valid, in practice there would rarely be a controlled 
area to be defined in the course of a single transport. 
The example considered above, of a transport with 50 
"transport index" (50 mR/h at 1 metre )-, carried out in 
an overall time of 30 hours, with the driver at a dis-
tance of 1 metre from the load and without screens, 
is in effect fairly rare. Experience indicates that, 
generally speaking, one of the assumed conditions at 
least is absent. However, in principle, it is possible 
that the presence of a controlled area can be specified 
even in a single transport. 
This interpretation of the existence of the con-
trolled area confined to the single transport can at 
the same time be associated with another which takes 
into account the transport activity as a whole, and 
not only during the single event. In this case it 
may be possible to consider as the controlled area, 
for example, the driver's cabin of a road vehicle used 
for the transport of radioactive materials, therefore 
frequently used for this purpose. In this case there 
is an analogy with what occurs, for example, in the 
surroundings of a machine generating radioactivity 
for which the controlled area, in addition to existing 
only when the machine is operating, may also differ in 
accordance with the type of usage of the machine or 
of the particular experiment being performed. If, 
for example, an X-ray diffra ctometer is involved, in 
accordance with the anticathode employed, there is an 
- 22 -
energy spectrum and exposure distribution differing 
from time to time. Similarly, in the case of a motor 
vehicle employed for the transport of radioactive 
materials, there would be a controlled area only 
during the period when radioactive material is being 
transported, and the area may differ each time. It is 
evident, however, that analogy only is involved, and 
not coincidence. Indeed, while the transport activity 
is completely terminated when it has been carried out 
and therefore it can be considered that the geometry 
of the controlled area changes totally from one transport 
to another, on the other hand in the case of a machine-
generated ra.diation, equipment generally remains the 
same, is installed in a fixed position and not variable 
in time, and consequently simply a variation or a.dap-
ta-tion is carried out in order to perform a different 
opera_tion. 
As a result of the greater difficulties, including 
legal, due to the acceptance of the second interpretation, 
it would appear more logical in principle to give more 
weight to the first interpretation and to conclude 
that, as regards transport, the controlled area may exist 
only during the single transport operation. There would, 
however, be a serious difficulty in both cases in res-
pect of the possibility that, leaving out the existence 
or otherwise of the controlled area, the persons employed 
in the transport receive greater doses than those per-
missible for the population as a whole or for specia.l 
- 23 -
groups, of the population, consequently requiring 
physical control or medical control. In practice, 
therefore, it may happen that a worker employed in 
the transport of radioactive materials will be affected 
by transports which, even if individually do not involve 
the presence of a controlled area , render necessary 
as a wholejfor that particular worker, a classifi-
cation as occupationally exposed person. 
In these considerations, therefore, it must be 
deduced that, from the essential standpoint, it is 
important to establish not so much whether, in the 
course of a transport, he is or is not in a controlled 
area, than rather to which group should the workers 
employed be allocated. From the moment when the 
groups involved are associated with the concept of 
controlled area in the basic standards, difficulties 
of application arise. 
A second consideration representing a further 
problem for the subject dealt with here, is that 
physical control of protection against radiation 
and medical control are connected with the definition 
of controlled area. Indeed, apart from the discussion 
on the presence of a controlled area for individual 
transports or any coincidence with the driver's 
cabin of a road vehicle, there still remains the fact 
that the controlled area is variable and this presents 
appreciable difficulty in demarking it or controlling 
access of persons. This variability, connected in 
- 24 -
addition with the possibility of workers employed 
on the transport alternating, involves the practica.l 
impossibility of the routine perforrafnce of such 
controls, excluding perhaps the ambient, provided 
for such area or for the persons affected by it. 
Again, therefore, the circumstance arises where 
the actual importance from the standpoint of the 
protection expert is not in ascertaining the presence 
or otherwise of a controlled area but rather in carry-
ing out control of the workers employed in the transport. 
From the analyses carried out, it is seen hov; the 
inherent problem in the controlled area extends to 
"protected area" , as defined in the basic standards 
and therefore inside a controlled area . 
It may on the other hand be observed that, by 
removing from the definition of the protected area 
(title I, section 2, basic standards) the words: 
"at the periphery of a controlled area " an area would 
be singled out in which there would exist a. hazard 
of receiving a. radiation dose greater than the 
maximum permissible for the population as a whole. 
A minor hazard area would thus be involved, perhaps 
associated with the controlled area only by the different 
dose level, equal to the lower limit established for 
the controlled area. A strict spatial connection 
would not be essential between the two. 
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In any case, it can be stated that the concept 
of "protected area" on the basis of the previous 
discussion and therefore strictly connected above 
all with the conception of "controlled area" does not 
appear to be important and significant in the field 
of transport of radioactive materials. 
At this point it would a_ppear essential, before 
drawing conclusions, to study the cla.ssification of 
workers and individual groups, in accordance with the 
content of the basic standards, applying this to the 
field of transport of radioactive materials. 
1-6. CLASSIFICATION, OF WORKERS AND THE GENERAL PUBLIC 
II: TUB FIELD OF TRANSPORT _ 
The previous section, following a critical analysis 
of applicability to the field of transport of controlled 
zone in accordance with the basic standards, led to 
the following conclusions: 
1) the definitions of "controlled area" and "occupation-
ally exposed persons" contain a manifest tautology 
which can be resolved only by separating the two con-
cepts and hence the two definitions; 
2) for transport, there can be at least two possible 
definitions of "controlled area», respectively considering 
a. single transport or portion of space which may represent 
a constant in the case of a number of transports (for 
example the driver's cabin); 
3) the presence or otherwise of controlled area in the 
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transport of radioactive materiale does not appear 
so important as regards the substance of radiation 
protection, which must directly affect the persons 
on the basis of the possibility of exceeding certain 
doses. 
Having adequately discussed in the preceding 
item 1-5 the problem connected with the presence or 
otherwise of controlled area in transport, we will 
now deal with the analysis of definitions regarding 
the classification of workers, either as reflected in 
the analysis carried out on the concept of controlled 
area or in order to establish the extent to which the 
basic standards may be valid for the purpose of ef-
fective radiation protection in transport. 
The basic standards, as previously stated, dis-
tinguish between! 
occupationally exposed persons, special groups 
of the general public and the population as a whole. 
Apart from group b) of the special groups of the general 
public, for the reasons already stated, we still have 
to consider,for persons directly affected by transport 
activity, groups a) and c) under title I of the basic 
standards already quoted, and occupationally exposed 
persons. 
All three categories, according to the basic 
standards, are connected with the definition of con-
trolled area. At the same time, despite the discussion 
under the preceding item, it would appear possible to 
apply these to persons affected by transport of radio-
active material without any modification. 
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If it is desired to take into account the first 
hypothesis concerning application of the definition of 
controlled area to transport, as discussed in the 
preceding section 1-5» it can be readily deduced that 
the definitions under items a) and c) of the special 
groups of the population and "occupationally exposed 
persons" do not involve any difficulty of interpretation 
where the controlled area can mean a geometric series 
variable in time and space. 
Also taking into account the second interpretation 
of controlled zone discussed in the preceding section 
1-5, now meaning by controlled area a geometry which, 
while being variable in space and time in respect to 
external points of reference, there is at the same 
time a constant point of reference for example in the 
motor vehicle, for which standards could be accepted 
"in toto". At the same time, in both cases there 
remains the difficulty of including situations where, 
while not appearing as controlled area , the workers, 
for example, by the fact of carrying out loading and 
unloading, may receive doses in excess of 1.5 rem 
annually. 
Considering that the same considerations "mutatis 
mutandis" may be encountered also for activities 
differing from transport, it appears important at 
this point to ask whether minor modifications should 
be introduced into the basic standards in order to 
render them applicable to the field of transport, 
when this does not appear at present sufficiently to 
affect other activities. In effect, developing this 
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aspect of analysis "a priori" of the basic standards, 
it does not seem possible to ignore the fact that 
these have been constructed primarily from infor-
mation emerging from the situation of nuclear plants 
which were the main cause of radiation hazard. 
This situation is nowadays historically past, in the 
sense that radiation hazard extends significantly to 
many other activities (radioisotopes, gamma rays and 
accelerators for diagnostic and therapeutic purposes, 
industrial and research gammagraphy, n-graphy, etc.) 
for which interdependence between the "controlled 
area" concept and groups of persons working within 
its ambit does not appear so close. 
By analogy with what has been stated regarding 
the definition of controlled area , which takes on a 
more general and effective significance when linked 
with the presence of occupationally exposed persons, 
it appears appropriate and more so when dealing 
directly with radiation protection of persons, that 
the definitions of the basic standards regarding 
persons should be connected in turn with the con-
trolled area concept. 
Precise proposals in this respect are dealt 
with and developed in section IV of this study. 
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1-7. CONTROLS BY NATIONAL AUTHORITIES 
Considering now the basic standards as affecting 
controls carried out by the national authorities, it 
is possible to set out synthetically the following 
facts, emerging from these standards ι 
1) transport activities, as listed in the scope of the 
standards (article 2) are subjected to controls (article 
18, section 2); 
2) these controls are listed in the working code and 
in advance authorization by reason of the gravity 
of the resulting hazard (article 3); 
3) in order to ensure protection of the populations, 
the national authority must adopt measures for protec­
tion, inspection and action in the case of incidents 
(article 17); 
k) in order to carry out physical and medical control 
supervision of workers and to promote measures for 
protection and action in all cases where this is 
necessary, the national authority sets up one or 
more inspection systems (article 18, section 2) and 
entrusts physical and medical control for protection 
respectively to qualified experts and authorised 
medical practitioners (articles 19 and 23). Prohibi­
tions are drawn up for the employment of workers, 
together with criteria of suitability and procedures 
for the revision of personnel health records (articles 
24, 25 and 26). 
Passing on to a more detailed study of these 
points, two different considerations arise, the first 
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for items l)and 2) above, referring to a general 
"hazard resulting from ionizing radiation" and the 
second for points 3) and k), which take account more 
directly of the controls to be established for the 
population and workers. 
As regards the first, it does not appear neces-
sary to place any emphasis on the particular field of 
transport of radioactive materials. It does, however, 
appear appropriate (item 3) to draw attention to 
measures for the health and protection of the general 
public, as specified in article 17» section 1 of the 
basic standards on the overall arrangements and 
controls for specified factors which can create an 
irradiation hazard to the general public. On the 
basis of article 17» section 2, these are operative 
in the "protected area" for the special group c) of 
the population and for the territory as a whole for 
the population as a whole. 
As discussed above, since the protected area 
is not very important for the field of transport, 
measures for protection, inspection and action 
lose substance, the more so since, if it is theoretically 
possible to carry out some of the operations described 
in section 3 of article 17» a), it does not seem 
either possible or important to carry out the assess-
ment as under b) in section 3 for each transport, 
assuming the first hypothesis regarding the controlled 
area. 
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This difficulty exists in practice also when con-
sidering the second hypothesis for "controlled area" 
for which, at a rate suitably assessed, the evaluations 
would be carried out. If indeed it is unthinkable that 
these can be carried out on the occasion of each trans-
port, as would be required taking into account the 
first hypothesis regarding controlled area , it is 
equally unthinkable that they could be carried out within 
a controlled area which, although referring to a given 
zone in the space, such as for example the platform of 
a transport vehicle, is by nature variable. 
Transports are so varied and unpredictable that 
not only under the conditions of any action and damage 
but even in the normal conditions, the only system 
reasonably complying with the problem of protective 
measures for the population is to abandon the controlled 
and protected area concepts and to rely, as previously 
stated, for affected workers, on accurate statistical 
analysis of transport frequency and the transport 
indices of the packages. It must be the responsibility 
of the competent authorities to select any items of 
high traffic intensity of the packages and,if necessary, 
to impose the necessary measures in order to safeguard 
the population as a whole and so that any single in-
dividuals do not at any time exceed the given maximum 
doses. 
For item 4, regarding workers, the criterion must 
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be finally dispensed with as set out in the first 
section of article 18 of the basic standards, by 
which heal ;h inspection for workers is tied to the 
controlled zone. It is necessary, on the other hand, 
to provide a correct classification of personnel 
affected by the field of transport as a function of 
dose hazards, where necessary accompanied by stati-
stical evaluations. In the case where the need 
arises either for physical or medical control, these 
must be carried out as set out in chapters I and II 
of title V of the Euratom directives, regarding the 
basic principles of health inspection of workers, 
articles 19 and 23. 
It emerges from these considerations that each 
member State which has placed transport activities 
lander &n advance authorisation and declaration system 
can, through the inspection systems thus brought into 
action, control a-posteriori by statistical analysis 
of the transport carried out by the carrier and with 
appropriate evaluations, if classification of the 
personnel involved is or is not correct and may require 
to be modified; it can also control the conduct of 
the qualified expert and authorised medical practitioner. 
This applies particularly to the qualified expert in so 
far as the development of transport activity could result 
in the established classification being amended from the 
standpoint of the protection expert for workers affected 
by the transport activity. 
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SECTION II 
ADOPTION OF THE BASIC STANDARDS BY THE COMMUNITY 
STATES AS REGARDS THE FIELD OF TRANSPORT 
PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS 
Prior to the issue of the basic standards, the 
national legislations were fairly complicated and 
diverse as regards radiation protection. 
The issue of the Euratom directives, 2 February 
1959» drawn up on the basis of article 30 of the 
Founding Treaty of the Commission of the European 
Community., represented an important act not only as 
regards content, being based on the already existing 
international recommendations (iCRP) but for the 
harmonization which their adoption has brought about 
in regard to the standards already existing or in 
course of preparation within the range of the six 
Community States. 
Such harmonization, consequent upon the statement 
that the basic standards stipulate adoption in the 
national legislations, had been brought about having 
in mind primarily the existence of various technical 
legislative measures available in the States. This 
fact has again brought about the necessity for con-
ferring upon the regulations of the individual countries 
an "individual" character, either where the general 
juridical disposition of the State requires it or for 
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the purpose of better adaptation of such concepts 
of the basic standards to the national situation in 
the sector. 
It should be observed that, with the exception 
of Italy, the legislations of the six States, on 
adopting the Euratom protection directives, have not 
taken into particular consideration transport activity 
as regards the detail of the protection standards, but 
have considered it in a global fashion, together with 
other activities. Each State, on the other hand, has 
separately a standard for the transport of dangerous 
materials which includes standards for radioactive 
materials. These standards, generally speaking, as 
will be specified more strictly in appendix b ) , do 
not contain particular and detailed conditions on the 
legislative level for radiation protection. Con-
sequently, it shall be understood how difficulties 
emerging from application of the basic standards for 
transport have been encountered in Italy before other 
Community States. Indeed, Italian legislation, not 
having considered transport activity on the adoption 
of the protection directives, has been confronted with 
the necessity of preparing an "ad hoc" standard for 
this field and therefore has had to study its applica-
bility to this field item by item. 
This section II will analyse adoption of the 
basic standards in the legislations of the member States 
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for those items which may, directly or indirectly, 
affect transport activity. After close study and 
on the basis of discussion in section I, the conclusion 
has been reached that these items can be synthesised 
into the following groups : 
a) declaration, authorisation and inspection; 
b) controlled area and protected area; 
c) classification of workers and special groups of the 
population. 
A part of this section is devoted to each of these 
groups of items. 
PART I 
ADOPTION OF THE CONCEPTS OF DECLARATION, AUTHORISATION 
AND INSPECTION 
II-I-l. INTRODUCTION 
It should be recalled that the field of application 
of the basic standards as defined in article 2 includes 
all possible uses of radiations for peaceful purposes, 
including transport; article 4, on the other hand, 
provides for the possible exemption from the condition 
of declaration and advance authorisation for carrying 
out such activities with a fairly limited hazard. It 
appears obvious,from the spirit of the text of the 
basic standards and from what has been written that 
such possibility is left to the choice and decision of 
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the member States, taking into account throughout the 
sanction criteria in the community text. It is, however, 
evident that they can also adopt more restricted standards 
and, according to article 5> even prohibitions. 
We will limit ourselves here to a study of the method 
of adoption of the system of declaration and advance 
authorisation in the various Community States as regards 
the field of transport of radioactive materials, with 
reference also to any subsequent restrictions or 
prohibitions. 
It was considered that interest could be attached 
to a study, where possible, of the system of "inspection" 
which is strictly connected obviously with the par-
ticular authorisations. 
II-I-2. ANALYSIS OF THE LEGISLATIONS OF THE MEMBER STATES 
II-I-2.1. Belgium 
The BELGIAN legislation, on adopting the Euratom 
directives, included within its general regulation 
a detailed system of advance authorisation for all 
activity containing a hazard of ionizing radiation, 
including transport, in application of the general 
principle already sanctioned by law regarding the 
health and safety of the general public ^ ' against 
the hazards of ionizing radiations. 
^ Royal decree 28 February, 1963, containing the 
general regulation for protection of the general public 
and workers against the hazards of ionizing radiation. 
^++'Statute of 29 March, 1958, relating to the protection 
of the general public against the hazards of ionizing 
radiation. 
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In view of article 5 of the basic standards, the 
prohibition faculty is exercised by the Belgian 
legislatures for the use of radioactive substances 
in the activity intended in this article, maintaining 
an exceptional condition which, however, does not 
affect the field of transport. 
As regards supervisory inspection, the Belgian 
law does not provide for the establishment of an 
"ad hoc" body for nuclear activities. Inspection is 
therefore entrusted to public administration services 
already existing^ based on the type of activity or 
installation. The standards relating to bodies 
charged with inspection functions, their powers and 
any penal actions are contained in the general 
regulation already recorded for the protection of 
the general public against radiation, particularly 
for application of the specific arrangement provided 
for by the decrees for enforcement of the law. Such 
inspection standards refer also to the transport of 
radioactive materials to which, as stated, the 
legislation for adoption of the basic standards apply 
without exception. 
II-I-2.2. France 
In FRANCE, the fundamental text relating to adoption 
of the basic standard can be identified in the decrees: 
11 December 1963, 20 June I966 and I5 March I967. 
Other legal arrangements, although important for the 
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general standards affecting radiation hazards, do not 
appear significant for the field of transport. 
Among the accomplishments relating to the system 
of declaration and authorisation there is a detailed 
standard for the use of substances and instruments 
having an ionizing radiation hazard and, within the 
scope of this standard , ' explicit reference is made 
to transport, for which however, the standard establishes 
regulations on the application level. Inspection and 
supervision controls are entrusted essentially to 
inspectors under the Ministry of Social Affairs, who 
are also responsible for control in the application of 
radiation protection laws to the field of transport of 
radioactive materials. 
II-I-2.3. Italy 
As regards ITALY ? the particular fact is recalled 
that the Italian law for adoption of the basic standards, 
i.e. DPR I85, 13 February 1964, does not rule the sector 
of transport of radioactive substances apart from a 
reservation contained in DPR, 30 December I965, No.1704 
as regards the technical-administrative authorisation 
standards (permanent and "ad hoc") on the transport of 
^ S e e decree No. 475, 3 May 1954 of the CIREA (inter-
ministerial Commission for Artificial Radioactive 
Elements) and the succeeding decree No.512, 11 May 1955 
and decree No.1197, 26 November 1956. 
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radioactive substances, which will be dealt with 
later. 
The text of 1965 quoted above contained the 
declaration and authorisation system for the transport 
of radioactive substances. Authorisations, general 
or particular, are granted by the Ministry of Industry, 
Commerce and Trade, in conjunction with the Ministry 
of Transport and Civil Aviation, if involving road or 
air transport, and the Ministry of Mercantile Marine 
if sea transport is involved. A simple system of 
advance declaration is available for each particular 
case (occasional transports below certain amount of 
radioactivity). 
The DPR No.I85, for the functions of supervision 
and control of an inspection nature as regards radia-
tion protection, introduces the new inspectors body 
of the National Committee for Nuclear Energy (CNEN) 
in conjunction with those already existing from other 
administrations involved. The inspectors have right 
of access wherever sources of radiation are stored 
or used in a quantity such as to present a hazard. 
The creation of the new authority constitutes a solu-
tion sui generis which has not been encountered in 
the corresponding legislations of other States. 
There is, however, a problem not yet resolved as 
regards the extent of the inspectors authority in the 
field of radioactive transports, while the competence 
of supervision in general in the CNEN has not been 
discussed in the sector affected. 
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II-I-2.4. Luxembourg 
Adoption of the basic standard by Luxembourg was 
accomplished substantially by a fundamental law (25 
March 1963) and with the regulation on protection 
against radiation (8 February 1967). This regulation, 
however, foresees the issue of subsequent standards 
of application which will include the procedures for 
transport authorisations. 
II-I-2.5. The Netherlands 
In the Netherlands the standard texts for adoption 
of the basic standards form the fundamental law of 21 
February 1963 and decree of 18 March 1963» which amend 
the public administration regulation provided by the law 
for the prevention of works accidents and for industrial 
health of 193^. Operation of the law of 21 February 1963 
was governed by the issue of certain execution and in-
tegration provisions of the arrangements concerned therein. 
Among the various decrees thus Issued, attention is drawn 
to the decree of 10 September 1969 relating to the trans-
port of fissile materials, minerals and radioactive sub-
stances >in which there are several standards dealing with 
the system of declaration and authorisation. 
In virtue of the power arising from the fundamental 
law quoted above, the Ministry for Social Affairs and 
Health is responsible for the supervision and control of 
activity involving radiation, in order to prevent damage 
to public health. Control is entrusted to various 
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specialist bodies which, under the coordination of this 
Ministry, function in relation to their own field of 
competence (environmental hygiene, industrial medicine, 
human sind veterinary medicine, etc.). Provision is not 
therefore made for setting up appropriate bodies,and 
supervision devolves on those already existing for con-
ventional activities. For transport, the existence of 
two bodies should be noted in particular, namely a body 
of controllers of dangerous substances, supervising 
transports within Dutch territory and a body of mercantile 
marine inspectors acting in conjunction with the former. 
These bodies, who come under the Ministry of Transport 
and Water, are responsible for carrying out, jointly 
where appropriate, the necessary controls over the trans-
port of dangerous substances. 
II-I-2.6. German Federal Republic 
It can be stated that in the German Federal Republic 
the fundamental standard text for adoption of the basic 
standards takes the form of the law of 23 December 1959» 
completed in the "First radiological protection regulation" 
of 24 June I960 and amended by the text of 15 October I965. 
This law subjects the various activities, including 
the transport of radioactive substances, to a system of 
authorisation (and in certain cases exemption) governed by 
the degree of confidence which the applicants offer, on the 
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personnel or technical level, as regards adequacy of 
apparatus, the submission of financial guarantee in the 
event of nuclear damage and the absence of consequences 
contrary to the public interest. With reference to 
article 5 of the basic standards, prohibitions are not 
introduced but the system of authorisation is extended 
also to levels below the thresholds of exemption stated 
in article 4 of the said standards. 
Regional (Lander) authorities are responsible for 
the inspection and supervision of nuclear activities, 
including transport, carried out on behalf of the 
Federal Authority (Bund). 
PART II 
ADOPTION OF THE "CONTROLLED AREA" AND "PROTECTED AREA" 
CONCEPTS 
II-II-l. INTRODUCTION 
The first part of this section dealt with the adoption 
of the basic standards in the separate national legislations 
of the Community States as regards systems of declaration, 
authorisation and inspection with reference to transport. 
The second part will consider the protected and con-
trolled area concepts as appearing in the legislations of 
the member States, particularly for the purposes of compari-
son and analysis in the light of their application to the 
transport field, bringing out the difficulties encountered 
in the practical application of these concepts. 
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H - H - 2 . CONTROL AND PROTECTED AREA IN THE LEGISLATION OF 
THE MEMBER STATES 
II-II-2.1. Belgium 
Article 1 of the decree quoted, 28 February 1963» 
regarding the general regulation for protection of the 
general public and workers against hazards from ionizing 
radiation,states that this applies also to the transport 
of radioactive materials. The definitions of controlled 
area and protected area reported there consequently apply 
also to transport. These arel 
controlled area ι location where there exists a source of 
ionizing radiation capable of supplying 
an individual dose in excess of 1.5 rem/ 
year; 
protected area t any location in the space at the periphery 
of a controlled area where there exists 
a permanent danger of the maximum per­
missible dose being exceeded for the 
population as a whole. Such a dose, as 
reported in another part of the decree, 
has been established at 5 rem per head 
accumulated during a period of 30 years. 
In evaluating this, account must be taken, 
for purposes of weighting, of the doses 
received by occupationally exposed persons 
and those habitually within the vicinity 
of the controlled area. 
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II-II-2.2. France 
The decree of 20 June 1966 relating to general principles 
of radiation protection states in article 2 that the provi-
sion contained in the decree applies to the transport of 
radioactive materials. Consequently, standards issued in 
application of this decree must be applicable to transport. 
In particular, in appendix 1 of the decree of 15 March 1967» 
containing the regulation for the protection of workers, 
there appears only the definition for controlled area t 
controlled area t location where access is regulated for 
reasons of protection against ionizing 
radiation« 
The decree, in chapter H , title II, specifies the 
technical characteristics governing this zone. No reference 
is made to protected area. 
II-II-2.3. Italy 
As regards Italy, the Presidential decree of 13 
February 1964, No. I85 does not directly embrace transport 
activities; at the same time, article 2 of the Presidential 
decree 30 December 1965, No. 1704, in amendment of article 5 
of the law 31 December 1962, No. i860, final clause, states 
that»pending the appropriate regulating standards, transport 
of radioactive materials must be carried out in accordance 
with the various special provisions (Ministerial circulars) 
apart from the health protection standards contained in the 
Presidential decree 13 February 1964, No. I85 which remain 
in force. 
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The definitions set out under article II, decree 
No. I85» quoted above, including controlled area and 
protected area, can, however, apply but with the limitation 
specified in the phrase, "which remain in force", also in 
the case of transport. Article 9 of the Presidential 
decree No. I85, in particular sets out definitions for 
controlled area and protected area as follows: 
controlled area ; a certain location where there exists a 
source of ionizing radiation and where 
occupationally exposed persons can receive 
a radiation dose in excess of 1,5 rem 
annually. In such a zone, physical 
supervision and medical supervision shall 
be carried out for radiation protection; 
protected area t any location at the periphery of a con-
trolled area where there exists a permanent 
danger of the maximum permissible dose 
being exceeded for the population as a 
whole and where physical supervision must 
be carried out against radiation protection. 
II-II-2.4. Luxembourg 
The Grand Duchy regulation 8 February 1967» in application 
of the law 25 March I963 regarding protection of the general 
public against the hazards of ionizing radiation, states in 
article 1.1, chapter I, scope, that this applies also to the 
transport of radioactive materials. 
Appendix I of the above regulation sets out definitions 
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for controlled area and protected area as follows: 
controlled area; given location in the space where there 
exists a source of ionizing radiation and 
where occupationally exposed persons may 
receive a radiation dose in excess of the 
maximum permissible dose for occasionally 
exposed persons. Physical control shall be 
carried out in such a zone for radiation 
protection together with medical controls; 
protected area t location in the space at the periphery of 
a controlled area where there exists a 
permanent risk of exceeding the maximum 
permissible dose for the population as a 
whole and where physical control must be 
carried out for radiation protection. 
II-II-2.5. Netherlands 
The decree on protection against ionizing radiation, 
18 March I963» amending and completing the public admini-
stration regulation provided in the law for the prevention 
of incidents and for industrial hygiene, 193^» states that 
the formulation of the protection standards is such as not 
to require a definition for controlled and protected area. 
II-II-2.6. German Federal Republic 
The health protection regulation against radiation 
hazards, 15 October 1965» states in part I, section 1, 
scope, that the regulation shall apply to the transport of 
radioactive materials. 
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Part III, section 22, defines controlled area and 
protected area as follows: 
controlled area : location where, by reason of the handling 
of radioactive substances, there exists the 
possibility for persons occupying that 
position for 48 hours per week of receiving 
a radiation dose exceeding 1.5 rem/year by 
external irradiation or inhalation, the 
latter being verified if the concentration 
of radioactive substances in the air exceeds 
one third of the value stated in appendix II 
(setting out the concentrations of radio-
active substances in water and in air). 
The same definition states also that such 
areas must be indicated by notices carrying 
the word "radioactive"; 
protected area t location directly adjacent to controlled 
areas where, by reason of the handling of 
radioactive substances, there exists the 
possibility for persons stationed there 
permanently receiving a dose exceeding 0.15/rem 
year. Such areas must be protected in the 
manner set out in section 35 of the decree 
(regarding measurement of dose intensity 
and determination of radioactive concentrations) 
Section 22 again states that access to controlled areas 
shall be permitted only to those persons who must enter them 
in order to carry out their work or whose position requires 
access to such areas . The competent authority may grant 
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access to other persons possessing an authorisation (on 
the basis of section III). The competent authority for 
issuing the authorisation or the control authority shall 
be responsible for establishing that certain areas must be 
classified as controlled or protected where this is necessary 
for the protection of individuals and the general public 
as a whole. The authorities quoted may, in particular cases, 
issue exemptions from the provisions laid down in the 
definition of controlled area on condition that these do 
not constitute a hazard for individuals or the population as 
a whole. 
II-II-3. COMPARISON WITH THE EURATOM DEFINITION 
A study of the definitions of controlled and protected 
area as laid down in the legislations of the six Community 
States has brought out the following facts. 
In the Netherlands, the radiation protection regulation 
does not include the concepts of controlled and protected 
zone. 
Italy and Luxembourg have adopted the definitions of 
controlled and protected area in their entirety from the 
basic standards, with the reservation, as regards Italy, 
of the possibility of their application to transport. 
The remaining Community States (Belgium, France and 
the German Federal Republic) deviate to different extents 
from the Euratom definition, also in accordance with the 
state of progress of their standardization. 
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More precisely, the definition adopted by Belgium 
for controlled area is substantially different from the 
Euratom definition, associating the controlled area con-
cept with the presence of occupationally exposed persons. 
The definition of protected area, however, is that of 
the basic standards. 
The solution adopted by France is different, in the 
regulation for the protection of workers, 15 March 1967· 
The definition of protected area disappears, while the 
definition of controlled area is associated not only with 
the presence of occupationally exposed persons but also with 
the possibility of exceeding a radiation dose. Without en-
tering into detailed discussion, it is seen that this defini-
tion has the advantage of ready adaptation to the various 
practical situations but,on the other hand, has the dis-
advantage of excessive arbitrariness in determination. 
For the German Federal Republic, the definition of 
controlled area differs from the Euratom definition in so 
far as it does not explicitly quote occupationally exposed 
persons and whether the maximum doses laid down apply to 
such persons. The definition of protected area, on the 
other hand, is taken almost entirely from the basic standards, 
with the difference that the maximum permissible dose level 
for the population as a whole, also taken as 5 rem in 30 
years, is distributed with suitable roundings in each year 
and is therefore fixed at 0.15 rem annually. 
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PART III 
ADOPTION OF THE CONCEPT OF CLASSIFICATION OF WORKERS AND 
GENERAL PUBLIC 
II-III.l. INTRODUCTION 
This third part of section II will study, in the same 
way as the controlled area and protected area concepts in 
the second part, adoption of classification of workers 
and general public from the basic standards in the standards 
of the six Community States, then analysing the relationships 
existing between those adopted and the basic standards. 
Before undertaking the analysis, it is recalled that 
the radiation protection standards apply to the field of 
transport in all the Community States with a restriction in 
the case of Italy as already discussed. 
II-III-l.l. Belgium 
As regards workers and the general public, in the 
decree of 28 February I963 regarding the general regulation 
for protection against ionizing radiation hazards, two classes 
of occupationally exposed persons are defined, apart from a 
special group of the population. 
The first category, indicated with the letter A, 
embraces workers who regularly carry out their work in a 
controlled area. Category Β, on the other hand, includes 
those workers, not included in class A, who may also be 
exposed to ionizing radiation by reason of their work. 
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As regards the definition of special group of the 
population, this means persons who are habitually in the 
vicinity of the controlled area and who, for this reason, 
may receive irradiation in excess of that laid down for 
the population as a whole. 
II-III-1.2. France 
As regards the workers and general public, appendix I, 
definitions of the decree of 15 March 1967 quoted previously 
sets out four categories into which the workers and general 
public can be classified. These are: persons directly em­
ployed on work involving radiation, defined as persons 
habitually working in the controlled area ; persons not 
directly employed on work involving radiation, defined as 
persons, occupationally exposed to radiation, but who do 
not work regularly in a controlled area; the general public, 
defined as individuals not forming part either of persons 
directly employed on work involving radiation nor persons 
not directly employed on work involving radiation; the 
population as a whole, comprising all the population, i.e. 
persons directly or indirectly on work involving radiation 
and the general public. 
ΓΕ-ΙΙΙ-Ι.3. Italy 
As regards Italy, with the reservations in the intro­
duction to this part and what was stated in section II-II.2.4, 
the following are considered, within the meaning of article 9 
of the DPR, 13 February 1964 No. I85: 
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Occupationally exposed persons: persons who habitually carry 
out work in a controlled area which exposes them to the ioni-
zing radiation hazard. 
Special groups of the population: 
Group 1) persons who by reason of their work are occasionally 
in a controlled area, but who are not considered as occupationally 
exposed persons; 
Group 2) persons who handle apparatus emitting ionizing 
radiation or containing radioactive substances in amounts 
such that the radiation emitted does not exceed the maximum 
permissible dose for this class of person; 
Group 3) persons who are habitually in the vicinity of the 
controlled area and who, for this reason, may receive 
irradiation in excess of that laid down for the population 
as a whole. 
II-III-1.4. Luxembourg 
In the Grand Duchy regulation 8 February I967» two 
classes of person are defined in appendix I as follows: 
Occupationally exposed persons: persons who habitually carry 
out work in a controlled area which exposes them to ionizing 
radiation hazards. 
Occasionally exposed persons: persons who, by reason of their 
work, are occasionally in the controlled area but who are not 
considered as occupationally exposed persons, or persons who 
handle sources such that the radiation emitted cannot exceed 
the maximum permissible dose for this class of person. 
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II-III-1.5. The Netherlands 
The decree on radiation protection, 18 March 1963» 
in article 2 defines radiological work, not including 
transport operations. Article 4, however, establishes 
groups of workers who, in accordance with the various 
definitions of the statute, are classified as follows: 
workers carrying out radiological work; workers not carry-
ing; out radiological work but who regularly occupy locations 
where radiological work is being carried out; workers outside 
the above two categories for whom it is difficult, by reason 
of their activity, to lay down a maximum dose of 0.5 rem 
annually for the hematopoietic organs, the gonads and 
crystalline organs for which a dose of 1.5 rem annually has 
been established (subject to the approval of the departmental 
head); and finally workers not included in the above categories 
for whom the maximum dose is 0.5 rem/year for the hematopoietic 
organs, gonads and crystalline organs. 
Since, however, workers employed on transport must be 
included in one of the categories classified above, these 
are allocated to the two latter categories. Consequently, 
the possibility is excluded of classifying workers employed 
on transport as occupationally exposed. 
II-III-1.6. German Federal Republic 
Section 24 of the regulation on protection against 
radiation hazards defines as occupationally exposed persons 
persons who : 
l) in the handling of radioactive substances may be exposed 
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/ 
to radiation emitted by the substances; or 
2) habitually remain in controlled areas for reasons of 
work. 
Occasionally exposed persons, however, are not explicitly 
defined but a maximum permissible dose of I.5 rem annually is 
laid down for persons who, being in the controlled area, do 
not handle radioactive substances. This dose must not be 
exceeded by those persons who are occasionally in the controlled 
area for training; if they are below 18 years of age, the 
maximum permissible dose is laid down as O.5 rem annually. 
Persons permanently in the protected zone must not take up 
a dose exceeding O.5 rem annually. 
II-III-2. COMPARISON WITH THE EURATOM DEFINITIONS 
From the above it emerges that the basic standards are 
scrupulously observed, as regards classification of workers 
and special groups of the population, by Italy. Luxembourg 
has made substantial changes in the classification of per-
sonnel. The Grand Duchy decree quoted above actually omits 
definition of the special group c) in the basic standards, 
while definition of the special group b) refers to "persons 
handling sources such that ...." also as in the basic standards, 
as "persons handling apparatus emitting ionizing radiation or 
containing radioactive substances in amounts such that ....". 
Incidentally, it may be observed that this difference could 
perhaps offer readier application of this group to transport 
workers. 
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Belgium defines two categories of person, placing in 
category A workers habitually carrying out their work in a 
controlled area, including however in this definition, as 
indicated by Euratom and in category B, all those workers 
not included in A, who, for reasons of work, may be exposed 
to ionizing radiation. With this latter definition of 
workers, the Belgian standard definitely escapes from the 
strict classification of special groups of the population 
set out in the basic standards, thus providing a possibility 
of application to transport. The Euratom definition c) 
relating to the special group of the population habitually 
in the vicinity of the controlled area is, however, retained. 
As regards France, the difference consists in a dif-
ferent structure, on which classification in accordance with 
the basic standards can only be partially superimposed. In 
particular, persons not directly employed in work involving 
radiation differ from the special group a) of the basic stan-
dards as regards definition as exposed to occupationally ex-
posed persons; the concept of general public in particular is 
completely new, meaning individuals xvho are neither directly 
nor indirectly employed on work involving radiation. 
It should be emphasised that persons not directly employed 
on work involving radiation, according to the French definition, 
include all those who, on account of their occupation, may take 
up an ionizing radiation dose even if not working habitually 
in a controlled area. The special group a) of the population 
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according to the Euratom definition, comprises only those 
persons who, for reasons of work, are occasionally in the 
controlled area but who are not considered as occupationally 
exposed persons. In other words, the Euratom definition is 
much more restrictive just because its strict statement in-
cludes in that group only persons who are occasionally in 
the controlled area and not those who, while not in the con-
trolled area , may take up an ionizing radiation dose. The 
difficulty again arises of strictly relating exposed persons 
and controlled area. 
As regards the Netherlands, it has been seen already that 
the definitions of the decree of 18 March I963 differ markedly 
from the basic standards in so far as the comparison is rather 
complicated. 
It can, however, be stated that workers carrying out 
radiological work are largely those classified as occupation-
ally exposed in the basic standards. It is interesting to 
observe, however, that as regards workers employed on trans-
port operations, these must be classified as workers defined 
under item c) or d ) , clause 2, article 4 of the decree quoted 
above, while these workers, distinct from those carrying out 
radiological work, are subjected to a restriction of the dose, 
which must be less than 1.5 rem annually. 
A s regards the German Federal Republic, occupationally 
exposed persons are not only those who habitually carry out 
their work in a controlled area, still for the purpose of 
their work, but also all those who, when dealing with radio-
active substances, may be exposed to radiation emitted by 
such substances. This category therefore may comprise all 
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persons who are involved in activities with a radiation 
hazard, while the category of occasionally exposed persons 
for which, however, no explicit definition is given, may be 
classified among those for whom the maximum permissible dose 
is laid down as 1.5 rem annually or 0.5 annually, where the 
age is below 18 years. It should be noted finally that the 
definition of the special group c) of the population is 
retained, as set out in the basic standards. 
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SECTION III 
COMPARISON BETWEEN THE BASIC EURATOM STANDARDS AND THE 
INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS 
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SECTION III 
COMPARISON BETWEEN THE BASIC EURATOM STANDARDS AND THE 
INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS 
III-l. INTRODUCTION 
The study of the basic standards, with particular reference 
to transport of radioactive materials has so far dealt with 
the range of their significance "a priori" apart from their 
adoption in the laws and regulations of the Community States. 
The information drawn from this study has brought out 
many difficulties, even important ones, regarding the pos-
sibility of application of the basic standards to transport. 
At the same time, information has not emerged with sufficient 
clarity regarding how any amendments should be developed. 
It seems appropriate therefore to carry out a study of the 
extent to which other international bodies have developed 
the subject in order to obtain a better understanding of the 
proposed formulation in section IV of this work. 
This section will compare the basic standards with the 
recommendations issued by the ICRP, the IAEA and the OCDE-
ENEA for the purpose of bringing out international trends in 
the field of radiation protection as regards those factors 
which mainly affect the field of transport of radioactive 
materials and similarly to the previous sections, for control, 
including the systems of declaration and authorisation, on 
the part of the national authorities, for the controlled 
and protected area concepts and classification of personnel. 
The choice of recommendations compared, indicated below 
systematically by the initials ICRp'1', IAEA' 2' and 
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OECD-ENEA' 3' is strictly justified. 
In the first place, the work carried out by the 
International Commission for Radiological Protection 
(ICRP) is well-known as regards radiation protection 
standards and more generally health guides, their publications 
having been an authoritative guide for more than 30 years in 
the field of protection against ionizing radiations. Con-
sequently, in developing a comparative study of the basic 
standards with recommendations issued by other international 
bodies, it was natural to carry out an initial comparison 
with the ICRP which, among other things, has the reputation 
of forming the vanguard in this sector. 
It was also considered useful to carry out a comparison 
with the recommendations issued by the International Atomic Enerj 
Agency (IAEA) which, although also inspired by the ICRP, has 
issued recommendations in the field of transport of radio-
(4) active materials ' which have significantly inspired the 
drafting of regulations both international and national. 
It was also considered appropriate to carry out a 
similar comparison with the recommendations issued by the 
Organisation for Economic Development and Cooperation, of 
which the European Atomic Energy Agency forms part (OECD-
ENEA) as regards protection against ionizing radiation, in 
view of the fact that the six Community States form part of it. 
For each of the three subjects for which the comparison 
is carried out (control on the part of the national authorit-
ies, controlled and protected area, classification of personnel) 
a table has been prepared setting out in synthetic form the 
definitions adopted by the publications of the bodies quoted. 
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III-2. CONTROLS ON THE PART OF THE NATIONAL AUTHORITIES 
Table I sets out the information given in the basic 
standards, the ICRP, IAEA and OECD-ENEA recommendations 
regarding controls on the part of national authorities, 
with the intention of including the systems of declaration 
and authorisation. 
A critical comparison as regards this specific subject 
does not appear very important simply because, while the 
basic standards constitute directives which the member States 
must adopt, the ICRP, IAEA and OECD-ENEA recommendations are 
not of an obligatory nature on account of the institutional 
scopes of these bodies. 
In addition, the ICRP states that the attitude adopted 
by the Commission in preparing their own recommendations 
was to consider the basic principles on which appropriate 
radiation protection provisions could be founded, leaving the 
various national bodies the responsibility of formulating 
legislative arrangements and regulations best adapted to the 
needs of the individual countries. On the subject of controls 
by the national authorities, however, the ICRP does not formu-
late specific recommendations for the national bodies nor sug-
gest what action they should undertake. 
The OECD-ENEA also invites the member States only to 
adopt the necessary measures for ensuring that adequate 
protection against ionizing radiation is adopted and main-
tained as regards both workers and general public in relation 
to activities for which irradiation hazards may occur, in-
cluding the transport of radioactive materials. 
H 
S 
8Ü 
o 
TABLE I 
CONTROLS ON THE PART OF THE NATIONAL AUTHORITIES 
Each member State shall subject operation of the activities indicated in article 2 to 
declaration and, in cases determined by the member State, by reason of the gravity of 
the risk resulting from such activities, through a system of advance authorisation .... 
Each member State shall set up one or more systems of inspection for the purpose of 
exercising supervisory controls and to promote measures for the supervision and action in 
all cases where these are rendered necessary. 
The basic attitude adopted by the Commission in preparing its own recommendations is 
that of taking into account the basic principles on which these can be based and approp­
Pi riate provisions for radiation protection, leaving to the various national protection 
H bodies responsibility for formulating particular suggestions, technical standards, legis­
lative arrangements and regulations best adapted to the needs of the individual countries. 
these operations must be notified or registered as required by the competent 
authorities and if necessary subjected to a system of authorisation by the authorities 
in accordance with the gravity of the resulting danger ......... 
W An appropriate system of inspection must be established by the competent authorities for 
controlling the safety specifications both within and without the establishments in which 
the radioactive sources are present and in order to apply the suitable standards. 
en 
CO 
The ENEA member States must undertake the necessary measures for ensuring that adequate 
ι w protective measures are adopted and maintained against ionizing radiation hazards to oc­
cupationally exposed persons and to the general public in all cases where radioactive 
materials are produced, transported, 
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Only the IAEA, by reason of its more precise functions 
in this matter, gives some indications to the national 
authorities in the field of controls for operations and 
activities involving radioactive materials, including 
transport; in particular, it advises the activities be 
notified or registered, but only in the manner which the 
competent national authority considers more suitable, also 
providing any systems of authorisation for certain activities 
in accordance with the gravity of the resulting hazard. It 
also recommends appropriate systems of inspection by the com-
petent national authorities for the control and application 
of protection and safety standards. 
The basic standards, on the other hand, consistent with 
the competence ensuing from the institutional suggestions, 
specify the declaration for the exercise of activities 
involving the risk of exposure for workers and the general 
public to ionizing radiation, including transport and, in 
cases determined by the member State according to the gravity 
of the risk resulting from such activities, a system of 
advance authorisation. They also require that each 
member State sets up one or more systems of inspection in 
order to exercise control supervision and to promote 
measures of supervision and action in all cases where this 
is rendered necessary. 
As regards controls by the national authorities, a 
closer comparison between the Euratom directives and the 
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ICRP, IAEA and OECD-ENEA recommendations does not appear 
useful by reason of the different institutional functions. 
Considering more particularly the field of transport, 
but also in general all activity involving radiation hazards, 
it should be noted that there is an analogy between the IAEA 
and Euratom positions as regards the merit of controls. 
There follows from this a well-founded requirement for a 
control exercised by the competent authority, which is daily 
found to be increasingly necessary. 
III-3. CONTROLLED AM) PROTECTED AREA 
Table II, in a similar way to the preceding section, 
sets out the definitions in Italian of the Euratom, ICRP, 
IAEA and OCDE-ENEA controlled and protected areas, 
A prime consideration is that the definition of 
protected area appears only in the basic standards. This 
fact is brought out from a study of the definitions of 
controlled which, in the form adopted by the ICRP, 
by the IAEA and by the OCDE-ENEA render superfluous the 
definition of protected area. 
Before discussing this point, however, it is 
appropriate to compare the definitions of controlled area. 
It can be directly seen that the ICRP, IAEA and OCDE-
ENEA definitions start by stating that the controlled area 
is a location to which access is controlled for the purpose 
of protecting persons against exposure to radiation. Fol-
lowing this statement of a general nature, only the IAEA 
adds that the controlled area .mist be placed under the 
supervision of a person with competence and responsibility 
TABLE II 
CONTROLLED AND PROTECTED AREA 
Controlled area a given location in the space where there exists a source of ionizing 
radiation and where occupationally exposed persons may take up a radiation dose in excess 
of 1.5 rem annually; in such a zone physical control shall be exercised for radiation 
o protection, together with a medical control. 
<j Protected area any location in the space at the periphery of a controlled area where there 
W exists a permanent risk of exceeding the maximum permissible dose for the population as a 
whole and where physical control for radiation protection must be carried out. 
Controlled area ; zone to which access is controlled for the purpose of protecting persons 
against exposure from external radiation or radioactive materials. Access can be controlled 
by a wide variety of methods, the most simple being the use of warning signals. The extent 
of a controlled area i s a subject of professional judgement but in each case the extent must 
ü be such that it is extremely improbable that workers outside the controlled area will receive H a dose exceeding 3/lOths of the appropriate maximum permissible doses. Considerations of 
another type may on the other hand require an extension of the controlled area. 
Protected area · no definition 
Controlled area, ; zone classified in such a way for the purposes of controlling individual 
exposvure of persons under the supervision of a person possessing the competence and res-
ponsibility of applying appropriate health and safety regulations controlled areas 
must be established where separate individuals may receive doses exceeding 3/lOths of the 
<; 
^ maximum permissible doses annually. Such areas must be marked and the warning signals must 
H be properly situated at the entry and within the zone 
Protected area : no definition. 
Controlled area; zone to which access is controlled for the purposes of radiation protection. 
This must be established where workers may take up doses exceeding 3/lOths of the maximum 
permissible doses annually. Considerations of another type may require an extension of the 
controlled area . Access to such a zone may be controlled by a wide cariety of means, the 
(xi simplest being the use of appropriate warning signals. 
en 
O Protected area : no definition. 
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for applying the appropriate health and safety regulations. 
At the same time, the ICRP, OECD-ENEA and the basic standards 
contain the supervision concept as expressed in another part of 
the context. 
Regarding the basic standards, which define the con-
trolled area as a given location in the space where a 
source of ionizing radiation exists, there is a marked 
difference in the ICRP, IAEA and OECD-ENEA. The Euratom 
definition indeed, is the only one which does not emphasise 
the fact that the controlled area is a location to which 
access is controlled for the purpose of protecting persons 
against exposure to radiation, but rather the fact that there 
is a source of radiation at a certain location. Evidently, 
confining comparison to these initial statements, the 
Euratom definition is more precise and less general but 
because of this, more restrictive. In addition, what 
appears to be really important is not so much the presence 
of a radioactive source but, as frequently stated, the fact 
that persons may receive radiation doses and that it there-
fore appears necessary to make reference to such doses. 
In the light of these circumstances, however, the 
definitions of the remaining bodies would appear to be 
better orientated and more adequate in accordance with 
section I, for applicability of the controlled area con-
cept to transport. 
Continuing to read the definition of controlled area 
given by the ICRP and, although with a postponement of 
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Finally, the ICRP, IAEA and OECD-ENEA statements, 
in respect of the Euratom statement, are completely dis-
sociated from the concept of occupationally exposed persons 
while reference is made more generally to persons or 
workers« occupationally exposed or otherwise. In ad-
dition, the definitions of the three international bodies 
quoted above emphasise the face that the controlled area 
is a location subject to control for the purposes of 
protecting individuals of the general public against 
radiation; protection of the person is thus brought out 
while Euratom specifies, whether for the same purpose, 
first the spatial fact and then reference to the dose. 
In the case of all four international bodies, on the other 
hand, the value of the maximum dose for which the establish-
ment of a controlled area is considered necessary is prac-
tically the same, being I.5 rem for Euratom and 3/lOths 
of the maximum permissible doses for the remaining bodies. 
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Statements, by IAEA and OECD-ENEA., it is seen that access 
can be controlled by a variety of means, the simplest of 
which is the use of warning signals. The IAEA also in-
dicates the positions of the signals. 
The most obvious difference between the Euratom 
definitions and the ICRP, IAEA and OECD-ENEA is in the 
relationship between controlled area and occupationally 
exposed persons, which is specifically indicated in the 
basic standards, as already exhaustively discussed in 
section I of this work, while it is not considered in the 
definitions of the remaining organisations. With the ex-
ception of this, the definitions given by the four bodies 
do not display substantial differences. Only the ICRP, 
for example, states that the extent of a controlled area 
is a matter of professional judgement but adds that in each 
case the extent must be such that it is extremely improbable 
that workers outside the controlled zone will talee in a 
dose exceeding 3/lOths of the appropriate permissible 
maximum doses, actually corresponding to 1.5 rem annually. 
The ICRP finally states that considerations of another 
type may, however, require an extension of the controlled 
area, equivalent to stating that the criterion of proba-
bility of exceeding the dose must not be the sole and ex-
clusive one in determining the extent of the zone. There 
is a similar statement in the OECD-ENEA definition of con-
trolled area but it is absent in the IAEA definition. 
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III-4. CLASSIFICATION OF PERSONNEL AND THE GENERAL PUBLIC 
Table I H , as previously, synthesises the definitions 
regarding classification of personnel as set out in the 
basic standards and in the ICRP, IAEA and OECD-ENEA recom-
mendations. On this subject again, there are marked simi-
larities between the definitions of the three international 
bodies, while certain differences are observed between these 
and those of the basic standards. 
The ICRP, IAEA and OECD-ENEA definitions indeed, con-
sider two different situations in which persons may find 
themselves in respect of ionizing radiation, that is to 
say, exposure to radiation by reason of the occupation of 
the persons and exposure to radiation of separate indivi-
duals of the population or of the population as a whole, 
apart from the work carried out. The basic standards, on 
the other hand, define occupationally exposed workers, 
special groups of the population and the population as a 
whole; the special groups of the population, however, com-
bine persons exposed by reason of the work (groups a) and b)) 
and separate individuals of the population (group c)) who 
are in a particular situation, not working, in respect of 
ionizing radiation. It is appropriate therefore, when carry-
ing out a comparative study, to consider for the moment not 
the special group c) of the population (the only group 
which considers persons exposed other than for purposes of 
work) as defined by Euratom, considering this, on the other 
hand whenever restrictions of doses for separate individ-
uals of the population are being spoken of. The case of 
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the population as a whole will not be discussed, since 
this factor takes in all human activities with radiation 
and can certainly not be limited to the restrictive field 
of transport. 
Table III shows that there are two situations for 
the ICRP, the IAEA and OECD-ENEA for which workers may be 
exposed to radiation, according to which the respective 
probabilities of doses will or will not exceed 3/lOths 
of the maximum permissible doses. 
The Euratom classification, on the other hand, apart 
from the reasons quoted above under case c) of special 
groups of the population, considers two categories, 
namely occupationally exposed persons and the special 
groups a) and b) of the population. 
Occupationally exposed persons are those who, in a 
controlled area, habitually carry out work which exposes 
them to the danger of ionizing radiation. The definition, 
several times falling into underlined tautology, refers 
explicitly to the controlled area, differing from what is 
found in the ICRP, IAEA and OECD-ENEA definitions, where 
emphasis is placed on the doses. The difference between 
the definitions is of basic importance as regards applicabi-
lity of the basic standards to transport. Indeed, the in-
teresting point is that the individual worker may take up 
a dose exceeding 3/lOths of the maximum permissible doses 
annually. It is not important, however, whether the dose 
was taken up by an habitual worker in the controlled zone 
or under several different situations, each of which may 
not involve the existence of a controlled zone as defined 
by Euratom. 
TABLE III 
CLASSIFICATION OF PERSONNEL 
Occupationally exposed persons: persons who, in a controlled area, habitually carry out work 
which exposes them to the danger of ionizing radiation. 
Special groups of the population: the following form part of these groups: 
a) persons who, for reasons of work, are occasionally in the controlled area but who are not 
g considered "occupationally exposed persons"; 
< b) persons who handle apparatus emitting ionizing radiation or containing radioactive sub­
Q stances in amounts such that the radiation emitted does not exceed the maximum permissible 
dose for this class of person; 
c) persons who are habitually in the vicinity of the controlled area and who, for this reason, 
may be exposed to irradiation exceeding that fixed for the population as a whole. 
For purposes of the organisation and management of protection, two different situations should 
be considered where the workers are exposed to radiation: ­J 
_ ^ 
o i) situations where the doses may exceed 3/lOths of the maximum permissible doses annually; ι 
Η " 
ii) situations where it is extremely improbable that the doses exceed 3/10ths of the maxi­
mum permissible doses annually. 
For administrative purposes, two situations should be considered where the workers may be ex­
posed to radiation during the course of their work the two situations are: 
< i) situations where the doses may exceed 3/lOths of the maximum permissible doses annually .... 
¡_j ii) situations where it is extremely improbable that the dose can exceed 3/lOths of the raaxi­
mum permissible doses annually 
For the purposes of radiation protection and health policy, distinction should be made between: 
<j i) persons employed in situations such that the dose may exceed 3/lOths of the maximum per­
^ missible doses annually; 
Q ii) persons employed in situations such that it is extremely improbable that the dose can ex­
o ceed 3/lOths of the maximum permissible doses annually. 
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It therefore appears reasonable to state that 
occupationally exposed persons are those for whom, in-
dependently of the fact that they carry out their activity 
in a controlled area, there exists a probability by reason 
of their work activity of taking up doses exceeding 3/lOths 
of the maximum permissible doses annually. 
The difficulty is in the estimation "a priori" of 
situations where workers may take up doses exceeding 3/lOths 
of the permissible maximum doses annually. This is parti-
cularly important in the case of transport. An evaluation of 
such situations may however be carried out a posteriori, 
either by individual measurement of the dose taken up or 
a statistical enquiry into transports carried out and into 
the methods by which they were performed. j n addition 
a reasonable forecast can be obtained from this as to the 
trend in future years, allowing the initial estimate to be 
amended where necessary. 
As regards workers classified according to Euratom in 
special groups of the population, it is recalled that there 
are two special groups of the population, namely group a) 
comprising "persons occasionally in the controlled area 
for reasons of work but not considered as occupationally 
exposed" and group b) comprising "persons handling 
apparatus emitting ionizing radiation or containing radio-
active substances to amounts such that the radiation 
emitted does not exceed the maximum permissible dose for 
this class of person". 
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With the exception of group b), comprising a specific 
class of person, all others receiving a radiation dose 
less than 1.5 rem annually by'reason of their work must 
be classified in group a). This latter group, however, 
similar to occupationally exposed workers, contains ex-
plicit reference to the controlled area , leading to the 
anomalies already discussed on several occasions in this 
work. This category therefore cannot include those per-
sons who, while not entering the controlled area and not 
handling apparatus emitting ionizing radiation or con-
taining radioactive substances, may take up, by reason of 
their work, doses less than 1.5 rem and greater than 0.5 rem 
annually, a fact which can be encountered fairly frequently 
in transport. 
Exclusive reference to doses in the ICRP, IAEA and 
OCDE-ENEA definitions, on the other hand, permits all 
possible cases of various work activities to be included 
and hence transport also, when workers, whether in the 
controlled area or otherwise, may take up doses less than 
1.5 rem annually. 
It is important also to note that both in the ICRP, 
IAEA and OECD-ENEA recommendations and the basic standards, 
reference to the dose relates to the possibility of ex-
ceeding certain levels rather than the levels actually 
encountered, with the important practical consequences 
necessarily implying the problem of professional judgement. 
Another interesting observation emerges from the com-
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parative analysis of the definitions supplied by the 
four international bodies being considered, referring 
to individuals of the general public for whom the 
maximum dose is fixed at O.5 rem annually. While no 
reference is made by the ICRP, the IAEA and the OECD-
ENEA to their location, in the case of Euratom, they are 
restricted to those (case c) of the special groups) who 
are habitually in the vicinity of the controlled area 
and who, for this reason, may be exposed to irradiation 
exceeding that fixed for the population as a whole. 
This consideration particularly affects transport 
which, by its nature, is such that single individuals 
may take up doses exceeding those fixed for the population 
as a whole while there is the problem already discussed 
as regards the existence or otherwise of a controlled 
area as defined in the basic standards. 
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SECTION IV 
CONCLUSIONS AND PROPOSALS 
IV-1. INTRODUCTION 
The first section of this study discussed the 
problem of applicability a priori of the basic standards, 
on the basis of general theoretical considerations, jus-
tifying rejection of actual application of the standards 
in the Community States. 
The second section discussed adoption of the stan-
dards by the six States with particular regard to con-
cepts of major interest as regards transport, that is to 
say declaration, authorisation and inspection (part I), 
controlled and protected area (part II) and classification 
of workers and general public (part III). 
The third section compared the same concepts as laid 
down in the basic standards with the analogous definitions 
issued by the international bodies affected by this sector 
(ICRP, IAEA and OECD-ENEA). 
This section, after briefly recapitulating the con-
clusions arrived at in the preceding sections, formulated 
a number of proposals for improving the applicability of 
the basic standards to the field of transport of radio-
active materials. 
IV-2. CONTROLS ON THE PART OF THE NATIONAL AUTHORITIES 
As regards controls on the part of the national 
authorities, the only observations regarding the basic 
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Standards are those of section I of this work. As 
already recorded, uniformity within the Community States 
as regards such controls does not appear to be a reasonable 
proposal on account primarily of the diversity of the 
standards in force in the various countries where strict 
autonomy prevails in this field. 
Again, a comparison with analogous recommendations 
issued by the ICRP, IAEA and OECD-ENEA has not brought 
out any useful indication by reason of the institutional 
scopes of the international organisations. 
IV-3. CONTROLLED AND PROTECTED AREA 
Following on a critical analysis of the controlled 
area concept as defined in the basic standards within the 
scope of applicability to the field of transport, the 
following conclusions were reached in section I: 
1) the definitions of "controlled area " and "occupationally 
exposed persons" contain a manifest tautology which can 
be resolved only by separating the two concepts and 
therefore the two definitions; 
2) by rendering the definitions independent, two possible 
hypotheses may be obtained for transport regarding the 
configurations of the controlled zone, on the one hand 
the environment connected to each individual transport 
considered as an activity starting and finishing with 
that transport; on the other hand the portion of the 
space (for example, the interior of a motor vehicle) 
considered as a continuing activity in the case of 
several transports; 
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3) neither of the two configurations appears to represent 
an important fact as regards the substance of radiation 
protection which, particularly as regards transport, 
should be related to the dose for the person rather 
than to a criterion of location in space. 
Of these observations, the latter is fundamental, 
whichpin substance, renders less significant the dis-
cussion regarding the protected and controlled zone concepts. 
However, if it is decided to accept the existence of 
a controlled area during the course of transport for one 
or other hypothesis, the definition stated in the basic 
standards, as quoted under item 1 above, is inapplicable, 
not only in the field of transport but also in other 
sectors of radiation protection. 
Confirmation arises not only from the theoretical 
discussion but also on the practical level, from the manner 
in which this concept has been received by a number of 
Community States. Some countries, indeed, have adopted 
the Euratom definitions as a whole, probably considering 
that they cannot be amended partially and, as in the case 
of Italy, after having adopted them, have sought to amend 
them directly within Euratom. Other countries, on the 
other hand, have not adopted them in their entirety in 
the respective nationa.1 legislations, probably because of 
the difficulties which could arise. These have introduced 
a number of amendments which, as discussed in section H , 
are nearly always substantial. 
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The case of France is particularly interesting from 
this standpoint, where the regulation for radiation 
protection modifies a number of definitions, including 
the definition of controlled area , completely rejecting 
the definition of protected area . The amended definition 
of controlled area includes elimination of the tautology 
of the Euratom definition. 
In Belgium and the German Federal Republic, on 
adopting the concept of controlled area , the definition 
has been transformed by substantial modifications, 
probably in an attempt to free the controlled area from 
the existence of occupationally exposed persons there. 
These amendments, however, are quite in harmony 
with the definitions of controlled area set out in the 
recommendations issued by the international bodies con-
sidered in section III. 
The protected area concept, which has not been 
adopted in the French standard, does not exist in the 
ICRP, IAEA and OCDE-ENEA recommendations. As was studied 
in section III, the absence of definitions of protected 
area is a consequence of the definition of the controlled 
area established in the recommendations of the three 
international bodies quoted, for which emphasis is 
placed primarily on the risk of exceeding or otherwise 
3/lOths of the maximum permissible dose. As already 
discussed, freeing the protected area concept from the 
controlled area concept, some use could also be derived 
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from retaining the concept in order to characterize the 
area where persons located there could take up a radiation 
dose greater than that laid down for separate individuals 
of the population or for the population as a whole, but 
less than 3/lOths of the maximum permissible doses. 
The controlled area, according to the definitions 
la d down by the international bodies quoted, is, as 
distinct from Euratom, a place to which access is controlled 
for the purpose of protecting persons against exposure to 
radiation and where persons or workers may take up a dose 
exceeding 3/lOths of the maximum permissible doses. 
It should be observed that this definition is quite 
different from the French, where no reference is made to 
control of access to the controlled area , although this 
area is defined as a regulated location for the purposes 
of radiation protection, that is to say, a location where 
certain arrangements are in force for radiological protec-
tion without any reference to the doses which persons may 
talee up there. The Euratom definition, on the other hand, 
emphasises the existence of a source of radiation at a 
certain location, being consequently much more restrictive. 
In conclusion, in the light of the considerations 
set out so far, it may be stated that: 
l) the controlled area concept, as defined by the basic 
standards, does not appear useful as regards transport 
of radioactive materials. Hence, it can either be 
stated explicitly that this concept does not apply 
to transport or a definition of controlled area can 
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be formulated which can be adapted to the transport 
of radioactive materials>dissociated from the case 
of occupationally exposed persons. 
2) On the basis of what has been said so far, it can be 
stated that the definitions of the international 
bodies considered are better adapted to the require-
ments of transport. In addition, if these definitions 
were adopted, a fairly important uniformity would be 
obtained in the international field as regards aspects 
of radiation protection. 
IV-4. CLASSIFICATION OF WORKERS AND THE GENERAL PUBLIC 
The Euratom definitions regarding classification 
of workers and general public, as stated on a number of 
occasions, differentiates three categories of person, 
that is to say, occupationally exposed workers, special 
groups of the population and the population as a whole. 
From the discussion of section III regarding comparison 
with the definitions of the international bodies, it 
emerges that workers and general public are still 
separated into three categories as follows! in the first 
the workers who, by reason of their activity, may be 
exposed to ionizing radiation; in the second, single 
individuals of the population who, for various reasons, 
may take up a radiation dose greater than that laid down 
for the population as a whole; and the third, the 
population as a whole. 
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This classification distinguishes homogeneous 
categories of persons and allows greater simplicity in 
application to the transport of radioactive materials while 
not raising difficulties for other activities. The dis-
tinction between workers who may be exposed to radiation 
by reason of their activities and the single individuals of 
the population is particularly useful in the field of 
transport. The first category can indeed include workers 
actually employed on the transport of radioactive materials, 
while the second may include those single individuals of the 
population who, by the nature of transport, may take up 
doses in excess of those laid down for the population as 
a whole. 
The Euratom classification, on the other hand, 
contains a group of occupationally exposed workers, while 
other workers, not occupationally exposed but who may none 
the less take up doses by reason of their work, are included 
in special groups^ together with single individuals of the 
population who may take up doses by reason of the location 
they occupy and not by reason of the work performed; this 
involves group c) of the population in the basic standards, 
that is to say those persons who are actually in the vicinity 
of the controlled area. 
However, in analogy with the recommendations of the 
international bodies considered, it is logical to propose 
the division of the whole of the population into three 
groups in respect of the possibility of exposure to 
radiation, namely: 
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j 
1) workers who, in the course of their activity, may be 
exposed to ionizing radiation; 
2) single individuals of the population who may take up 
a radiation dose in excess of that laid down for the 
population as a whole; 
3) the population as a whole. 
Within the scope of group l) it is proposed that 
two categories be distinguished, namely: 
a) workers carrying out work which exposes them to the 
hazard of ionizing radiation and who, for this reason, 
may take up a radiation dose exceeding I.5 rem annually 
(or 3/lOths of the maximum permissible dose annually). 
This definition, which is in harmony with those of 
the ICRP, IAEA and OECD-ENEA, emphasises the dose 
hazard without any reference to controlled zone. 
Consequently, occupationally exposed persons in the 
basic standards would again fall into this category. 
b) workers who carry out work which exposes them to the 
hazard of ionizing radiation but who cannot take up a 
radiation dose greater than 1.5 rem annually (or 3/lOths 
of the maximum permissible dose annually). 
This definition again, as in the preceding case, is 
analogous to the international standards and emphasises 
the dose risk, likewise dispensing with reference to 
controlled area. As regards the basic standards, groups 
a) and b) of the special groups of the population would 
again fall into this category. 
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Hence, the first of the three proposed groups would 
Include all those, occupationally exposed or otherwise, 
who may take up doses by reason of their working activity. 
The second group would include single individuals of the 
population who may take up doses on account of their 
particular geographic location but not for reasons of 
work. This group would also include group c) of the special 
groups of the population in the basic standards. 
The third group would include the entire population as 
a whole for the purpose of calculating the genetic dose. 
Comparison between the classification of the basic stan-
dards and that proposed is set out in the following table: 
TABLE 
CATEGORY OF THE 
POPULATION 
Workers in a 
controlled area i 
> 1.5 rem/year 
Workers not In a 
controlled area : 
> 1.5 rem/year 
Workers occasion-
ally in a con-
trolled area : 
< 1.5 rem/year 
Persons handling 
apparatus : 
< 1.5 rem/year 
Persons in the 
vicinity of a con-
trolled area : 
< 1.5 rem/year 
Single Individuals 
< 0.5 rem/year 
General public: 
5 rem in 30 years 
CLASSIFICATION OF THE 
BASIC STANDARDS 
Occupationally 
exposed persons 
-
Special group a) 
Special group b) 
Special group c) 
— 
Population as a whole 
PROPOSED 
CLASSIFICATION 
1-a) 
1-a) 
1-b) 
1-b) 
2 
2 
3 
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This classification, apart from providing a 
substantial analysis of the international recommendations, 
would have ready application for the field of transport, 
both for workers employed and for any of the general 
public affected. 
For the specific transport sector, application of 
the proposed groups may be proposed as follows. 
The first, category a),could include those workers 
who, habitually employed on transport, may find themselves 
in situations which, taken together, could result in ex-
ceeding the dose of I.5 rem/year (or 3/lOths of the 
maximum do s e s). 
Again the first group, category b), could include 
those workers employed on transport who, however, do not 
run the risk of taking up a dose exceeding 1.5 rem/year 
(or 3/lOths of the maximum permissible dose). 
The second could include those single individuals 
of the population who may occasionally find themselves in 
the vicinity of packages containing radioactive materials 
and who may therefore take up a dose exceeding that fixed 
for the population as a whole. 
The third group would include the population as a whole, 
to whose genetic dose transport activities also contribute. 
For the purpose of selecting the most suitable 
classification, the carrier could carry out individual 
measurements,over a certain period,of the dose taken up 
by the workers employed or, in a forecast manner, an 
estimation of the number of transports intended during the 
year, the number of persons involved in carrying them out 
and an analysis of the methods generally employed for 
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carrying out the transport operations, and assessing 
the distances employed - packages and the hours occupied 
on these distances. In this way, it is in effect possible 
to arrive with some approximation at an estimation of the 
doses which the workers employed on transport may take up. 
It is clear that this advance estimate can be subsequently 
made more precise when the number of transports carried out 
in a period of any year is known. 
As regards single individuals of the population who 
may occasionally be within the vicinity of packages con-
taining radioactive material, reasonable estimates have 
already been carried out by international bodies such as 
the IAEA, for example^ ' which, taking into account the 
maximum number of permissible transport indices per load, 
clearly demonstrate that it is highly improbable that such 
individuals may take up a radiation dose approaching 
orders of magnitude of 5OO mrem annually. 
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APPENDIX A 
SYNTHETIC COMPARISON OF INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORT REGU-
LATIONS WITH PARTICULAR REGARD TO SAFETY REGULATIONS 
PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS 
On the international level the transport of radio-
active materials Is governed,with particular reference to 
technical aspects, by numerous international regulations 
and agreements. As affecting the Community States and 
according to the form of transport, these are: 
- the A.D.R. (European agreement on international road 
transport of dangerous goods) and the A.D.N. (European 
agreement on the international transport of dangerous 
goods by inland waterway) which lay down standards res-
pectively for road transport and inland waterways; 
- the C.I.M.-R.I.D. (international convention for the 
rail transport of goods - International regulation 
governing the rail transport of dangerous goods) which 
lays down the standards for rail transport; 
- the I.M.C.O. (Inter-governmental Maritime Consultative 
Organization) which lays down the standards for sea 
transport; 
- the I.A.T.A. (international Air Transport Association) 
which lays down the standards for air transport. 
Each of these international bodies possesses different 
legal structures which therefore impose different degrees 
of rigidity in respect of the standard which in fact is 
always imposed for the technical aspects of transport in 
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the various countries. These standards refer in par-
ticular to the transport of radioactive materials but 
are included for each of the bodies quoted within the 
framework of the regulation for the transport of dan-
gerous materials in general. 
In addition, it should be stated that the countries 
belonging to the various bodies are not always the same. 
At the same time, for the purpose of the present study, 
it is noted that they involve all the countries of the 
European Community. 
The A.D.N. is not considered, in so far as this dis-
plays characteristic aspects interesting only some of the 
Community States. 
Discussion of the legal capacity of the bodies quoted, 
and consequently the force of the standards issued by them, 
does not fall within the scope of this study, which is 
limited to a comparison of technical aspects of the various 
standards and of the arrangements,including formal, which 
may have an influence as regards the protection of workers 
and general public. 
Within the above context, the following items for 
study and comparison are enumerated: 
I. Technical specifications regarding packaging and mode 
of dispatch; 
II. Specifications regarding nuclear safety; 
III.Administrative specifications regarding the approval 
of packaging and parcels; 
IV. Authorisation for dispatch and advance notification; 
V. Marking and labelling requirements; 
VI. Requirements of the personnel carrying out the transport' 
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VII. Regulations applicable to incidents occurring 
during transport. 
For each of these items a comparison has been drawn 
up between the standards provided in the texts quoted, 
paying particular attention to disagreements arising. 
As will be seen in detail, such disuniformities, frequently 
marginal or formal, are also numerically very few. 
In particular, while certain discrepancies arise from 
the diverse methods of transport, several others are based 
on the adoption of the specifications contained in different 
editions of the IAEA recommendations (international Atomic 
Energy Agency) which in principle are taken as the basis 
by all the bodies quoted and to which the IMCO refers 
explicitly for certain aspects. 
I. TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS REGARDING PACKAGING AND MODE 
OF DISPATCH 
A study of these specifications does not bring out 
substantial differences between the four regulations 
examined. 
An analysis is provided of the arrangements which 
differ between themselves, together with synthetic 
comments on those which are in common, for the purpose of 
better understanding where necessary. 
1-1. General packaging specifications and general con-
struction characteristics. 
It is first seen that the specifications provided by 
the ADR are practically identical to the RID. Hence these 
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regulations will be considered jointly below. 
Regarding the weight of parcels and provisions 
relating to the handling of parcels, the specifications 
are the same for the RID, ADR and IMCO regulations, 
while they are not in fact provided in the IATA 
regulation. 
The IATA and the IMCO specify that the form of 
outer wrapping of the packaging must be designed so as 
to prevent the entry of rainwater. This specification is 
not provided by the RID and the ADR. 
For all four international regulations, the packagings 
which must perform the functions of containing and screen­
ing radiation may be of the industrial type, type A and 
type Β. 
Of the four regulations, however, only the IMCO and 
the IATA expressly provide for industrial type packaging 
while the RID and ADR do not define it but quote it in the 
case of transport of materials for which it is required 
that the packaging correspond to the general specifications 
and for which tests are not necessary as provided for 
type A and type B, and define it implicitly by establishing 
the characteristics of packages of neither type A nor 
type B. 
The RID, in addition to the ADR, as distinct from the 
IMCO and the IATA, provide that "all the constituent 
elements necessary for ensuring observation of the provi­
sions of the above regulations regarding packaging shall be 
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considered as forming part of the packaging. Packaging 
can in particular consist of one or more vessels, an 
absorbent material, structural members ensuring separation, 
a radiation protection screen and arrangements for cooling, 
damping mechanical impacts and thermal insulation. For 
materials under 2 and 4 * , these arrangements and 
members may include the carriage with anchorage system 
if these form an integral part of the packaging". 
The four regulations specify that in the choice 
of materials for making up the packaging, account must be 
taken of temperature variations to which the packages 
may be exposed during transport or storage. These tem-
perature limits are -40°C and +70°C for IMCO, RID and ADR, 
while for IATA they are -40°C and +54.4°C. The IMCO also 
accepts, on principle, the use of mild steel in the con-
struction of packaging. At the same time, particular 
attention is recommended to brittle fracture in accor-
dance with the lower temperature range limit quoted 
above. 
Precautions to be taken are provided in order to 
prevent damage due to acceleration, vibration and 
^*' Large fissile and non-fissile sources respectively. 
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resonance encountered during transport. 
For type A and type Β packaging a hermetic outer 
container is also necessary, kept closed by a safe device. 
Outer container means the vessel provided for ensuring 
containment of the radioactive material if the vessels 
inside the outer container suffer fracture or cease to be 
hermetically sealed. 
There is one difference between the specifications 
regarding characteristics of the outer container. While 
the IMCO, RID and ADR specify that "the outer container 
must be sufficiently robust to remain watertight (or 
hermetically sealed) in the event of the ambient pressure 
falling to 0.5 atmospheres absolute", the IATA specifies 
that "the outer container and its closing devices must be 
o 
such as to remain watertight with a pressure of O.5 kg/cm 
(above ambient) in the case of solid materials and 1 kg/cm 
in the case of liquids. Gases under pressure must be held 
in suitable cylinders or other metal containers constructed 
expressly for this purpose". 
1-2. Supplementary specifications for type A packaging. 
The supplementary specifications for type A packaging 
provided by the four international regulations are sub­
stantially the same. The only specifications differing 
partially are those relating to the transport of gamma-
emitting materials with an activity exceeding 3 Ci. I n 
particiliar, the four regulations examined establish a 
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series of tests for type A packaging and specify that 
these must prevent any loss or dispersion of the radio-
active content and maintain its screening function under 
the conditions of such tests. 
In the case of type A packaging intended for the 
transport of liquids or gases, it is established that 
these must also prevent any loss or dispersion of the 
radioactive content under the conditions of supplementary 
tests laid down for such types of packaging unless, in the 
case of liquids, the casing contains internally a quantity 
of absorbent material sufficient to absorb twice the volume 
of liquid contained and one of the following conditions 
is met: 
1. the absorbent substance is inside the protective screen, 
or 
2. the absorbent substance is outside but it can be checked 
that the liquid content is absorbed by it, and the in-
tensity of the dose does not exceed 1000 mR/h or 
equivalent, at the surface of the parcel. 
The specifications contained in the regulations for 
type A packaging intended for the transport of gamma-
emitting radioactive materials are as follows: 
IMCO: In a type A packaging designed for gamma-emitting 
radioactive materials with an activity exceeding 
3 Ci and comprising a radiation screen made from 
material with a melting point below 800 C, the 
radioactive material must be enclosed in a closed 
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metal container (which may be the casing), the 
outside dimensions of which must be less than 5 cm. 
The model must possess characteristics such as to 
allow the container to maintain its own integrity 
after exposure to fire in an oxidizing atmosphere 
at 800 C for 30 minutes. (Note: gamma-emitting 
radioactive materials requiring such specifications 
are only those the decay of which is such that gamma-
radiation with an energy greater than 100 keV is 
emitted in more than 10$ of the total disintegration)". 
IATA : "A packaging designed for a gamma-emitting radioactive 
material to an amount greater than 3 Ci and comprising 
a screen against radiation made from material with a 
melting point below 85O C must include a steel con-
tainer in which the material is enclosed. This contai-
ner must possess outside dimensions not less than 5 cm 
and steel thickness not less than 2 mm". 
RID and ADR: "In a type A packaging intended for the trans-
port of gamma emittore with an activity exceeding 
3 Ci and containing a screen made from material with 
a melting point below 850°C, the radioactive material 
must be inside a closed steel casing,(which may be 
the outer container). No outside dimension of the 
casing must be less than 5 cm and in thickness must 
be at least 2 mm. (Note: for the purpose of this 
provision, emittore of gamma rays means only radio-
active materials which in disintegration supply more 
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than 10$ gamma emissions with an energy exceeding 
100 keV). 
It is seen that the above specifications differ 
essentially: 
in the choice of melting point of the screen; 
in the material from which the internal metal con­
tainer must be made; 
in the statement, not in the IATA, that gamma 
emittore for the purposes considered mean only radio­
active materials which in disintegration supply more than 
10$ of gamma emissions with energy exceeding 100 keV. 
1-3. Supplementary specifications for type Β packaging 
The four international regulations provide that 
type Β packages must satisfy the following specifications, 
apart from the general packaging conditions: 
a) a type Β package, under the conditions of penetration, 
mechanical, heat and immersion tests, must: 
i) prevent any loss or dispersion of the radioactive 
content; 
li) sufficiently maintain its protective screening 
function so that the intensity of irradiation does 
not exceed 1000 mR/h at 1 m from the surface of the 
packaging on the assumption that the parcel contains 
a quantity of Iradium-192 sufficient, prior to the 
test, to emit a radiation of 10 mR/h at 1 m from 
the surface of the parcel. If a type Β package is 
- 99 -
intended for containing a given radionuclide, this 
can be assumed as referring in place of Iridium-!92. 
b) a type Β packaging must also be such as to guarantee 
that the outer container maintains its hermetic tight­
ness, even if the packaging is immersed in water to a 
depth of 15 m. 
1-4. Supplementary specifications for parcels containing 
large radioactive sources. 
As regards supplementary specifications for parcels 
containing large radioactive sources, it can be stated that 
the RID, ADR and IMCO provide fairly similar indications. 
The IATA, on the other hand, while setting out substan­
tially all the specifications of the remaining regulations, 
omits certain explanatory statements and includes a number 
of provisions relating to the particular characteristics of 
air transport. The IATA regulation provides that: 
Large sources must be transported only by cargo air­
craft and prior agreements must be reached with each of 
the carriers affected. 
Large sources must be of a type not requiring 
operational controls during transport and/or transit, apart 
from controls which must be carried out by the shipper prior 
to presenting the parcel to air transport, controls which are 
also provided by the remaining regulations. 
Packages containing large sources must be protected 
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so as not to require vents during transport. In order 
to meet this requirement, auxiliary external cooling 
systems are permitted. 
Another disagreement between the IATA and the 
remaining regulations is as follows: 
IATA: "The temperature of the accessible surfaces of the 
package must not exceed 50°C in the shade at any time 
during transport, assuming a typical 38 ambient tem-
perature under normal conditions of transport." 
RID, ADR, IMCO: "The temperature of the accessible surfaces 
of the parcel shall not exceed 50 C, but if the parcel 
is being transported as the full load, this limit may 
be increased to 82°C". However, for application of 
this standard, it is assumed that the parcel is in the 
shade. 
All regulations also specify that the heat produced 
inside a parcel by the radioactive materials contained in it 
shall not lower the efficiency of the package during trans-
port, laying down those ambient conditions considered. 
The RID, ADR, IMCO (IAEA) later state that particular 
attention must be paid to the effects of heat which may: 
l) modify the arrangement, the geometric form and physical 
state of the contents or, if the material is contained 
in a metal casing or vessel, bring about melting of the 
metal casing, the vessel or the material itself; 
ii)reduce the efficiency of the packaging by cracking due to 
thermal stresses or as the result of the radiation 
protection screen melting; 
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ili) accelerate corrosion in the presence of humidity. 
It is finally noted that the design principles for 
the container and screening function, test procedures for 
the packaging and all tests provided for approval of 
pareels}are the same in the four regulations. 
1-5· Limitation of external irradiation 
The four regulations studied provide that, in regard 
to external irradiation, the parcels fall into one of the 
following categories: 
a) category I-WHITE, when the radiation dose intensity 
emitted by the parcel does not exceed O.5 mR/h or 
equivalent at any time during transport, at any point 
on the outer surface of the parcel and the parcel does 
not belong to fissile class H ; 
b) category II-YELLOW, when the limit indicated under 
point a) above is exceeded, or, if this limit is ex-
ceeded or not reached, the parcel belongs to fissile 
class II, and when: 
l) the radiation dose intensity emitted by the parcel 
does not exceed at any time during transport: 
(i) 10 mR/h or equivalent at any point on the outer 
surface of the package; and 
(ii)0.5 mR/h or equivalent at a distance of 1 m from 
the centre of the parcel ; and 
(2) the transport index does not exceed O.5 at any time 
during transport; 
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c) Category III-YELLOW when one of the limits indicated 
under point b) above is exceeded and: 
(1) the radiation dose intensity emitted by the parcel 
does not exceed at any time during transport: 
(i) 200 mR/h or equivalent at any point on the outer 
surface of the parcel; and 
(ii)lO mR/h or equivalent at a distance of 1 m from 
the centre of the parcel ; and 
(2) the transport index does not exceed 10 at any time 
during transport. 
In particular, according to the RID, ADR and IMCO, 
the limits laid down under point o) (l)(ii) and c) (2) can 
be exceeded on condition that the parcel is transported 
as complete load and in conformity to the particular 
specifications providing for this case. The IATA does not 
provide for this excess of dose intensity in the case of 
complete load. 
It is noted that references to nuclear safety class II, 
parcels included for completeness, do not apply for the pur-
pose of the material treated in this section. 
II. SPECIFICATIONS CONCERNING NUCLEAR SAFETY 
II-l, General specifications 
The general nuclear safety specifications as set out 
in the four international regulations studied, coincide, 
taking into account that the IMCO refers to the IAEA 
recommendations on this item as others. 
In particular, it is noted that the regulations 
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after stating that all fissile materials in amounts less 
than the exemption limits (see table I, page-j^) must 
be packed and dispatched so that the critical state 
cannot be reached under any foreseeable circumstances of 
transport, are limited to stating incidents requiring major 
attention and setting out the hypothises to be considered 
in the case, of irradiated nuclear fuels and unspecified 
fissile materials (for example, residues or scrap). 
It is further laid down that parcels must fall into 
one of the following classes: 
Nuclear safety class I: parcels which do not possess 
any nuclear hazard, whatever their number and arrangement , 
under all foreseeable circumstances of transport; 
Nuclear safety class II: parcels which do not possess 
any nuclear hazard, if restricted in number, whatever their 
arrangement and under all foreseeable circumstances of 
transport; 
Nuclear safety class III: parcels which do not possess 
any nuclear hazard, but which cannot be considered as parcels 
of nuclear safety classes I or H . 
II-2. Particular specifications for Fissile Class I parcels 
The particular specifications for fissile class I 
parcels are the same in the four regulations. All the 
regulations provide the same provision regarding fissile 
class I parcels. 
The only differences in the methods to adopt in 
respect of the nuclear safety criteria set out for fissile 
class I parcels: 
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RID (and ADR): Observation of the nuclear safety criteria 
"set out for fissile class I parcels" must be ensured 
by one of the following methods: 
a) following the calculation procedure indicated in 
marginal note 1621 of Appendix VI of the RID (marginal 
note 3621 of Appendix A.6 of the ADR); 
b) satisfying the data of the physical model indicated 
in the marginal note 1622 of Appendix VI of the RID 
(marginal note 3622 of Appendix A.6 of the ADR). 
IATA: Observation of the nuclear safety criteria "set out 
for fissile class I parcels" must be guaranteed by 
one of the following methods: 
a) following one of the systems of calculation in-
dicated in Appendix III, 1-1 (IAEA); 
b) corresponding to one of the physical models in-
dicated in Appendix III, 1-2 (IAEA); 
c) observing the specifications of one of the packaging 
projects described in Appendix H I , I-3 (IAEA). 
IMCO: Nothing is stated on this point apart from reference 
to the IAEA recommendations, whose specifications on 
this point are the same as those of the IATA. It is 
also observed that, with the sole exception of point 
c) provided by IATA, and implicitly by IMCO, these 
criteria also coincide completely, the calculation 
procedure and data contained in the tests, repeatedly 
quoted, being identical. 
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II-3. Particular specifications for Fissile Class II parcels. 
The particular specifications for fissile class II 
parcels are the same for the ADR, RID and IATA regulations. 
The IMCO does not give specifications but,for this purpose, 
the specifications provided in the IAEA recommendations 
apply, coinciding with the specifications provided in the 
remaining regulations. 
H - 4 . Particular specifications for Fissile Class III parcels. 
The RID and ADR do not provide particular specifications 
for fissile class III parcels. 
The IATA, on the other hand, specifically mentions the 
general nuclear safety specifications. 
III. ADMINISTRATIVE SPECIFICATIONS REGARDING APPROVAL OF 
PACKAGES AND PARCELS 
HI-1. Type A packages 
The four regulations do not require approval of type 
A packages apart from those cases provided following 
point III-4. 
III-2. Type Β packages 
The four regulations require the packaging model be 
approved by the competent authority of the country of 
origin of the model. Only in the case of the RID and 
ADR is it specified that the above applies if the country 
of origin of the project is a member respectively of the 
CIM (RID) or the ADR. Otherwise, transport is possible 
on condition that: 
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- a certificate issued by that country testifying that 
the package corresponds to the technical specifications 
and that this certificate is validated by the competent 
authority of the first member country of the CIM (RID) 
or of the ADR through which the shipment passes; 
- if no certificate is supplied, the packaging model must 
be approved by the competent authority of the first member 
country of the CIM (RID) or the ADR through which the 
shipment passes. 
III-3· Approval of models of parcels for large non-
fissile radioactive sources. 
For the purposes of approval for models of parcels 
containing large radioactive sources a distinction is made 
by the four regulations studied, in accordance with the 
technical characteristics of the parcels. 
III-3.1. Unilateral approval 
Approval of the competent authority of the country of 
origin of the model of the parcel is sufficient, or, where 
applicable, of the country provided in the preceding point 
III-2, when the following technical conditions are observed: 
a) in the conditions of the tests provided for type 
A and Β packages, the parcel must prevent any loss 
or dispersion of the radioactive contents; 
b) the model must satisfy the provisions indicated 
in a) without filters being employed; 
c) a parcel containing a primary heat carrier medium 
must not employ a system allowing continuous de­
compression during transport; 
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d) the parcel must not contain any arrangement for 
decompressing the outer casing so as to liberate 
radioactive materials to the ambient under the con­
ditions of the tests provided for type A and Β packages; 
e) when the maximum working pressure of the outside 
container under normal conditions, with any pressure 
difference below atmospheric pressure at sea level, 
to which it may be subjected, exceeds 0.35 kg/cm , 
the outer container must be capable of withstanding 
a pressure at least equal to one and a half times the 
sum of this pressure. The stress at this pressure 
must not exceed 75$ of the unit yield load nor 40$ 
of the load to failure of the material from which 
the outer container is made at the maximum working 
temperature provided;* ' 
f) assuming that, at maximum pressure in normal 
service, the parcel is subjected to the thermal 
test provided for type A and Β packages, the pressure 
in the outer casing must not exceed that corresponding 
to unit yield load of the material of the casing at 
the highest temperature attainable during the test; 
g) for a parcel requiring the use of the primary heat 
* ' Maximum pressure in normal service means maximum 
pressure above atmospheric pressure at sea level which 
may be set up inside the outer container under conditions 
of temperature and solar irradiation corresponding to 
the mean conditions during transport, based on a period 
of one year. 
- 108 -
carrier medium or containing a liquid or gaseous 
source, the maximum pressure in normal service must 
not exceed 7 kg/cm ; 
h) under the conditions of the type tests provided for 
type Β packages, a parcel containing a primary heat 
carrier medium must not lose,during the period of 1 
week, a quantity of this medium greater than the 
smaller of the following values: 
- if the agent is in the gaseous or vapour form, 0.1$ 
by volume, or 5 litres at 0 C at a pressure of 76O mm Hg; 
- if the medium is liquid, 0.1$ by volume or 0.5 litres; 
i) the absence of any leak on the part of the source 
under normal conditions must not depend on a mechanical 
cooling system; 
k) in order to satisfy the provisions under c), re­
course must not be had to an external auxiliary 
cooling arrangement; 
l) for a parcel containing a primary liquid heat 
carrier medium or containing a liquid radioactive 
material, the outer container must be able to maintain 
its integrity at a temperature of -40°C;^+' 
^ ' For application of conditions (2) and (3) and of the above 
specifications regarding pressure, it is assumed that the ambieni 
conditions are as follows : 
i) temperature: 38°C; 
ii) exposure to solar irradiation: 
- parcels with flat surfaces transported horizontally, 
base: zero 2 
other surfaces: 800 cal/cm for 12 hours daily; transported 
other than horizontally 200 cal/cm2 for 12 hours daily; 
- parcels with curved surfaces: 
400 cal/cm2 for 12 hours daily. 
At the same time, for parcels which must be transported only in 
certain particular countries, different conditions may be allowec 
from those indicated in this note, if the competent authority of 
each of the countries allows it. Equally in this case, a temperati 
differing from that indicated above may be allowed by common 
agreement. 
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It is observed that in fact the IATA recommendation 
does not include conditions c) and k) a.s regards parcels 
excluding air transport. The same regulation, on the 
other hand, formulates condition e) from the standpoint of 
particular conditions of transport, in the form: 
"the outer container must be such as to withstand a pressure 
2 not less than 0.84 kg/cm plus one and a half times the 
maximum working pressure;and the stress at this pressure 
must not exceed 75$ of the load to failure of the outer 
container at the maximum working temperature provided". 
III-3.2. Multi-lateral approval. 
Models of parcels not corresponding to the require­
ments set out under point III-3.1. (a)-e)) must be approved 
by the competent authorities of the countries of origin 
and of all the countries through which or in which the 
parcel must be transported. 
The four regulations subordinate issue of approval 
to the condition that activity which may be released 
within a week^under the conditions resulting from the 
mechanical and thermal tests provided for type Β packaging^ 
in the form of contaminated gas, vapour or liquid 
liberated by primary heat transfer medium and the space 
originally occupied by it^does not exceed predetermined 
values. 
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Issue of approval as above is also subordinated 
in the ADR, RID, IMCO-IAEA regulations to the condition 
thatjin the case where the model of the parcel is 
designed so as to liberate, by continuous decompression, 
contaminated gas or vapour resulting from the primary 
gaseous or liquid heat carrier medium under the condition 
resulting from the water spray test followed by impact, 
of the free-fall test, of the compression test and 
penetration test , taking into account the ambient 
conditions assumed during transport (temperature, solar 
irradiation), activity which must not exceed 
the values provided. Such a parcel must be transported 
alone as the complete load. 
This condition is not provided in the IATA 
regulation,which however does not provide for transport 
of this type of parcel. 
It is observed that in this case, as distinct from 
what is provided for models of parcels dealt with in the 
previous section, the certificate of approval must 
contain an indication of all the specifications to be 
observed during the course of transport which the 
competent authority considers necessary. 
III-4. Approval of models of nuclear safety class 1,11 
and III parcels. 
Ill 
As indicated below regarding authorisation procedures 
connected with the fissile nature of the material to be trans-
ported, it is seen that the specification; already studied in the 
preceding sections also apply, as is evident, for example, in 
the case of a large fissile souroe where, however, the quantity 
of material transported is less than the limits set out in 
table I: 
TABUS I 
parcels not containing 
more than 
parcels containing 
natural or Impoverished 
uranium 
parcels containing 
homogenised hydrogenated, 
solutions or mixtures ( ) 
parcels containing 
materials in which the 
only fissile component is 
enriched uranium 
■ 
15 g uranium-233 
15 g uranium-235 
15 g plutoniu_-239 
15 g plutonium-241 
15 g of any combination of these 
radionuclides 
in any quantities 
U23·3 or U235, when the ratio of 
numbers of atoms H: U 2 " or U235 is 
greater than 5200 
plutonium, when the ratio of numbers 
of atoms H: Pu is greater than 76OO 
235 *i the U content must not exceed Λ% 
of -the weight of uranium and must be 
distributed homogeneously in the mate-
rial considered on condition also that 
the material is not present in the form 
of lattice in the parcel· 
(°) With the reserve that the quantities of fissile materials per 
parcel do not exceed at most: 
U-235: 800 g U-233: 500 g Pu: 500 g 
If the parcel contains more fissile materials, the ratio 
between the number of hydrogen atoms and the number of atoms of 
fissile materials must be greater than 76ΟΟ and the maximum 
- 112 -
quantity of fissile materials must not exceed 500 g per parcel. 
ΙΙΙΛ.1« Models of nuclear safety class I parcels. 
Approval of the model of the parcel is always necessary. 
In the case of designs based on the physical models quoted in 
section II-2e as regards maximum quantities of fissile materials 
provided for, approval of the competent authority of the country 
of origin of the design is sufficient. The CIM-RID and ADR 
regulations understand such countries within the meaning set out 
in seotion III-2. 
For designs based on calculation procedures as quoted in 
section II-2, approval must be issued by each of the countries 
through whose territory the parcel must be transported. 
The IATA regulation, on the other hand, states that models 
of the parcels designed In accordance with the design speci­
fications contained in the text of the IAEA recommendations do 
not require approval. 
III.4.2. Models of nuclear safety class II parcels. 
Approval of the model of the parcel by the oompetent 
authority of the country of origin of the design and of all 
countries through whose territory the parcel must be transported 
is always necessary. 
The IATA regulation, on the other hand, states that the 
models of parcels designed in accordance with the design speci­
fications contained in the text of the IAEA recommendations do 
not require approvals. 
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III.4.5. Models of nuclear safety class III parpels. 
Approval of the model of the parcel by the competent 
authority of the country of origin of the design and of all 
countries through whose territory the parcel must be transported 
is always necessary. 
IV. AUTHORISATION FOR DESPATCH AND AD VAK CE NOTIFICATION 
A comparison of the international regulations (RID, ADR, 
IMCO and IATA) shows that these are not inspired by the same 
basic regulations and do not provide complete adoption of them. 
Nonetheless, the specifications governing transport authorisation 
and advance notification are substantially similar. 
IV-1. Large souroes: unilateral authorisation 
For the transport of parcels containing large radio-active 
souroes, including those of fissile classes I and II, conforming 
to certain technical conditions, laid down by the regulations, 
such as to render unnecessary additional working specifications, 
for example, such as controls and other human intervention during 
transport, despatch has to be authorised by the competent authority 
of the country of origin. 
In the case of rail or road transport, the CIM-RID and ADR 
provide that, if the country of origin does not form part of 
these organisations, transport must be authorised by the first 
of the countries passed through forming part of such organisations 
and considered as country of origin of the transport. The ap-
plication for authorisation must contain: 
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(i) either oomplete documentation issued by the manufacturer, 
by the shipper or the user testifying that the methods and 
materials employed for construction of the packaging are in 
accordance with the specifications of the approved design, or 
a document from the competent authority of the country in which 
the paokaging was constructed, testifying that such complete 
documentation has been supplied by the manufacturer, shipper or 
user; 
(ii) all information for demonstrating conformity with the cor-
responding parts of the respective regulations and all in-
formation regarding the type of transport proposed, in addition, 
where applicable, to any special loading, unloading and handling 
procedure. 
When authorising despatoh, the competent authority shall 
release a certificate: 
- authorising despatch; 
- specifying the measures which must be adopted by the shipper prior 
to despatoh; 
- confirming that additional working specifications are not neces-
sary during transport. 
The IATA and HtCO regulations, however, do not provide par-
ticular authorisation procedures but confine themselves to re-
quiring that the shipper supplies suoh certificates. 
Prior agreements must also be obtained with each carrier 
affected, so as to be able to undertake measures necessary for 
the transport in good time. The RID provides that the railways 
be informed if necessary of special measures to be adopted in the 
case of accident. In each case, advance notification of the 
- 115 -
transport to the oompetent authority of each of the countries 
affected by it is specified. Suoh notification must contain 
the necessary information for identification of the transport 
by the competent authority. 
IV-2. Large sources and nuclear safety class III parcels: multi-
lateral authorisation. 
For the transport of fissile class III parcels or parcels 
containing large radio-active sources (including those also of 
fissile classes I, II), the design of which requires 
multilateral approval as in section III-3.2, approval for despatch 
is necessary on the part of the competent authorities of the coun-
try of origin of the transport and of the countries through which 
the transport will take place and who have laid down special 
supplementary specifications for approval of the model of the 
parcel and its authentication, apart from those who have renounced 
such rights. 
Application for approval of a despatch must indicate the 
method of forwarding, the means of transport, the itinerary 
considered and all supplementary specifications to be observed 
during transport. 
The certificate of approval of the consignment issued by the 
competent authority shall indicate supplementary specifications to 
be observed during transport. 
In particular, it is forbidden for any other consignments to 
accompany nuclear safety class III parcels, and this prohibition 
must appear expressly in the authorisation. 
The RID and ADR also provide that if consignments pass through 
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oountries of different language, the supplementary speci-
fication to be observed during transport must be drawn up 
in an official language of the country of origin of the 
consignment and in the language of each country, the com-
petent authority of which has imposed such specifications. 
V. MARKING AND LABELLING- REQUIREMENTS 
V-1. Markings 
Each parcel of the types considered above must carry the 
following markings: 
- Each parcel corresponding to a type A design must be marked 
in an obvious and indelible manner on its outer surface with the 
wording "Type A"; 
- For each parcel conforming to a type A packaging design and 
containing gamma emitting radioactive materials with an activity 
exceeding 3 Ci*, the outer surface of the metal casing (for the 
IMCO-IAEA and steel for the RID, ADR and IATA) or whatever con-
tainer is placed inside a radiation screen constructed from 
material with a melting point above 800 C (for the IMCO-IAEA 
or 850 C for the RID, ADR, IATA), the outer surface of the screen 
must be marked in an obvious manner with the clover leaf symbol 
and with the word "RADIOACTIVE" in letters not less than 10 mm 
high, cut, punched or in any case carried out in such a manner 
as to withstand the action of fire and water**; 
* See section 1-2. 
** The RID and ADR explicitly require that the indication 
"Radioactive" be written in capital letters. 
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- Eaoh parcel for which approval of the design is necessary 
must carry on its outer surface in an obvious and indelible 
manner, the identification mark attributed to -the design by 
the competent authority which has approved it, the serial number 
and if the design is for type Β packaging, the wording "type BM; 
- Each parcel conforming to a type Β packaging design must be 
marked on the surface of the outermost vessel resistant to the 
action of fire and water, with the clover leaf symbol, out, punched 
or otherwise stamped in such a way as to withstand the action of 
fire and water. 
V-2. Labels and other indications 
For all regulations, three types of label are provided, 
to be applied on the two opposite sides of parcels containing 
radioactive materials, relating to the category to which the 
parcel belongs, as follows: 
on a I-WHITE category parcel, two labels shall be applied 
(on opposite sides of the parcel, representing the radioactivity 
hazard) white with a red stripe. Such labels shall carry the 
name of the main radioactive content and the aotivity in curies 
of the radioactive content. 
on a categoty II-YELLOW parcel, two yellow labes with two 
red stripes shall be applied. Such labels shall carry the name 
of the main radioactive content, the aotivity in curies of the 
radioactive content and the transport index. 
on a category III-YELLOW parcel, yellow labels with three 
red stripes shall be applied. Such labels shall carry the name 
of the main radioactive content, the activity in curies of the 
radioactive content and the transport index. 
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Each label must have dimensions 10 cm χ 10 cm. Each parcel 
weighing more than 50 kg must aleo carry on its outer surface an 
indication of the weight in an obvious and indelible manner. 
The four regulations finally provide: 
­ Empty packages: packages transported empty must carry the wording 
"empty package which has contained radioactive materials" and all 
symbols and labels must be cancelled or covered over (IMCO, RID, ADR) 
­ Exempt materials: labels need not be applied on the outside of 
a parcel containing only exempted materials, in thi3 case, the 
wording "radioactive" must appear on the vessel constructed to 
ensure containment of the materials so as to appear clearly prior 
to proceeding to open the parcel (IMCO, RID, ADR, IATA). 
­ Radioactive materials with low specific activity: it is not 
necessary to label packages containing radioactive materials with 
low specific activity if they are transported as the "oomplete 
load". If not transported as complete load, they must carry a 
white or yellow label according to case (HÍC0, RID, ADR). 
VI. REQUIREMENTS OF PERSONNEL CARRYING OUT TRANSPORT 
This section considers the requirements of personnel directly 
employed on transport, with reference on the one hand to their 
qualifications, and on the other any radio protection classifications 
In this respect it is first noted that there is a common 
tendency in the international regulations studied to prevent 
risk, establishing the standards previously examined regarding 
packaging and at the same time to limit the specifications to be 
observed during transport and therefore the requirements demanded 
of the personnel employed on it. 
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VI-1. Qualifications of the personnel. 
The f our international regulations differ markedly on this 
point, even though the specifications are eventually all of a 
general nature. 
The ADR agreement provides in generaljfor all dangerous goods¿ 
that written instructions be issued to the driver of the vehicle 
containing instructions on the nature of the hazard presented by 
the materials transported and on the measures to be adopted in the 
case of various types of accident. The carrier, on the other hand, 
is obliged to see that the personnel affected is familiarised with 
such instructions and is capable of applying them properly. 
The IMCO for their part, does not provide any explicit 
specification on this point, nor on the other hand, make reference 
to the IAEA recommendation for such material. The latter, however, 
is limited to stating that workers must be given the necessary in-
formation and instructions relating to the hazards to which they are 
exposed and the precautions to adopt. 
Neither the RID nor the IATA issue particular specifications 
on the subject. 
It is also observed that the regulations contain a number of 
protection standards regarding limitation of the dosage to per-
sonnel and surface contamination of the parcels, together with 
standards, also general, to be adopted in the case of accident. 
In this way, a degree of knowledge of the hazards connected with 
the transport of radioactive material is implicitly imposed at 
least, for the purpose of guaranteeing application of the par-
ticular standards. 
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VI-2. Classification of the personnel 
The ADR convention, while not speaking of classification 
of personnel, places limits on the exposure intensities at 
positions on board the vehicle reserved for the driving and 
accompanying personnel. This limit, equal to 2 mR/h average for 
an exposure time of 15 hours per week, or otherwise 390 mR per 
week,coincides in fact with that provided by the basic Euratom 
standards for persons not ocoupationally exposed. Observation 
of the above limit was based principally on criteria based on 
the minimum distance between the load and the positions occupied 
by the personnel. 
The IMCO regulation for its part lays down mini mum distances 
separating parcele from persons, based on a limit of 1.5 R/year 
or equivalent and an occupation factor equal to 1/4· In this 
case also, the limit provided is the same as that provided in the 
Euratom basic standards, for workers not occupationally exposed. 
The LATA regulation is confined also to laying down the 
minimum distances separating the passanger cabin or driving cabin 
from the parcels; in this way, the driving personnel is as-
similated to passengers. 
VII. RECOMMENDATIONS APPLYING IN CASE OF ACCIDENT 
The technical and administrative specifications provided in 
the regulations quoted, apart from guaranteeing the method of 
carrying out transports of radioactive materials which do not under 
normal conditions carry the possibility of injury to persons, also 
aim at restricting the possibility of accidents or ensuring that the 
gravity of such accidents' 'is not increased by the dangerous nature of 
the materials transported. 
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This heading includes, for example, all technical speci-
fications concerning packaging, nuclear safety and method of 
consignment. 
On the other hand, in the regulations examined, the standards 
explicitly affecting the mode of action in the event of accidents 
are extremely brief. The ADR, for example, for radioactive materials, 
is limited to specifying that: 
- if a parcel of radioactive materials displays fractures or losses 
of the content or if it is involved in an accident during transport, 
the vehicle or affected zone must be isolated in order to prevent 
persons coming into contact with radioactive materials and, if 
possible, must be suitably signalled and surrounded by barriers. 
No one ie authorised to remain in the isolated zone before the 
arrival of persons qualified indirect handling and rescue operations. 
The consigner and the authorities affected must be informed immediately. 
Despite such arrangements, the presence of radioactive materials must 
not impede rescue operations and fire fighting; 
- if there is verified a leakage of radioactive materials or 
spilling or scattering of radioactive materials in a vehicle, 
premises, ground or on goods or equipment used for transport 
or storage, qualified persons must be called on as quickly as 
possible to direct decontamination operations. 
Contaminated vehicles, premises, land or materials cannot be 
brought into use again without being declared safe by qualified 
persons. 
It is pointed out, however, that, regarding dangerous materials 
in general, it is required that: 
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­ in preparation for any accident which may occur during transport, 
written instructions must be issued to the driver setting out in 
detail: 
a) the nature of the dangers offered by the dangerous materials 
transported and safety measures which must be adopted to counter 
them; 
b) provisions to be adopted and precautions to be taken in the 
event of persons coming into contact with the goods transported 
or with products which may be released by them; 
c) measures to adopt in the event of fire and, in particular, means 
or groups of means of extinction, use of which is excluded; 
d) the measures to adopt in the event of breakage or deterioration 
of packages or of the dangerous materials transported, par­
ticularly when such dangerous materials are scattered on the road; 
­ these instructions must be drawn up by the manufacturer and con­
signer for each dangerous goods or class of dangerous materials; 
these muât be in the language of the country of origin. If this 
language differs from the languages of the transit countries or 
countries of destination, they must be written also in the latter 
languages. Δ copy of these instructions must be placed in the 
driver's cabin; 
­ all measures must be adopted by the carrier in order to fami­
liarize the personnel affected with such instructions and to 
render him capable of propertly applying them. 
The RID specifications are similar, with the obvious differences 
in nomenclature between "truck" and "vehicle" etc. The RID also 
requiresvfor the approval of despatch of parcels containing large 
fissile and non­fissile sources_,that "the railway be informed if 
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neoessary of the special measures to adopt in case of aocident". 
For air transports the IATA regulation does not provide any 
standard regarding this subject. 
The IMCO regulation is the most complete regarding this subject 
and provides an entire seotion dedicated to the procedures to follow 
in the event of accidents. This section lays down, after an ex-
planatory introduction on the characteristics of parcels which may 
be involved, a distinction between accidents during navigation and 
those in port. 
In the former case, it is laid down that: 
- When a parcel containing radioactive materials is involved in 
a fire, the normal methods of firefighting can be followed. Thus, 
for example, a down-wind fire will be fought as much as possible. 
Spraying the parcel with water will also contribute to preventing 
materials,for protection against irradiation such as lead, for 
example, being melted. 
- During the firefighting operations, when there is risk of ex-
posure to steam and smoke, contamination of the ambient and per-
sonnel will be avoided or reduced by protective clothing and in 
particular a gas mask. After the fire, the personnel must remove 
garments and equipment. Garments shall be isolated and the per-
sonnel shall be thoroughly washed by shower. The garments assumed 
contaminated shall be submitted to the competent authority after 
arrival in port. 
- When a parcel containing radioactive materials suffers fracture 
or displays leaks, no one must approach it or move near to it until 
a qualified radiological control can be obtained at the first port 
of call or by the competent national authority. 
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Foodstuffs and drinking water which may be considered as 
possibly contaminated following an aocident shall not be 
consumed before examination by qualified persons or before 
obtaining a competent opinion from qualified persons. 
For accidents in port it Ì3 provided that: 
- The port authorities must be informed when an accident 
damaging radioactive parcels has occurred on board ship. 
Provision for this has been adopted in several countries 
whereby experts in radiological subjects are consulted in 
the event of an accident. 
It can be observed how the tone and type of specifications 
depend greatly on the possibility or otherwise of rapid inter-
vention by the competent authorities or persons qualified in 
radiological protection action, as is particularly evident 
from the IMCO recommendations. 
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APPENDIX Β 
SYNTHETIC COMPARISON OF SAFETY SPECIFICATIONS IN THE MEMBER STATES 
PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS 
The legislative text and regulations governing the field of 
transport of radioaotive materials in the member states of the 
Community present a rather oomplex picture. A clear tendency is 
however observed towards adaptation and homogenization of the 
various national legislations witti the international regulations 
governing the transport of radioactive materials which, as already 
indicated in the preceding Appendix A, are now substantially 
similar between themselves. 
The greatest disuniformity between the various national 
legislations studied originate in most cases from the delay with 
which such texts have been adjusted to the international regulations 
on the occasion of amendments, even substantial ones. It can 
therefore be stated substantially that such disuniformities are 
those which exist between the various versions of the international 
regulations, with particular reference to the different editions of 
the IAEA recommendations (1961, 1964, 1967), on which all inter­
national standards in the field of transport of radioactive materials 
are now based. 
This appendix discusses national standards, isolating the 
subject treated in the preceding appendix A in the international 
field, again for the purpose of bringing out any irregularities. 
It is appropriate before entering into the above analysis 
to list, country by country, the legislative texts and regulations 
considered. The system of declaration and authorisation in the 
field of transport has been examined elsewhere, since these 
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are directly affected by the basic standards. These standards, 
indeed, lay down (article 3) that eaoh member State undertakes 
a system of declaration, and, where considered necessary, of 
advance authorisation of the regulated activities, including 
transport of radioactive substances when the total activity of 
the radioactive materials exceeds the limits laid down in 
article 4 and in appendix 1 of the basic standards. It can be 
seen that, since this subject devolves from the national regu-
lation, it has not been dealt with in the preceding appendix A. 
I. LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS AND REGULATIONS REGARDING THE TRANSPORT 
OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS IN THE COMMUNITY STATES. 
It appears appropriate first of all to list the legislative 
provisions and regulations in force in the Community States af-
fected directly or indirectly by the transport of radioactive 
substances. 
1-1. Belgium 
- Ratification of the CIM-RID Convention: 29.4.1955· 
- Act of 29.3.58 relating to the protection of the general public 
against the risks of ionizing radiation. 
- Royal decree 28/2/63, general regulation governing protection 
of the general public and workers against the risk of ionizing 
radiation. 
- Approval of the ADR: 10.8.60. 
1-2. France 
- Regulation governing rail, land and internal waterways transport 
of dangerous materials (Ministerial decree 15*4.45» amended several 
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times and in particular by the Ministerial decrees of 1.7.66 and 
17.6.67. 
- Regulation governing sea transport of dangerous materials 
(Ministerial decree 12.7.54, amended several times and in 
particular by the Ministerial decree 7.2.64). 
- Ratification of the CIM-RID convention: 4.3·55. 
- Ratification of the ADR convention: 2.2.60. 
- Institution of the CIREA (interministerial Commission for 
Artificial Radioelements) decree No. 475, 3.5.54, decree No. 
512, 11.5.55 and decree No. 1197, 26.11.56. 
1-3. Italy 
- Act 31.12.62 No. i860, Peaceful use of nuclear energy(amended 
and supplemented by DPR No. 1704, 30.12.65 and the Act 19.12.65 
No. 1008). 
- DPR 13.2o64 No. 185, Plant safety and health protection of 
workers and general public against ionizing radiation hazards 
resulting from the peaceful use of nuclear energy. 
- Ministerial decree 27.7»66. 
- Ministerial decree 15.12.70. 
- Circular No. 8/1965 prot.n. II96/238I/I, 1 February, 1965, 
Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation. 
- D.G. Civil Motorization and Licenced Transport: Road transport 
of special radioactive and fissile materials, technical specifications. 
- DPR 9 May, 1968, No. 108: Regulation for the loading, sea transport, 
unloading and transshipment of dangerous goods in parcels. 
- Circular Ho. 316597/32.1, 1 August, 1968, Ministry of Transport 
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and Civil Aviation, D.G. Civil Aviation: Specifications for 
air transport of special radioactive and fissile materials 
viith subsequent amendments. 
- Conditions and tariffs for the transport of articles by the 
Italian State Railways. 
- DPR, 3 July,1969, No. 1285: Amendments to appendix A and Β 
of the European Agreement relating to international road trans­
port of dangerous goods, 20 September, 1957, adopted at Geneva, 
15 December 1966. 
- RID ratification of the CIM-RID convention: 9.11»55. 
1-4. Luxembourg 
- Grand Duchy regulation 8.2.67 on execution of the decree 
25·3·67 regarding protection of the general public against 
ionizing radiation hazards. 
- Ratification of the CIM-RID convention: 12.1.55· 
- Ratification of the ADR convention. 
1-5. Netherlands 
- "Nuclear energy act" 21.2.63· 
- Decree on entry into force of the nuclear energy act: 12.11,69. 
- Decree 4.9.69 for bringing into effect articles 16,19 first 
paragraph, 21,29,30 second paragraph, 31 and 32 of the nuclear 
energy act (fissile, mineral and radioactive materials transport 
decree). 
- Ratification of the CIM-RID convention: 8.11.54. 
- Ratification of the ADR convention. 
- Dutch regulation for the rail transport of radioactive materials. 
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1-6. German Federal Republic 
- "Act on the peaoeful uses of atomic energy and protection 
against nuolear hazards", act 23.12.59, repeatedly amended 
subsequently, the last amendment being 28.8.69. 
- "First ordinance for protection against damage due to ionizing 
radiation", decree 24.6.60, most recent version 15.10.65. 
- Regulation on rail transport, appendix C, decree 17.10.68. 
- Decree on the sea transport of dangerous goods 4.1.67, sub-
sequently amended· 
- Decree on air traffic, amended 4.11.68. 
- Decree on admission to air transport, 28.11.68. 
- Ratification of the CIM-RID convention, 21.12.64. 
- Ratification of the ADR convention. 
II. DECLARATION AND AUTHORISATION SYSTEM FOR THE TRANSPORT OF 
RADIOACTIVE SUBSTANCES 
II-1. Belgium 
The transport of special radioactive and fissile materials 
is governed by chapter 7 of the General Regulation governing 
protection of the general public and workers against ionizing 
radiation hazards, issued as Royal Decree 28.2.63. 
As regards authorisation, this decree lays down that all 
transports of radioactive materials, whatever the means employed, 
including private vehicles, must be authorised in advance by the 
Ministry of Publio Health and the family, with the exception of 
the cases listed in the following section II-1.1. 
- 131 -
Three types of authorisation are provided: 
- general, for carriers regularly undertaking the transport of 
radioactive materials; 
- individual, for occasional transport; 
- epecial, for those types of transport with an outstanding 
danger level as described in detail in the following section 
II-1.2. 
It is observed that the authorising decree may specify 
special conditions for carrying out the transport and in par-
ticular, in the case of spedai authorisations, an escort may 
be required for the convoy. 
The carrier, being the holder of a general authorisation, 
is subjected by virtue of article 59 of the above decree, to 
the requirement of declaring monthly all transport carried out 
during the period considered, indicating the consignment dates 
and addresses of the consignees, the amount and nature of 
materials transported, precautions taken and any accidents 
occurring during transport. 
General authorisation, issued for periods not exceeding 
5 year3,and renewable on application from the carrier, as those 
of other types, may be withdrawn at any time by the competent 
Ministry with reason for the decision. 
II-1.1. Exemptions 
On the basis of article 56 of the above decree, no authorisation 
is necessary for the following types of transport: 
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a) transports of radioactive substances with activity below the 
following limits: 
­ for nuclides with very high radiotoxicity (group A): 0.1 μΟχ 
­ for nuclides with high radiotoxicity (group B): 1 ¿iCi 
­ for nuclides of moderate radiotoxicity (group C): 10 μΟί 
- for nuclides with weak radiotoxicity (group D): 100 ¿id. 
b) transport of the following radionuclides in any quantities: 
1 1 V 1^S_, 87Sb, 115ln, i87Re; 
c) transport of natural uranium and natural thorium in quantities 
respectively below 10 Ci and 10 Ci; 
d) transport of valves and electronic equipment, instruments and 
clocks incorporating radioactive substances in a form not lending 
itself to dispersion, on condition that such articles are enclosed 
in sufficiently robust packings and that the intensity of irradiation 
at any point on the outer surface does not exceed 10 mR per 24 hours 
(or equivalent). 
It is observed here, as regards point a) that classification 
of radionuclides as a function of their radiotoxicity, set out 
in article 4, is the same as that of the Euratom basic standards, 
and that the quantitative limits are the same as the limits below 
which, according to these standards, the system of declaration 
and advance authorisation may not apply. 
As regards points b) and c), however, such exemptions can be 
obtained by similar application of the note contained in article 3 
of the decree. 
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II-1.2. Cases for which special authorisation is required 
Special authorisation by the Ministry of Public Health and 
Family is required in all cases for e ach transport as follows: 
a) with reference to activity of the radioactive materials: 
a-1) transport of sealed sources comprising substances belonging 
to radiotoxicity groups A and Β if the activity is greater 
than 200 Ci and groups C and D if the activity is greater 
than 2000 Ci; 
a-2) transport of non-sealed sources comprising substances 
belonging to group A, if the activity is greater than 1 Ci, 
to group Β if the activity is greater than 10 Ci and to 
groups C and D if the activity is greater than 100 Ci; 
a-3) transport of mixtures of known composition when: 
- for sealed sources: the sum of the activities of substances 
of groups A and B, multiplied by 10 and of substances of 
groups C and D does not exceed 2000 Ci; 
- for sealed sources: the sum of the activities of substances 
of group A multiplied by 100, of substances of group Β mul­
tiplied by 10 and of substances of groups C and D does not 
exceed 100 Ci; 
a-4) transport of mixtures of unknown substances or mixtures in 
proportions not exactly known, when the calculated activity, 
assimilating the substances of the mixture with the known 
element of highest radiotoxicity (or if this is not known, 
to substances of group A) is greater than the values indicated 
respectively under a-1) and a-2). 
b) with reference to intensity of external irradiation: 
- transport of parcels, the screening of which is not sufficient 
to prevent the measured irradiation intensity in contact with 
the accessible outer casing of each parcel exceeding 200 mR/h or 
. 
- 134 -
the intensity of irradiation at any point situated at 1 m from 
the outer surface of the packaging exceeding 10 mR/h or equivalent; 
c) with reference to the risk of dispersion of radioactive sub-
stances: 
- transport of parcels for which the means of protection are not 
such as to ensure in a satisfactory manner the necessary 
guarantees against dispersion of radioactive substances outside 
the packaging; 
d) with reference to the particular nature of radioactive substances: 
d-1) transport of special fissile materials in quantities exceeding 
the minimum critical mass, with the exception of natural uranium 
and mixtures of natural isotopes when their purity is such as to 
prevent the possibility of a self-sustained chain reaction being 
maintained in an appropriate installation; 
d-2) transport of radioactive substances which may display pyrophoric 
or explosive characteristics; 
d-3) transport of radioactive substances which, in the case of an 
uncontrolled rise in temperature, may change the quantities of 
the packaging or bring about melting or destruction of the 
screening. 
II-1.3» International transports 
For international transports, in the case of transit only, 
the provisions set out in articles 43 and 44 of the R.D. 28.2.63 
quoted above apply, providing for general or individual authori-
sation which may be issued to persons residing in Belgium or 
having a responsible representative there. 
- 135 -
Generally speaking, moreover, Belgium has ratified the 
ADR and CIM-RID agreements and therefore adopted regulations 
already studied in the preceding appendix A. 
It should be mentioned that within the scope of the existing 
agreements between the Benelux countries, authorisations for the 
transit or transport of radioactive substances issued by the 
competent Luxembourg or Netherlands administrations are recognised 
as valid within Belgian territory. 
II-2. France 
The transport of special radioactive and fissile materials 
in France is governed by two decrees, the one relating to land 
transport (road and rail) and inland waterway transport, and the 
other sea transport. As regards air transport, the IATA standards 
apply. 
The regulation for land transport is substantially in agree-
ment with the RID and ADR regulations in the editions at present 
in force. The regulation for sea transport, however, appears to 
be based on the international regulations in force at the moment of 
issue,and in particular, the IAEA recommendations issued 1961. 
It appears, however, that these are being updated. 
As regards land transport, advance approval of despatch is 
necessary only in the caee of large fissile sources in nuclear 
safety I and II parcels, while for the transport of special fissile 
materials in nuclear safety III parcels, special advance authorisation 
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is necessary. Such authorisations are issued by the Ministry 
of Transport. 
It should be observed that, still in the case of land trans-
port, for the despatoh of: 
- large non-fissile sources 
- large fissile sources in nuclear safety I and II parcels 
- fissile material in nuclear safety III parcels, the shipper is 
subject to the requirement of advance notification to the national 
civilian protection department. Notification must indicate a 
series of data and information relating to the transport and in the 
case of rail transport, shall be transmitted to all stations to be 
passed through under the supervision of the railway administration. 
No authorisation is required, however, for other types of transport 
if exempt from any approvals required for the packaging and for 
models of the parceljWhich will be studied under the following point. 
In the case of sea transport, for the despatch of special fis-
sile materials in nuclear safety III parcels, special authorisation 
by the Ministry of Mercantile Marine is necessary. Similarly, for 
the case of large fissile sources in nuclear safety I and II parcels 
and non-fissile sources, approval of the method of shipment is 
required, which is also issued by the Ministry of Mercantile Marine. 
It is observed that, for sea transport, the activity limits 
above which transported materials are classified as large sources 
differ from those provided for land transport (see table ï), also 
in relation to the different classification for purposes of transport^ 
which in this case provides for 8 groups, while for sea transport 
only 3 are provided. 
Again for sea transport, the procedures for the approval of 
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packaging and models of the parcel are not considered under this 
head. 
TABLE I 
Lower activity limits for procedures required for large sources 
Method of 
transport 
Form l a d i o t o x i c i t y group fo r t r a n s p o r t purposes 
I I I I I IV VI VII V I I I 
Land t r a n s p o r t Specia l 
form 
Non- specialj 20 Ci 
form 
5000 Ci 
20 Ci 200 Ci 200 Ci 
5000 
Ci 
50,000 Ci 
Sea transport Special 
form 
Any form 
2000 Ci 
20 Ci 200 Ci 
(*) For tritium and crypton-85 these values rise to 2000 Ci 
II-3. Italy 
The system of declaration and advance authorisation in the 
field of transport in Italy is governed by the Act No. i860 
31.12.62 on the peaceful use of nuclear energy (subsequently 
amended and supplemented by DPR No. 174, 30.12.65 and by the 
Act No. 1008, 19.12.69), in conjunction with the Ministerial 
application decrees issued in accordance with the above legis-
lative provisions. 
On the basis of these provisions, the transport of special 
fissile materials and radioactive substances, apart from the 
exemptions which will be dealt wiih in the following section II-3.I, 
must be undertaken by land, air and sea carriers authorised by 
decree of the Ministry of Industry, Commerce and Trade in con-
junction respectively with the Ministry of Transport and Civil 
Aviation and the Ministry of Mercantile Marine. 
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General authorisations or authorisations for an 
individual transport are issued. 
Since observation of the statutory regulations quoted 
does not exempt the carrier from observation of special 
provisions applying to the individual forms of transport, 
the requirement for approval of despatch is superimposed on 
these authorisation procedures when necessary. 
II-3.1. Exemptions from the authorisation procedure. Advance 
notification 
On the basis of article 2, DPR No. 1704, of the Act No. 1008 
and decrees referred to therein, the following may also be transported 
without authorisation: 
N 144 147 87 
a) the following radioisotopes in any quant i t i es : Nd, Sm, Rb, 
115 187 
In, Re, natural potassium and its compounds; 
b) radioactive substances in quantities less than the following 
limits (*): 
0.1 μΟΐ for group I radionuclides 
1 ßC± for group II radionuclides 
10 μ0± for group III radionuclides 
100 ¿iCi for group IV radionuclides; 
c) radioactive substances whose concentration does not exceed the 
following limits: 
0.01 μβχ/g for natural solid radioactive substances 
0.002 ^ Ci/g for artificial radioactive substances; 
d) special fissile materials which do not exceed in total amount 
the limits provided in b) and in any case 9 g in weight; (*) Classification in groups coincides with the classification of 
radionuclides as a function of relative radiotoxicity, as set out in the 
Euratom basic standards. 
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e) natural uranium, natural thorium and impoverished uranium 
in quantities not exceeding 300 g uranium and 9 g thorium. 
Article 2 of the DPR No. 1704 also states that individual 
occasional transports*of radioactive materials in total amounts 
of radioactivity below the values established by the appropriate 
decree as set out below can be undertaken without authorisation: 
226 10 mCi for group I (for sealed sources of Ra: 300 mCi) 
100 mCi for group II (for 1 5 i I : 300 mCi) 
1 Ci for group III 
10 Ci for group IV 
2000 Ci for radioactive materials in the form of compact non-
brittle solid, having a melting point at any point 
o 
on the mass not less than 538 C, insoluble in water 
and not reacting with air (in the case of sea trans-
port only). 
The undertaking of individual occasional transports carried out 
under the above conditions (without authorisation) must be notified 
by appropriate declaration at least 48 hours before commencing 
transport, to the provincial Prefect and Medical Officer in which 
the transport starts and finishes. 
II-4. Luxembourg 
On the basis of the Grand Duchy decree 8.2.67 relating to 
* Individual occasional transports means individual transports 
undertaken by way of exemption^all concepts of frequency and 
continuity, however, being excluded from the comparisons. 
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protection of the general public against ionizing radiation 
hazards, any person transporting radioactive substanoes must 
be in possession of a general or individual authorisation. 
The procedure for the issue of the authorisation and the con­
ditions which must be observed for transport will be defined, 
as previously desoribed, by an interministerial decree, which 
has not yet been issued. Such provisions apply without 
prejudice to the legal provisions or regulations governing the 
various types of transport, apart from international agreements 
or conventions. 
The following are exempt from transport authorisation: 
a) radioactive materials to an amount less than the following 
limits: 
- for nuclides wi_t very high radiotoxicity (group A) : 0.1 /iCi 
- for nuclides Trith high radiotoxicity (group B) : 1 μΟί 
- for nuclides with moderate radiotoxicity (group C) : 10 μα 
- for nuclides with weak radiotoxicity (group D) : 100 μΖΙ 
b) the following radionuclides in any quantity: 
144 147 87 115 187 Nd, Sm, rRb, In, Re. 
c) apparatus containing radioactive substances in quantities less 
than the limits provided under a) on condition that they are in 
sealed form and that the dose intensity at any point 10 cm from 
the surface of the apparatus does not exceed 0.1 mrem/h; 
d) radioactive substances in any quantity when their concentration 
does not exceed: 
- 0.01 μθΐ/g for natural solid substances, 
- 0.002 /id/g in other cases. 
Essentially, activity or concentration limits are dealt with, 
above which the basic Euratom standards specify as essential a 
system of advanced declaration and authorisation. 
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The transit of radioactive substances is again subjected 
to general or individual authorisation issued by the Ministry 
of Public Health and valid for limited periods. 
In the case of Luxembourg also it should be stated that 
an agreement is in force between the Benelux countries for 
mutual recognition of transit and transport authorisations 
(Grand Duchy decree 18.9.67). 
II-5· Netherlands 
The system of declaration and authorisation for the 
transport of radioactive or special fissile materials in the 
Netherlands is governed by the Nuclear Energy Act 21.2.63, in 
conjunction with the decree on the transport of mineral fissile 
materials and radioactive substances, 4.9.69. The structure of 
these standards is such as to render preferable a distinction 
between the transport of special fissile materials and the 
transport of radioactive substances. 
II-5.1. Transport of special fissile materials and minerals 
Article 15» paragraph a) of the Nuclear Energy Act sub-
ordinates transport and storage in relation to transport of 
special fissile materials and minerals to the possession of 
an authorisation. The authorisation may contain specifications. 
This requirement does not exist for the transport of 
thorium, parcels containing fissile materials or minerals and 
conforming to the requirements for exemption from the regulation 
for rail transport of dangerous goods. 
These requirements are the same as those for the RID: 
moderate quantities of special fissile materials, natural or 
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impoverished uranium, hydrogenated homogeneous solutions or 
mixtures with precise characteristics, uranium with enrichment 
below 1 % under specific conditions, fissile materials not com-
prising large sources in nuclear safety I and II parcels. 
Exemption from authorisation also applies to the transport 
of large fissile sources in nuclear safety I and II parcels, 
undertaken on the basis of authorisation for despatch from a 
foreign country where the parcel corresponds to the RID require-
ments for unilateral authorisation, such as the transport of 
fissile materials in nuclear sefety class III parcels, in the 
case where approval or authentication on the part of the Dutch 
authorities of the model of the parcel does not include the 
adoption of special measures to be adopted during transport^ 
and despatch has been authorised by a foreign country. 
As regards the foreign countries quoted under the last 
heading, the decree on transport provides that these shall 
comprise those indicated in the Official Gazette. 
The decree on transport, on the other hand, regulates the 
transport of fissile materials end minerals according to the 
various forms of transport, stating that authorisation, when 
required, may contain various specifications, including obser-
vation of the specific national regulations in force for that 
form of transport (in the case of air transport, the regulation 
issued by the IATA, 11th edition). Transport not liable to 
authorisation on the basis of the above must, however, be 
undertaken observing these regulations apart from exemptions 
permitted by the Ministry of Social Security and Public Health. 
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As regards the transport of special fissile materials and 
minerals in the Dutch territorial waters, authorisation is not 
required in the sense of the nuclear law. A similar derogation 
is provided for transport in an aircraft when not landing on the 
territory of the Netherlands. 
It is finally observed that authorisations for the transport 
of special fissile materials and minerals issued by the competent 
authorities of Belgium and Luxembourg are valid also on the ter-
ritory of the Netherlands by reason of the special agreements in 
force between the Benelux countries. 
11-5*2. Transport of radioactive substances 
Article 29, paragraph 1, of the nuclear energy law, prohibits 
the transport or storage of radioactive materials in relation to 
their transport without authorisation of the Ministry of Social 
Security and Public Health. On the basis of the decree on 
transport, these prohibitions refer to: 
- radioactive materials which may explode on contact with a flame 
or -which are more sensitive to impact or to friction of dinitro-
benzol; 
- large nonfissile sources as defined in the regulation of rail 
transport of dangerous goods (definition coinciding with that of 
the RID). 
At the same time, the transport of large radioactive sources 
is exempt from liability to authorisation when shipment is 
authorised by the competent authority of a foreign country and the 
parcel possesses characteristics such as to require only unilateral 
authorisation on the basis of the RID or, in the absence of the 
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second condition, i f approval or authenticat ion of the model of 
the parcel by the Dutch au thor i t i es does not contain special 
specif icat ions to be observed during t ranspor t . 
Regarding the foreign countries mentioned under the preceding 
heading, what was s ta ted with regard to f i s s i l e materials or 
minerals also appl ies . 
The decree quoted also governs the individual forms of 
t ranspor t , l a id down in the appl icat ion procedures for author i -
sation^and the specif icat ions which may be contained i n the 
document author isa t ion. I t i s also l a id down t h a t , for the 
various forms of t r anspor t , the provisions contained i n the 
regulations regarding the t ranspor t of dangerous goods be 
observed (for a i r t r anspor t , the regulat ion issued by the 
IATA, 11th ed i t ion) . 
As regards the t ranspor t of radioact ive substances on the 
Dutch maritime t e r r i t o r y or non-Dutch waters, authorisat ion i s 
not required i n the sense of the nuclear law. A similar 
derogation i s provided for a i r t ransport ;on condition tha t the 
a i rc ra f t does not land on Dutch t e r r i t o r y . 
I t should f ina l ly be noted tha t ,by special agreements i n 
force between the Benelux countr ies , authorisat ion for t ranspor t 
issued by the competent au thor i t i e s of Belgium and Luxembourg are 
valid also for the t e r r i t o r y of the Netherlands. 
I I - 6 . German Federal Republic 
The t ransport of radioact ive and special f i s s i l e materials 
in the German Federal Republic i s regulated., generally speaking,by 
the Atomic Energy Act 23.12.59 (amended and supplemented recently 
28.9.69) and the f i r s t and second decree on radiological protect ion» 
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to which must be added the regulations appropriate to each 
type of transport. 
In view of the particular structure of the standards, it 
is preferable to distinguisn between special fissile materials 
and other radioactive materials. 
II-6.1. Transport of special fissile materials in the German 
Federal Republic 
The transport of special fissile materials outside of 
closed areas where they are guarded by the government or held 
for activities otherwise authorised above the amount specified 
in appendix I of the first ordinance on radiological protection 
must be authorised in advance by the Brunswick Federal Physical-
Technical Institute, obligation sanctioned in article 4 of the 
Atomic Law. Such authorisation can be issued to the consignor or 
to the person responsible for the shipment or transport and must 
be limited to the individual transport. Its validity cannot ex-
ceed 3 years. 
The transport of small quantities of special fissile materials 
within the limits and under the conditions provided by the regu-
lation for rail transport is exempt from such authorisation by 
exemption from application of nuclear safety criteria. It is stated 
on this point that on account of the date of issue of the first 
ordinance, this is referred to in the marginal notes 451 and sub-
section 3 (a; ana D ) ) or the marginal note 456 of the railway 
regulation then in force, coinciding with the similar marginal notes 
of the RID, 1 June, I962 edition. It is not therefore completely 
clear whether the less restrictive limits can be applied as 
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provided in the formulation at present in force of the railway 
a regulation or the RID, marginal note 451 . 
For the transport of fissile materials not entering this 
category, such authorisation procedure has to be added to that 
provided in the regulations for the particular type of transport 
(sea, air, etc.). This also applies in the case of international 
road transport with a dual administrative procedure, the ADR and 
as provided in the Atomic Law. 
II-6.2. Transport of other radioactive materials 
The "First Ordinance on protection against damage due to 
ionizing radiations" lays down that "any person transporting 
radioactive substances on the public highways or where the 
public has access must request authorisation". Such authori-
sations are issued by the competent authorities of the individual 
LSnder. 
However, there are a number of conditions of exemption 
to this standard. These include exemptions for small quantities 
of radioactive substances and for particular articles,and 
exemptions relating to specific standards for the individual 
types of transport. 
Among the former¿exemptions from liability to authorisation 
can be quoted for the transport of: 
a) radioactive substances with total activity less than the limits 
fixed by appendix I of the First Ordinance (coinciding substan-
tially with the Euratom limits for the system of advance 
declaration and authorisation); 
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b) radioactive substances with concentration less than 0.002 ^ Ci/g; 
c) solids having a concentration of radionuclides of natural 
origin less than 0.01 /iCi/g; 
d) natural potassium or medicinal waters of natural origin having 
a normal concentration of radionuclides of natural origin ; 
e) apparatus, ceramic, porcelain and other articles specified 
under article 11 of the First Ordinance; 
f) apparatus containing sealed sources, calibration devices or 
measurement instruments for radiation or dosimetry, radiation 
detectors containing radioactive substances on the condition that 
the model of such devices is approved by the competent authorities 
in accordance with the Land legislation, as provided in article 14, 
14a, 14b of the First Ordinance. 
To this type of exemption, also valid, there are added, as 
mentioned, special cases avoiding the necessity of dual 
authorisation procedures. Such exemptions are contained in 
article 9 of the First Ordinance and affect: 
a) the transport of radioactive substances within the limits and 
under the conditions provided in marginal note 451a of appendix C, 
section 54 of the Ordinance on rail traffic(*); 
b) the transport of radioactive substances undertaken in 
accordance with the provisions of the Ordinance on rail traffic 
or the RID, by persons acting as public railway operators; 
c) sea transport of radioactive substances packaged in accordance 
(*) For the transport of radioactive substances, the statement 
under the penultimate heading of section II-6.1. concerning fissile 
materials, also applies. 
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with the provisions of the Ordinance of sea transport of 
dangerous goods. In this case, however, loading and unloading 
of the substances in question must be notified in advance to 
the competent authorities in accordance with the Land legislation 
(not later than 24 hours before starting work); 
d) air transport of radioactive substances undertaken on the 
basis of authorisations within the meaning of the air traffic law. 
In the case also of radioactive substances, it is seen that, 
in the present state of German legislation, a dual authorisation 
procedure is necessary for international road transport within the 
meaning of the First Ordinance and respectively the ADR. 
III. TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS REGARDING PACKAGING AND MANNER OF 
SHIPMENT 
III-l. Technical standards of the Community States 
Before entering into the merit of the argument dealt with in 
this section, the situations in the individual countries are 
synthesised as regards existing technical standardisation within 
the specific field of transport. 
III-l.1. Belgium 
Rail transport is carried out on the basis of a national 
regulation based on the standards contained in the RID. Road 
transport is undertaken in accordance with the standards contained 
in the ADR. 
Specific regulations do not exist for air and sea transport. 
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III-l.2. France 
Land transport (road and rail) and inland waterway transport 
are undertaken in conformity with the technical specifications 
contained in the Ministerial decree 15 April 1945 (repeatedly 
amended), based substantially on the standards contained in the 
ADR. 
Sea transport is regulated by Ministerial decree of 7 
February 1964, based essentially on the IAEA recommendations, 
1964 edition. 
Finally, for air transport, the LATA regulation applies, 
in virtue of the decree of 22 August 1957 on the classification 
of dangerous materials (radioactive materials) for air transport, 
III-l.3. Italy 
Rail t ranspor t i s regulated by the "Conditions and t a r i f f s 
for the t ranspor t of goods on the State railway" subs tan t ia l ly 
based on the RID, I962 version, and hence, ul t imately , the IAEA 
recommendations, I96I. 
For road t ranspor t , c i rcu lar No. 8/I965 applies "Road 
t ranspor t of radioactive or special f i s s i l e mater ia l s . Technical 
speci f ica t ions" , Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation, 1 
February, I965, based en the I96I IAEA recommendations. 
Sea t ransport i s governed by the "Regulation for loading, 
unloading and trans-shipment of dangerous goods i n pa rce l s " , 
Ministry of Mercantile Marine, based on the 1964 IAEA recommendations. 
Final ly , a i r t ransport i s governed by the "Specifications for 
a i r t ransport of radioactive and special f i s s i l e mater ia l s , 
c i rcu la r No. 316597/32.1., 1 August I968, Ministry of Transport 
and Civil Aviation, which adopts the technical specif icat ions of the 
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IATA regulat ion. 
III-l.4. Luxembourg 
The intended i n t e r -min i s t e r i a l regulat ion on t ransport 
has not yet been issued. 
I I I - l . 5 . Netherlands 
The nat ional regulat ions for the Netherlands are based on 
the standards contained i n the valid regulat ions and i n t e r -
nat ional conventions. 
I I I - l . 6 . German Federal Republic 
The German nat ional regulat ion for r a i l t ranspor t i s i den t i ca 
with the RID, which has been adopted for in te rna t iona l t r anspor t . 
The ordinance for sea t ranspor t , 4 January i960, i s based 
p r a c t i c a l l y on the IAEA I96I. Subsequent amendments do not affect 
the t ranspor t of radioact ive mater ia ls . There i s , however, a 
"c i rcu la r" indica t ing the type of labe l adopted by IMCO. In 
the present s t a t e , the i s sue of a new ordinance i s imminent, 
probably adopting the RID or IAEA I967. This, however, has not 
as ye t been approved. 
As regards a i r t r anspor t , there i s an "ordinance" automatical" 
adopting the IATA. The Air Transport Act, however, i s based on th< 
more recent IATA regulat ion. Air navigation companies belonging t< 
the IATA, however, do not require any authorisat ion for under-
taking t r anspor t . If, on the other hand, a company does not belone 
to the IATA, author isat ion i s necessary. Special authorisat ion 
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must be requested, on the other hand, in those cases where the 
IATA specifications are not observed. 
As regards road transport, there is no appropriate regulation 
in the German Federal Republic at the present time other than that 
provided in the First Ordinance on protection against dangers due 
to ionizing radiations. It should be observed, however, that 
section 3, article 4 of the Ordinance definitely stipulates 
that the packaging, for example, should conform to the ADR which 
is observed for international transport. In this case,again, the 
publication of an appropriate regulation is imminent, but this 
has not yet been approved. 
III-2. General packaging specifications and general characteristics 
of construction 
All the regulations examined provide, as already seen for 
international standardisation, two types of packaging, namely 
type A and type B, for which the specifications are laid down 
by precise technical specifications. 
It should also be observed that, in countries where specific 
regulations have not been issued for certain forms of transport, 
there is stipulated, frequently through the authorisation proce-
dures, observation of the technical standard actually equivalent to 
those quoted. By way of example, in the German Federal Republic, 
where a regulation for internal road transport has not yet been 
issued, authorisation for transport is subordinated to the con-
dition that, even in the absence of legal provisions, the ".= '.-
transport of special fissile materials and radioactive substances 
shall be undertaken observing "all precautions necessary in the 
light of existing scientific and technological knowledge for the 
prevention of potential risks due to transport". 
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For the greater part of the national regulations, based, 
as already seen, on the analogous international specifications, 
what was stated in the previous appendix A applies. Regarding 
the points dealt with specifically there, it can be stated that 
the French decree on sea transport, the Italian regulations for 
internal road and rail transport and the German regulation for 
sea transport do not provide predetermined values for temperature 
variations during transport and storage, limiting themselves to 
specifying that "the vessels must withstand .... temperature 
variations .....". The Italian circular on air transport,for its 
part, lays down limits of -40 C and +70 C, coinciding with those 
of the RID, the ADR and the IMCO (IAEA) as distinct from the 
IATA standards. 
These regulations do not explicitly provide for the existence 
of an outer container, restricting themselves to giving specifi-
cations relating to the containment and screening function. The 
principal ones are as follows: 
a) packagings must be enclosed and hermetically sealed so as to 
prevent any dispersion of the content and for this purpose, they 
must be closed by an efficient device. 
The vessels must be placed, when necessary, in a radiation 
protection screen. The screen must be constructed and closed so 
that the vessels in it cannot emerge by accident and cannot change 
position in respect of the screen during transport. 
The packaging must be of such a type as to maintain 
efficiency of the protective screen. The vessels must be constructed 
so as to form the protective screen themselves. They must, in par-
ticular, withstand the action of fire, impact and water, in addition 
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to temperature variations and pressure variations which may 
develop internally, having in mind the presence of air. 
b) the packagings, closures and absorbent materials if necessary, 
must not be attacked by the content nor form noxious or dangerous 
compounds with them. 
The regulationsconsidered, with the exception of the French 
for maritime transport, also provide that the smallest outside 
dimension of the packaging must not be less than 15 cm instead of 
10 cm, as distinct from the international standards and the regu-
lations quoted based on them. 
III-2.2. Supplementary specifications for type A packaging 
As distinct from the international regulations and the 
national regulations, which, being modelled most nearly on these, 
specify that type A packaging must withstand a series of tests 
without loss of containment functions for the radioactive materials, 
the French and German regulations for sea transport, like the 
Italian regulations for inland rail and road transport, are rest-
ricted to establishing that type A packaging must satisfy the con-
ditions regarding containment and screening functions under normal 
conditions of transport and in the event of "minor accidents". 
Supplementary specifications are not provided for the transport 
of gamma-emitting materials with activity exceeding 3 Ci in type A 
parcels. 
As regards specifications for type A packaging intended to 
contain liquid or gaseous materials, the 4 national regulations 
quoted above, while not providing supplementary specifications for 
gaseous materials, lay down for liquid materials that: 
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a) the materials must be contained in a first vessel placed inside 
a second vessel. Each vessel must be hermetically sealed and closed 
with an efficient locking device. The inside vessel must have a 
filling margin sufficient to prevent an increase in pressure 
bringing about failure of the vessel; 
b) the inside vessel must be surrounded by a sufficient amount of 
absorbent material to absorb all the content. If the inside vessel 
is made from fragile material which can be easily perforated, the 
absorbent material must provide effective protection against impacts; 
if there is a protective screen, this must always surround the ab­
sorbent material. 
It is observed in particular that the international regu­
lations, like the remaining national regulations, specify that 
the absorbent material must be able to absorb twice the content. 
The final specification regarding the position of the screen refers 
explicitly also to type A parcels only in the Italian regulation 
for road transport. 
III-2.2. Supplementary specifications for type Β packaging 
The 4 regulations not adopting the international standards 
in their most recent form (i.e. the French sea transport regulations, 
the German sea transport regulations and the Italian rail and road 
transport regulations) are restricted to specifying that type Β 
packaging must satisfy the general packaging conditions also in the 
case of the most serious foreseeable accident or series of accidents 
during transport for the manner and conditions of transport considered. 
The French regulation for sea transport, moreover, states explicitly 
that the packaging must be fire resistant. 
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The same regulations impose special specif icat ions for 
type Β packaging intended for containing l iqu id radioact ive 
mater ia ls , providing i n pa r t i cu l a r t h a t : the ins ide vesse l , when 
made from f rag i le material or material which i s eas i ly perforated, 
must be surrounded by a suff ic ient amount of absorbent material to 
absorb the en t i re content. I f the ins ide vessel i s not made from 
f rag i l e material or material which i s eas i ly perforated, the pac­
kaging may, i n cer ta in cases, be not of absorbent material and the 
vessels may not be material ly separated, with the approval of the 
competent authori ty of the country affected. 
I t i s observed tha t these supplementary specif icat ions 
governing packaging for l iqu ids are not provided e i the r i n the 
in te rna t iona l regulat ions discussed i n appendix A nor the remaining 
nat ional regulations which are r e s t r i c t e d to specifying the t e s t s 
which type Β packaging i n general must withstand. . . ■■■■>:■ 
I I I ­ 2 . 3 . Supplementary specif icat ions for parcels containing l a rge 
radioact ive sources 
The national regulat ions examined are i n best agreement with 
the in te rna t iona l standards governing the various types of t ranspor t 
with the exception of the 4 regulat ions repeatedly quoted. '■■:'■ 
In pa r t i cu l a r , as regards l imi ta t ion of the temperature of the 
outer surface of the parce l , t h e . I t a l i a n regulations for road and 
r a i l t ranspor t provide tha t the paroel must be designed and con­
st ructed so that ,under the most unfavourable conditions, t h e tem­
perature of the outer accessible surfaces of the packaging does not 
exceed 50 C during t ranspor t . ·:■■.!■. ■ ; ; . . ; ; . ­ · · .';. · a­a­i 
Before despatch, the parcel must be held i n storage by the 
shipper u n t i l the temperature of the system has reached equilibrium 
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unless it has not been laid down that the state of the parcel 
shall continue to conform to the specifications of the regulations 
quoted above throughout transport. This limit may be raised to 
82°C in the case of complete load transports. 
The French sea transport regulation lays down similar 
specifications, but standardising the temperature limit at 82°C. 
It is observed that the regulations quoted do not refer to 
ambient conditions as regards the above limits. 
All the national regulations, like the international (RID, 
ADR, IAEA-IMCO) lay down that the heat produced inside the parcel 
by the presence of radioactive materials shall not at any time 
reduce the efficiency of the packaging. However, when stating 
the effects to be considered particularly, the 4 national regu-
lations above do not quote those which may accelerate corrosion 
in the presence of moisture. 
The national regulations studied, with the exception of the 
4 above quoted, provide the same container design principles and 
screening function, the same test procedures and the same tests for 
approval of the parcels as quoted in the preceding appendix A. 
The Italian road transport circular lays down that if a 
refrigerating fluid or system is used, this fluid or system must 
conform to the following conditions: 
a) the primary gaseous or liquid refrigerating fluid (refrigerating 
fluid making contact with the source of irradiation) must not 
circulate outside the protective screen; 
b) if the packaging is provided with a mechanical refrigerating system, 
failure of this mechanism must not result in an excessive increase in 
pressure or liberation of radioactive materials to an injurious amount: 
- 157 -
c) if a liquid is used as the refrigerating fluid, measures 
must be adopted to prevent freezing during transport; 
d) if a liquid is used as the refrigerating fluid and if the 
temperature inside the packaging may at any time during transport 
reach the boiling point of the liquid, the packaging must be desig-
ned and constructed so as to withstand the increase in pressure 
without loss of liquid, reduced efficiency of the packaging or 
liberation of radioactive materials. If the packaging is not so 
designed and constructed, the system must be studied so that the 
temperature of the liquid inside the packaging and in proximity 
with the radioactive materials are always at least 10°C below the 
boiling point of the liquid, taking into account the external con-
ditions which may be encountered during transport. If pressure-
reducing devices are used, measures must be taken to prevent the 
liberation of particles of radioactive material in injurious 
quantities. 
The remaining 3 regulations quoted above contain fairly 
similar specifications. For example, the French sea transport 
regulation, under point b) also considers loss of refrigerating 
fluid and, under point c) adds: "or prevent, by means of a filling 
margin or expansion device or any other appropriate means, the 
packaging or its content being damaged in the event of freezing". 
This type of specification does not exist in the remaining 
regulations examined, either national or international, in so far 
as the material dealt with is governed by the standards for the 
approval of models of the parcel providing two types of administrative 
procedure according to the characteristics of the parcels (see 
appendix A). 
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III­2.4. Limitation of external irradiation 
Also as regards limitation of external irradiation, the 
only national regulations which differ from the international 
regulations are: 
­ the German sea transport regulation; 
­ the Italian road and rail transport regulation ; 
­ the French sea transport regulation. 
The first 3 provide that the parcels must fall into one of 
the following categories: 
a) the white category when the total irradiation exposure intensity 
at any point on the outer surface of the transport packaging does 
not exceed 10 milliroentgen per 24 hours; 
b) yellow category when the total irradiation exposure intensity 
exceeds 10 milliroentgen per 24 hours but without exceeding the 
limits of: 
­ 200 milliroentgen per hour at any point on the outer surface 
of the transport packaging and 
­ Í0 milliroentgen per hour at 1 m from any outer surface of the 
transport packaging. 
However, only in the case of complete load transport of large 
sources, the two Italian regulations quoted lay down, in derogation 
of the above, that: 
­ the irradiation exposure intensity may be 10 milliroentgen per 
hour at 3 m from the surface of any outer face of the packaging; 
­ the total X or gamma radiation intensity or its equivalent must 
not exceed: 
­ 200 milliroentgen per hour at any accessible outer surface of the 
truck (or vehicle); 
­ 10 milliroentgen per hour at 1.6 m from either of the two base walls 
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The German sea transport regulation, on the other hand, 
still for large sources, allows transport which, on the basis of 
rail transport conditions, may be considered as complete truck, 
with total irradiation intensity reaching 10 mR/h at 3 m from the 
surface of any outer face of the packaging. 
The standards provided by the French regulation for sea 
transport, while being formulated differently, provide the same 
limits and the same derogation as stated for the similar German 
regulation. 
It is seen that the major differences between the national 
regulations examined and the international regulations (and 
therefore the remaining national regulations also) are as follows: 
- they provide a single yellow category coinciding largely with 
the Ill-yellow category; 
- the irradiation intensity limits at a distance refer to a distance 
of 1 m from the outer surface of the packaging, rather than the 
centre of the parcel; 
- for the white category, the exposure intensity limit at the 
outer surface of the parcel is equal to 0.4 mR/h or equivalent^ 
rather than 0.5 mR/h or equivalent. 
IV. NUCLEAR SAFETY SPECIFICATIONS 
IV-1. General specifications 
As regards nuclear safety specifications also, the 4 regu-
lations studied in particular in the preceding sections are the only 
ones which deviate from the international regulations dealt with in 
the preceding appendix A. . 
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In the f i r s t p l a c e , condit ions of exemption from the 
s p e c i f i c standards w i l l be considered regarding f i s s i l e 
mater ia l s . Both the I t a l i a n regulat ions and the German sea 
transport regulat ion provide the fo l lowing 3 cases : 
a) plutonium t o the amount of 9 grammes maximum per parcel 
uranium-233 " " "16 " " M M 
uranium-235 " « « M M M M M 
When a parcel contains more of one of the above mater ia l s , 
the l i m i t apply ing t o a p a r c e l must be ca lculated from the f o l ­
lowing formula: 
t h e t o t a l 
(number of grammes plutonium) χ l6+ 
(number of grammes uranium-233) x 9+ 
(number of grammes uranium-235) x 9 
must be equal t o o r l e s s t h a n 144; 
b) n o n - i r r a d i a t e d uranium i n which t h e only f i s s i l e r a d i o i s o t o p e 
i s uranium-235, t h e con ten t of which must not exceed 0.72 $ by 
weight , t o an amount p e r p a r c e l no t exceeding t h a t provided f or 
t y p e A o r Β p a r c e l s . 
I f more t h a n one of t h e s e 3 m a t e r i a l s a re p r e s e n t , t h e t o t a l : 
(Beryl l ium: uranium) χ 15 + ( g r a p h i t e : uranium) χ 1 + 
+ (hydrogen-2: uranium) χ 3 
must not exceed 15; 
c) aqueous o r o t h e r s o l u t i o n s i n which t h e only f i s s i l e m a t e r i a l i s : 
1. uranium-235 t o an amount no t exceeding 800 g. In t h i s case 
t h e hydrogen: uranium-235 atomic r a t i o i n t h e s o l u t i o n must not 
exceed 5 ,200. This atomic r a t i o , i n o rd ina ry aqueous s o l u t i o n s , 
corresponds t o a uranium-235 concen t r a t i on below 5 grammes p e r 
l i t r e . 
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2. plutonium to an amount not exceeding 320 g. In this case, 
the hydrogen: plutonium atomic ratio in the solution must be 
greater than 76OO. This atomic ratio, in ordinary aqueous 
solutions, corresponds to a plutonium concentration below 
3.5 grammes per litre; 
on condition that homogeneity of the solutions is ensured at all 
times during transport and that, at no time during transport, the 
concentration of any part of the solution exceeds the above. The 
effects of freezing and evaporation must be duly taken into account. 
The French regulation, again,provides the same exemptions but 
under point b) does not stipulate quantity limits. 
Comparison with table I in appendix A shows that the major 
differences reside in the amount of material, under point a), the 
quantity limit under point b) and the absence of exemptions for 
enriched uranium with ^ D percentage not exceeding 1$ by weight. 
The 4 regulations above do not explicitly state that the 
fissile materials mentioned must be packaged and transported in 
such a way that criticality cannot be reached under any foreseeable 
circumstances of transport. This, however, is implicit in the 
context of safety standards. 
The same national regulations, moreover, impose specifications 
regarding the hypotheses to be adopted for the transport of non-
irradiated or irradiated fuel elements, with particular regard to 
the evaluation of radioactivity. 
For unspecified fissile materials, such as scrap or residues, 
the French sea transport regulation provides the same specifications 
regarding hypotheses to consider in the safety calculations contained 
in the international regulations as in appendix A. 
As regards nuclear safety class, the 4 regulations quoted 
provide definitions only formally different from those studied in 
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appendix A, specifying in fact that the consignment belongs to 
one of the 3 following types: 
- Type I consignment. Each parcel of the consignment shall not be 
subject to any hazard due to neutron interaction under any fore-
seeable circumstance, whatever the arrangement of the load, in 
other words, no critical assembly shall be formed when such parcels, 
in any number, are stacked in any manner. 
- Type II consignment. A number of parcels such as to make up a 
single consignment without a critical assembly being formed under 
any foreseeable circumstances, even if by chance, a number of parcels 
5 times that authorised is combined together. 
- Type III consignment. This type comprises all consignments not 
satisfying all the conditions of types 1 and II. 
It is seen that the specifications cover consignment, but 
implicitly 3 different types of parcel are defined. Other dif-
ferences are formal, or depend on the different distribution of 
the material dealt with. 
IV-2. Particular specifications for nuclear safety class I parcels 
The 4 national regulations repeatedly quoted, for nuclear 
safety I and II parcels provide that 
a) if the mass is the determining factor, the permissible amount in 
any parcel must not exceed 1.80 f¿ of the critical mass evaluated for 
the most unfavourable conditions of moderation and reflection which 
can be encountered under the conditions of transport, taking into 
account the neutron absorbers incorporated; 
b) if geometry is the determining factor, the permissible size of 
any determining dimension must include a safety margin of at least 
10 $ on the critical dimensions evaluated under the most unfavourable 
conditions of moderation and reflection which can be encountered 
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under the conditions of transport. 
The Italian road transport regulation and the French sea 
transport regulation provide in an appendix typical data for con­
structing packages satisfying the requirements of nuclear safety 
I and II parcels from the criticality standpoint. The French 
regulation quoted specifies that the packaging for nuclear safety 
class I and II parcels must be type B. 
The remaining national regulations, like the international 
regulations discussed in appendix A, give much more detailed 
specifications regarding both isolated parcels and assemblies of 
parcels, damaged and undamaged. Tests are laid down, moreover, 
to which parcels must be subjected in order to determine the 
hypotheses on which to base nuclear safety calculations and the 
conditions of moderation and reflection to be considered. 
IV­3. Particular specifications for nuclear safety class II parcels 
The 4 national regulations of the preceding section, apart from 
the specifications already studied in regard to nuclear safety I 
parcels, lay down that as regards the number of type II parcels 
authorised, the effective neutron multiplication factor (K ._) of 
eff 
the system obtained>when a number of parcels 5 times that authorised 
is combined under the most difficult foreseeable circumstances, 
must noi enceed 0.9. 
On this subject also the remaining national and.the inter­
national regulations are much more detailed, stipulating: 
■ ­ th" tests which each nuclear safety class II parcel must withstand, 
maintaining certain characteristics;. ..­.·­'■ 
­ the nuclear safety criteria for parcels of these classes taken 
individually and for calculating the permissible number of parcels, 
considering both sound parcels and damaged parcels. 
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IV-4. Particular specifications for nuclear safety class III parcels 
None of the regulations studied lays down particular tech­
nical specifications regarding the characteristics of nuclear 
safety class III parcels taken individually. 
Standards of this type, but referring to consignment and not 
specifically to the model of the parcel, are,on the other hand, 
contained in the French sea transport regulation. 
It is noted also that,in the standards of both the inter­
national and national regulations, models and shipment of parcels 
of these classes must be approved by the competent authorities, who 
may specify all the precautions rendered necessary. 
V. ADMINISTRATIVE SPECIFICATIONS REGARDING THE APPROVAL OF PACKA­
GINGS AND PARCELS 
V-l. Type A packaging 
All the national regulations issued by the Member States 
require no approval of type A packaging. 
V-2. Type Β packaging 
All the national regulations examined specify that the type Β 
packaging model must be approved by the authorities designated for 
this purpose by the national legislation. 
Certain complications arise for models of parcels originating 
and approved in countries different from those where the transport 
is undertaken. The Belgian royal decree on transport provides 
nothing regarding the approval of parcels; the subject is governed 
within the framework of the transport authorisations. 
As regards France, the land transport and inland waterway 
transport decree lays down that: 
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- "any parcel originating abroad for which the packaging is in 
conformity with these specifications may be transported^on con-
dition that the shipper can supply a statement certifying that 
the packaging conforms to specifications conforming to the TABA 
recommendations; certification must be authenticated by the Minister 
if not issued by the competent authority of the country of origin of 
the parcel design or shipment". 
Again, the French decree on sea transport does not provide 
for this case. 
In the German Federal Republic the railway regulation adopts 
the findings of the RID, while the sea transport ordinance does not 
expressly provide for these circumstances. 
For Italy, the road transport circular, the air transport 
circular and the sea transport regulation provide that the national 
competent authority (CNEN) may authenticate a certificate of approval 
issued by competent authorities. The regulation for rail transport, 
on the other hand, does not provide for this case. 
The Dutch regulations for various types of transport adopt 
the findings of the corresponding international regulations. 
As regards Luxembourg, however, it is noted that the inter-
ministerial regulation governing the transport of radioactive 
materials has not yet been issued. 
V-3. Approval of models of parcels for large non-fissile radioactive 
sources 
Approval of the models of the parcels for large non-fissile 
radioactive sources is not provided for in the following regulations: 
- French sea transport regulation; 
- German sea transport regulation; 
_ Ttalian lroad transnort circular; 
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The remaining regulations examined provide two types of 
approval, one relating to models of the parcel conforming to the 
requirements set out in section III-3.1. of appendix A, which is, 
so to speak, unconditional, and the other relating to models of 
the parcels corresponding to the requirements set out in section 
III-3.2. of appendix A, issued with supplementary precautions to 
be observed during transport, when the precautions must appear on 
the certificate of approval. 
As regards recognition in the various countries of certificates 
of approval issued by competent foreign authorities, the circum­
stances are rather different, as in the case of approvals for 
type Β packaging models dealt with in the preceding section. 
V-4. Approval of models .of nuclear safety class I, II, III parcels 
The 4 national regulations quoted at the beginning of section 
V-3, with the exception of the French regulation for sea transport, 
do not provide for approval of models of nuclear safety class I, II 
and III parcels. All the remaining national regulations^like the 
international regulations (section III-4, appendix A.) provide 
this type of approval. 
In this case again, limited to models of nuclear safety class 
I parcels, much disuniformity may be encountered in recognition by 
the various countries of approval of parcel models issued abroad. 
VI. AUTHORISATION FOR DESPATCH AND ADVANCE NOTIFICATION 
The material to be dealt with is frequently superimposed 
on that affecting the system of declaration and advance authorisation 
as dealt with in the preceding section II. 
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The Belgian royal decree 28.2.63, as was seen, provides 
special authorisation to be issued from time to time in the case 
of transports of particular danger. The procedure is comparable 
with authorisation for despatch as provided in the international 
regulation. It is, however, noted that the Belgian regulation 
provides that the transport of radioactive materials must in every 
case conform to the international conventions in force. 
The French regulation on the subject, which does not provide 
a particular system of authorisation, has already been examined in 
the preceding section II. This moreover conforms to the RID and 
ADR conventions for land transport and, for sea transport, provides 
for approval of the type of shipment for large sources and a special 
authorisation for nuclear safety class III shipments. 
The German regulation on sea transport lays down that the 
means of transport for large sources must be approved by the 
competent authority and that shipments of parcels containing 
fissile materials in amounts exceeding the exemption limit must 
observe the provisions contained in the certificate issued by the 
competent authority. As regards other forms of transport, it is 
noted that, while a regulation governing road transport has not yet 
been issued, that for rail transport is completely similar to the 
RID. The IATA standards apply for air transport. 
The Italian circular on road transport, in the case of parcels 
containing large radioactive sources (fissile and non-fissile) pro-
vides for approval of the technical means of transport, on the basis 
of a nuclear safety certificate issued by the CNEN. As previously 
stated, nuclear safety class I, II and III consignments are 
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subject to the issue of the CNEN nuclear safety certificate. 
Similar standards apply to rail transport. 
The Italian circular on air and sea transport lays down that 
acceptance for transport of parcels containing large radioactive 
sources (fissile and non-fissile) or nuclear safety class III 
parcels shall be subject to the issue of an appropriate certificate 
by the CNEN. 
As regards the regulations in force in the Netherlands, these 
coincide materially with the provisions of the national regulations 
examined in appendix A. 
It is noted, finally, that for Luxembourg, the subject will be 
governed by the issue of an interministerial regulation on the 
transport of radioactive materials. 
VII. MARKING AND LABELLING REQUIREMENTS 
VII-1. Markings 
The national regulations examined specify that each parcel 
conforming to a type A design shall be marked in an obvious and 
indelible manner on its outer surface with the wording "type A" 
with the exception of the following: 
« French sea transport regulation; 
- German sea t ranspor t regulat ion; 
- I t a l i a n road t ranspor t c i rcu la r ; 
- I t a l i a n r a i l t ranspor t regulat ion. 
which do not provide such markings. 
These 4 regulat ions do not provide pa r t i cu l a r indicat ions 
for type A parcels containing gamma-emitting radioact ive substances 
with ac t iv i ty exceeding 3 Ci, as d i s t i n c t from the remaining national 
regulations.which standardise on the in te rna t iona l standard as in 
appendix A. 
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All the regulations examined provide tha t parcels for which 
approval of the package or parcel model i s necessary require^on the 
outer surface i n an obvious and inde l ib le manner, the iden t i f i ca t ion 
mark assigned to the design by the competent authori ty which has 
approved i t , the se r i a l number and, for type Β packaging, the wording 
"type B". As regards the wording "type B", t h i s i s not provided 
i n the 4 regulations mentioned at the s t a r t of the sect ion. Of 
these , only the French regulation for sea t ranspor t provides the 
wording "radioact ive". 
All the regulations examined lay down, with ins igni f icant 
differences, t ha t each parcel conforming to a type Β packaging 
design must be marked>on the surface of the outermost f i r e and 
water r e s i s t an t metal,with the clover leaf symbol, cut, punched 
or otherwise stamped so as to withstand the action of f i r e and 
water. 
VII-2. Labels and other indicat ions 
The 4 regulations quoted at the s t a r t of sect ion VII-1 
provide only 2 types of danger label to be applied on the 2 
opposite side faces of the parce l . The remainder provide 3 
types of label , previously mentioned i n connection with the i n t e r ­
nat ional regula t ions . This re la tes to subdivision of parcels in to 
only 2 categories . 
I t i s observed tha t there are some differences i n d e t a i l 
between the symbols reproduced on the l abe l s . In pa r t i cu l a r , the 
label models provided i n the above 4 regulations carry a s k u l l . 
These 4 regulations do not provide the wording "empty package 
which has contained radioactive mater ia ls" . The remaining regulat ions 
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adopt the specifications of the international standards. 
All the regulations, for parcels containing materials exempt 
from technical specification governing transport, provide the 
wording "radioactive". 
As regards radioactive materials with low specific activity, 
the Italian regulations for rail and road transport and the German 
regulations for sea transport do not provide standards for labelling, 
while the French regulation for sea transport and the remaining 
regulations conform with the international standards. 
VII. REQUIREMENTS OF PERSONNEL UIŒ)ERTAKING TRANSPORT 
VIII. 1. Qualifications of personnel. 
The Belgian royal decree 28.2.63 governing in general the 
transport of radioactive substances in these countries does not 
provide particular specifications regarding the requirements of 
the personnel undertaking the transport. It however requires that 
the application for authorisation shall contain information regard-
ing the qualification of such personnel and information be issued to 
them regarding measures to adopt in the event of accident. It is 
clear then that, through the authorisation procedure, guarantees 
can be obtained regarding the qualification of the personnel em-
ployed on the transport. 
The French regulation examined^and particularly the regulations 
quoted above>do not contain any explicit standard regarding the 
qualification of personnel employed on transport. 
As regards the German Federal Republic, one of the conditions 
to which the First Ordinance subjects issue of authorisation to 
transport is a guarantee that the transport is carried out by 
reliable persons possessing the necessary knowledge regarding any 
irradiation risks and protection methods to be adopted for the mode 
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of transport involved. Of the regulations on the various types 
of transport, the sea transport regulation does not provide any­
thing on the subject; the remainder refer to what was stated in 
general in section III. 
For Italy in general, the DPR 1704 lays down that, pending 
the issue of standard regulations for the transport of special. 
fissile materials and radioactive substances, in addition to the 
standards contained in the regulations already examined, the 
health and safety standards contained in the DPR 185 which apply 
shall be observed. The DPR 185, article 61, lays down that"employers ... 
must make workers aware of the specific hazards to which they are 
exposed, the method of carrying out the work and the essential 
protection standards ....". This standard is repeated and adapted 
to the case of transport by the air transport section and sea 
transport regulation. 
For the remaining member countries we will limit ourselves 
here to stating that.while in Luxembourg the intended inter-
ministerial regulation on transport has not yet been issued, the 
Dutch regulations are in close agreement with the international 
regulations examined in appendix A. 
VIII-2. Classification of radiation protection 
The Belgian royal decree 28.2.63, governing also transport, 
provides that workers may be classified in class A or Β (occupationally 
exposed and not occupationally exposed). 
The French regulation on sea transport sets out a table of 
minimum distances separating the parcels and positions occupied 
by persons, while the regulation for rail, road and inland water­
way transport is limited to stating that, for road transport, parcels 
to a maximum number, determined in accordance with the transDort index, must be placed as far towards the end of the vehicle as 
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possible, opposite that of the driving seat. 
As regards the German Federal Republic, the regulations 
examined do not provide details regarding the classification of 
personnel. It is, however, stated that the problem does not arise 
and, when it does, workers employed on transport may be considered 
as not occupationally exposed. 
The Italian regulation, with the sole exception of rail 
transport, provides that workers employed on the operations of 
transport and handling of parcels must be classified either as 
occupationally exposed or not occupationally exposed. The land 
transport circular also allows classification as single individuals 
of the general public (group 3)· 
As regards the Netherlands and Luxembourg, the preceding 
section VIII-1 applies. 
IX. REGULATION APPLYING IN THE EVENT OF ACCIDENT 
The national standards of the Member States governing the 
transport of special fissile materials and radioactive substances 
normally limit themselves to laying down, for the case of any 
accidents occurring during transport, specifications of a general 
nature similar, as will be seen below, to those provided in the 
international regulations already examined in the preceding appendix A. 
It is, however, found that in each case it is the responsibility 
of the authorities of the individual countries to organise the mode 
of action of the public bodies (fire services, civilian protection 
services, police, etc.) for the purpose of limiting as far as pos-
sible the damage due to any accidents. 
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The standards contained in the laws and regulations of the 
various countries are briefly described below. 
IX-1. Belgium 
The Belgian royal decree 28.2.63 (article 60) expressly 
provides, for the case of accidents occurring during transport, 
that the responsible person must immediately inform the public 
authorities designated for this purpose if it is found that a 
hazard endangering public safety exists. It is also specified 
that such declaration does not relieve the carrier from immediately 
adopting all protective measures stipulated by the circumstances. 
It is also noted that every month, when submitting the 
quarterly summaries, the holder of the authorisation must notify, 
a posteriori, all accidents which may have occurred during the 
transports undertaken. 
IX-2. France 
The French regulation for land or internal waterway transports 
devotes Title VI of class IVb of the regulation governing transport 
of dangerous goods to the procedures to follow in the event of 
accidents. Article 23 of the same regulation also applies, referring 
to any dangerous goods. The provisions of article 4, sub-title IV, 
class IVb of the regulation for sea transport of dangerous goods 
also apply to sea. transport. 
In the case of road or internal waterway transports, for the 
specific case of radioactive materials, in the event of an accident 
occurring during handling or transport on the public highway or if 
the packaging or materials have suffered evident or probable damage 
and, more generally, each time there is a probability of radioactive 
contamination or accidental irradiation hazard, the person responsible 
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for undertaking the transport must: 
- notify the shipper and the authorities designated for this 
purpose or see that they are informed immediately, supplying all . 
the information on the case; 
- establish if possible an isolation perimeter around the point of 
the accident and take all precautionary measures useful and com-
patible with his material possibilities. 
Similar specifications¿but adapted to the type of transport, 
are proviaea for rail transport. 
For sea transport, it is provided that: 
- in the event of damage to parcels containing radioactive materials 
occurring during transport, the affected zone must be isolated 
(in the case of a hold, this shall be closed off and any ventilation 
prevented). The authorities affected and the shipper must also be 
informed immediately; 
- in the event of fire occurring in a compartment of the hold 
adjacent to that occupied by radioactive material, the Captain shall 
take the necessary steps to remove them from the fire^ 
In general, the presence of radioactive materials must not 
be considered as preventing rescue or firefighting operations; 
- persons who may have been contaminated shall be subjected to 
control and appropriate examinations; 
- contaminated materials, goods and areas shall not be returned to 
service without prior authorisation by competent persons. 
IX-3. Italy 
The regulations governing the individual types of transport 
provide, in the event of accidents, specifications substantially 
similar to those of the RID and ADR, with the additional statement 
that persons for whom the possibility of contamination is suspected 
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must be subject to appropriate controls. 
It should be noted in particular that the specifications for 
sea transport and air transport, as distinct from the road transport 
circular, provide that: 
­ apart from situations of serious urgency, any discharge of radio­
active materials following accidents must be carried out on the basis 
of arrangements issued by the provincial medical officer; 
­ reuse of means of transport, premises or materials which have been 
contaminated entirely or in part and have been subsequently de­
contaminated, must be declared in advance as exempt from risk by a. 
"qualified expert" as defined in article 70 and 71 of the DPR 13.2.64, 
Ko. 185. 
IX­4. Luxembourg 
Arrangements to adopt in the event of accident must be laid 
down in the interministerial regulation quoted above (not yet issued). 
IX­5. Netherlands 
As previously noted, the Dutch national regulations applying 
to the individual types of transport have incorporated the standards 
provided in the international regulations (CIM­RID, ADR, draft ADN) 
or refer to these (IATA). As regards the regulations applying to 
accidents, the previous appendix A therefore applies. 
IX­6. German Federal Republic 
■Without prejudice to the provisions of the specific regulations 
regarding the individual types of transport, the First Ordinance, 
article 53, lays down that any person subject to liability for 
authorisation to transport must immediately inform the supervisory 
authorities of any mishap or accident resulting from the transport 
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of radioactive substances. 
A similar obligation exists, within the meaning of article 
45 of the same Ordinance, in the case of loss of radioactive 
substances during transport. 
It is also indicated, for rail transport, that the par-
ticular regulation provides standards entirely similar to the 
RID. 
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APPENDIX C 
PRACTICAL EXPERIENCE IK ITALY IN RADIATION PROTECTION IN THE 
TRANSPORT OF RADIOACTIVE SUBSTANCES 
PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS 
This appendix provides a synthetic description of experience 
in radiation protection gained in Italy during more than a. decade 
of activity in the sector of transport of radioactive substances. 
Before talcing up the subject, however, it should be noted 
that the transport of radioactive substances in Italy, in accor-
dance with the basic standards, independently of the technical 
provisions which must be observed when undertaking transport, is 
subject to advance authorisation or simple declaration in ac-
cordance 1-ri.th the level of risk of the radioactive substances 
transported. 
On the basis of article 2 of the DPR, 30 December I965, 
No. 1704 amending and superseding article 5 of the act 3I December 
ly62s No. I060, the transport of special fissile materials in any 
quantity and of radioactive materials to a total quantity of radio-
activity or by weight exceeding the values determined in accor-
dance with article 1 of the DPR, I3 February 1964, No. 185, must 
be undertaken by authorised land, air or sea carriers by decree of 
the Ministry of Industry and Trade respectively in conjunction 
with the Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation and the Ministry 
of Mercantile Marine. This article was amended in turn by the act 
19 December I969, No. IOO8, which lays down that exemption from 
authorisation may be granted for moderate quantities of special 
fissile materials and prime source materials. The ministerial 
decree 15 December 1970 (G.U. 15.2.71, Ko. 39) establishes the 
limits of such exemption. 
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By article 2 of the DPR No. 1704 quoted, individual occasional 
transports of radioactive materials can be undertaken without 
authorisation to a total quantity of radioactivity or by weight 
not exceeding the value determined by decrees of the Ministry of 
Industry 27.7.66 and 18.7.67. In such cases, however, at least 
48 hours before starting the transport, information must be sub-
mitted to the Prefect and to the provincial medical officer of the 
provinces in which the transport starts and finishes. 
Individual transports of special fissile materials and radio-
active materials, occasional or not occasional, but to a total 
quantity of radioactivity or by weight exceeding the limits laid 
down in the acts and decrees referred to above, must be undertaken 
by land, air and sea carriers,if necessary authorised by decree of 
the Ministry of Industry and Trade in conjunction with the Ministry 
involved. 
By decree of the President of the Republic, ultimately in 
accordance with article 2 of the DPR, 30 December I965, standard 
regulations must be issued relating to the transport of· special 
fissile materials and radioactive materials in accordance also with 
the basic standards laid down by the European Atomic Energy Community. 
Until this regulation is issued, still in accordance with the 
provisions of article 2, the transport of special fissile materials 
and radioactive materials must be undertaken in observance of the 
instructions issued by the Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation 
for land and air transport and by the Ministry of Mercantile Marine 
for sea transport, observing also the health and safety standards 
contained in the DPR,13 February 1964, No. 185 which apply. 
Transport is therefore subject to advance authorisation or 
simple declaration in accordance with the quantity, classified into 
groups of radiotoxicity and hence level of risk for the given' 
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transport, in harmony with the basic standards. There is an 
interesting distinction in the legislation between individual 
occasional transports and individual transports; the purpose of 
this is to distinguish the occasional nature of an individual 
transport,, undertaken by way of exception,below the limits for 
which authorisation is required, leaving the carrier the pos-
sibility of undertaking individual transports from time to time 
which should, however, be authorised in advance. It is a subtle 
distinction and presents considerable difficulties of inter-
pretation. The major difficulty is, however, the fact that 
the regulation provided has not yet been issued. In the present 
state,moreover, the only reference as regards radiation protec-
tion is in the statement contained in article 2 of the act 1704, 
regarding the application of the standards of the DPR No. 185, 
13 February 1964, vii th the limitation of the expression "which 
are applicable"^which poses a problem not easy to resolve. 
Into this legal framework there are grafted controls on the 
part of the Italian bodies existing for this purpose, the ex-
planation of which emerges from experience gained in this sector. 
I. THE SYSTEM OF DECLARATION FOR THE TRANSPORT OF RADIOACTIVE 
MATERIALS 
As stated in the previous section, individual occasional 
transport of radioactive materials with activity below certain values 
can be undertaken without authorisation, by simple notification to 
the Prefect and the provincial officer of health of the provinces 
in which the transport starts and finishes. Such notification, 
in harmony with the provisions of the basic standards, aims on the 
one hand at ensuring action by the competent peripheral authority 
in the event of accidents, and on the other hand, making it pos-
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sible for that authority to be acquainted with the movements of 
radioactive materials. 
Such a. system of notification, moreover, makes available 
the information necessary to draw up traffic statistics for radio-
active materials, particularly useful in specifying any points of 
high intensity in this traffic, for which specific action would be 
necessary from the standpoint of radiation protection in order to 
protect the general public or individuals of the public against 
undue radiation. 
Finally,analysis of the reports may indicate carriers con-
travening the "occasional" concept and who should therefore be 
issued with authorisations in accordance with the act. 
The outcome of experience as regards the system of advanced 
reporting does not, however, appear very comforting for various 
reasons. 
Firstly, substantial negligence is encountered on the part 
of occasional carriers, so that a large proportion of transports 
undertaken by them are not reported as they should be to the com-
petent authorities. This negligence arises both from widespread 
ignorance of the legislative provisions and particularly the 
nuisance to the occasional carrier of notifying in advance the 
undertaking of a transport to the peripheral authority. 
Secondly, a. lack of usefulness can be noted^ other than for 
the case of accidents, of regular notifications to the peripheral 
authorities. They indeed, by Italian law loaded with 
numerous and the most varied burdens, have not drawn up statistics 
regarding any noda"1. traffic points for radioactive materials nor 
singled out cases of carriers whose activities cannot be considered 
as occasional, except for a few exceptions. 
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It is worth noting, however, that the system of declaration;, 
even with the difficulties of application brought to light, con-
tinues to be a useful tool, in particular as regards protection 
of the general public against the risk of undue irradiation 
following an accident or strong concentrations of radioactive 
traffic. At the same time it is a tool which could better reflect 
its effectiveness in the field of wider familiarity with the law 
on the part of the users and s, more specific functioning of the 
peripheral authorities. 
II. THE SYSTEM OF AUTHORISATION FOR THE TRANSPORT OF RADIOACTIVE 
MATERIALS 
As regards the system of authorisation, it should be noted 
that this is divided between permanent authorisation, valid for 
one year and renewable each year, and authorisation for a single 
transport. 
For the purposes of protection and nuclear safety, the 
application for permanent authorisation by the carrier must con-
tain, as indicated in the circular l6-F, 21 April I965, Ministry of 
Industry, Commerce and Trade, in addition to a list of protection 
and nuclear safety equipment, explicit information regarding the 
qualification of the personnel employed on both the organisation 
and carrying out of the transport and the use of instrumentation. 
This, however, is not necessary in the case where application is 
made for authorisation for an individual transport, for which it 
is sufficient if the applicant declares himself familiar with the 
technical standards for undertaking the transport. 
Authorisation, both permanent and individual, is issued by 
means of a. decree which renders binding the technical standards for 
that type of transport, under penalty of loss of authorisation with 
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the application of the consequent penal provisions. 
The above differences between the documentation required 
for the two types of authorisation are due to the fact that, while 
in the first case there is continuity in carrying out transports, 
in the second case transport is carried out only rarely. 
The former case presupposes a systematic activity involving 
the necessity of having available a qualified person who can put 
into force the protective arrangements, which does not appear 
relevant in the second case, naturally excluding accidents. 
It is obviously at this point that supervision on the part 
of the competent authorities must come into play. 
Permanent authorisation for transport on the basis of the 
circular of the Ministry of Industry, Commerce and Trade No. 
16-F, 21 April 19°5» laying down the procedures, is subjected^as 
regards protection and nuclear safety, to favourable opinion by the 
National Nuclear Energy Committee. 
In this respect, the CNEN has drawn up for discussion an 
advance instruction procedure which is explained x-jhen the carrier 
requests authorisation for the first time, together with an enquiry 
supplement on renewal of the permanent authorisation. The advance 
instruction procedure examines the information provided by the carrier, 
i.e. the whole of the activity intended, in order to assess the 
classification of the workers involved in the event of any physical 
and medical controls, the instrumentation which aftst be made available 
to the carrier, etc. This information, carried out on a-priori 
evaluations, is then usually checked at the end of 1 or 2 years 
activity, at the conclusion of which it is possible to establish 
more accurately, on the basis ox the frequency of transports 
undertaken, and on the whole and method of execution, «hat should 
be the most appropriate protective arrangements to apply for 
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In the case of authorisations for individual transport, 
any requirements regarding protection organisation, according to 
the circular quoted above, will be undertaken by the CNEN and 
imposed on issuing the authorisation, obviously varying as a 
function of its importance and the level of risk of the transport 
in question. 
The results of practical experience gained in Italy as 
regards the system of authorisation do not appear to be com-
pletely positive. 
For permanent authorisations,indeed, an increase was observed 
during I966-I97O in the authorisations issued, rising from 3 in 
I966 to 8 in I967, to 15 in I968, to 20 in I969 and to 21 in 1970. 
It is worth considering that practically all transports of 
radioactive materials involving important activities were carried 
out by firms or companies carrying permanent authorisation, the 
number of which actually appears sufficiently high to ensure 
competitive costing, and sufficiently limited to allow a certain 
degree of specialisation with a high standard of radiation 
protection. 
Parallel with this, there was a reduction during the early 
months of 1971 in applications for permanent authorisation relating 
to radioactive pharmaceutics, being released only to 4 manufacturing 
or importing companies. 
This development, although still in its beginnings, displays 
undoubted positive features. It would seem therefore possible that 
the big gap in retail distribution of radiopharmaceutics is bein^ 
bridged. In other words, the majority of transports involve 
an activity which could fall within the system of advance 
notification of occasional transports but which are assumed not to 
be of this character. 
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Again, as regards authorisations for individual transports, 
practical experience gained in Italy displays some quiet com-
forting notes. Relative to the transport of radioactive materials 
subject to individual authorisation indeed, there is not very 
great casuistry (approximately 100 transport/year) which confirms, 
with reserves for possible transports undertaken in abuse, that 
the large majority of transports relating to important activities 
are undertaken within the scope of permanent authorisations. 
It seems possible, therefore, with the reserves indicated, 
to state that the authorisation system has enjoyed sufficient 
acceptance in the countries on the part of the users affected, 
as the result of awareness of the risks connected with the 
activity being performed, which could continually improve in the 
future, particularly if the procedures are accelerated and certain 
individual conditions freed, largely respecting the radiation 
protection standards. 
III. TECHNICAL MEANS FOR UNDERTAKING THE TRANSPORT OF RADIOACTIVE 
SUBSTANCES 
As repeatedly stated, the authorisation system for transport 
of radioactive substances does not exempt the carrier from adopting 
suitable precautions for carrying out the transport in a correct 
manner from the technical standpoint and carrying out oncthe trans-
port a protection analysis based on the instructions issued by the 
competent ministries. 
These instruction, based on the IAEA, recommendations for the 
transport of radioactive materials, are pertinent only partly to 
the subject of this appendix, and it is therefore opportune to 
draw attention only to that part of the instructions affecting 
radiation protection in particular. 
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The technical regulations, while largely dealing with 
containers, or the tests to which they must be subjected in 
order to conform to certain standards, or questions of a purely 
nuclear nature, such as for example the problems of facility, 
do not touch on several aspects regarding protection, such as 
for example maximum permissible contamination on parcels, 
maximum irradiation intensity per parcel and load, etc. 
From the standpoint of radiation protection, moreover, 
particularly as regards the consequence of any accident during 
transport, the IAEA recommendations refer to a standard accident, 
which, apart from major catastrophes, may be normally accepted 
during transport in the sense "Chat, when transport is carried 
out in complete observation of the specifications contained in 
the technical recommendations, this will not represent serious 
risks. 
Analysis of radiation protection therefore aims firstly at 
ensuring that transport is performed in a. manner conforming with 
the dictates of the technical provisions and, in this case also, 
that the ambient conditions in which it occurs, for example 
particular highway routes, are not such as to run counter to 
the hypotheses forming the basis of the IAEA recommendations. 
If on the other hand, it does not conform to the provisions of 
the regulations (for example container not capable of withstanding 
the mechanical or thermal tests provided where this is considered 
under type 3) then radiation protection analysis must be more 
accurate. In particular, all those preventive measures must be 
brought into play largely replacing engineering deficiencies of 
the transport in question. 
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Mature experience in the field of transport has indeed 
recently brought about an ever increasing conviction that this 
is an adequate "policy" in this sector. In effect, the standards 
required for containers of either type A or type Β are sufficiently 
high in relation to the probable risk consequent on the danger level 
of the substances transported. Italian experience has in fact 
shown that the risk consequent upon undertaking transport, par­
ticularly for the general public or single individuals of the 
public, is largely acceptable. When, however, these standards 
appear less cautious, measures must be provided (such as for 
example a reserve of expert personnel on hand both from the 
nuclear standpoint and, where appropriate, firefighting) which in 
cases of this type are necessary on the part of the competent 
authorities. 
IV. CONTROL BY THE COMPETENT AUTHORITY 
Control and supervision by the competent authority, which, as 
already seen, is entrusted also to the National Committee for 
Nuclear Energy in Italy as regards protection against ionizing 
radiation, is explained on the basis of the activities described 
in the preceding sections, namely on the one hand permanently 
authorised carriers and on the other hand visits during 
individual transports. 
It is also the responsibility of the CNEN to check all 
those measures necessary for safeguarding, apart from workers, 
single individuals of the public or the public as a whole directly. 
As regards the control of carriers authorised permanently 
for the transport of radioactive materials, it should be immediately 
noted that this takes on a radiation protection character. In 
effect, as frequently emphasised, the carrier, on applying for 
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permanent authorisation, lists the equipment for radiation 
protection which he has available, making use or otherwise of 
the collaboration of the qualified expert obviously in accor-
dance with the frequency and size of the transports he intends 
to undertake, draws up, a priori, a classification for the 
personnel employed and the frequency of contamination controls. 
The control body, moreover, is responsible for supervising 
and assessing that the protective devices employed are in propor-
tion to the transport activity which the carrier intends to 
undertake and once having more concrete data, such a,s for 
example, statistics of .the transports undertaken or the manner 
in which these are carried out, etc., seeing that the protec-
tive measures previously established are adequate, requesting 
where appropriate integration or^in some cases, suggesting 
suitable limitations. 
On-the-spot investigations during individual transports, 
on the other hand, are normally of a more technical nature., in the 
sense that these also require the collaboration of specialist 
transport engineers,also agreed in the conventional sense, 
apart from radiation protection experts for the control of 
irradiation levels and contamination levels of the parcel. 
The control body is also responsible for seeing that single 
individuals of the general public or,more generally, the public 
as a whole are not exposed to undue irradiation beyond the 
limits laid down for them. 
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V. CONTROLS AID INSPECTIONS. PRACTICAL EXPERIENCE 
P r a c t i c a l exper ience obta ined i n I t a l y i n t h e f i e l d of 
c o n t r o l s i s p a r t i c u l a r l y r i c h . I t i s t h e r e f o r e a p p r o p r i a t e 
t o s tudy i t i n some d e t a i l i n o rde r t o e s t a b l i s h , i f p o s s i b l e , 
t hose working parameters which may guarantee a high s t anda rd of 
r a d i a t i o n p r o t e c t i o n . 
I n t h i s r e s p e c t , t h e Nat ional Nuclear Energy Committee 
has d i r e c t e d i t s own a c t i v i t i e s along d i s t i n c t l i n e s : 
a) d i r ec t control ac t iv i ty : undertaken both on the authorised 
c a r r i e r ' s premises and on t ranspor ts on the road; 
b) research ac t iv i t y : based on the analysis of data col lected 
and aimed at suggestion i n i t i a t i v e s emerging from the analys is ; 
c) accident a c t i v i t y . 
V-l. Direct control activity 
As regards direct control activity, this is aimed at 
practical instruction in the issuing of permanent authorisation and 
by visits on the site; during the course, of such visits·, the 
availability of instruments is ascertained, together with the 
physical and medical control services available, personnel in-
struction and the competence of the responsible engineer. It 
is worth noting that all this can contribute towards the expression 
of a valuation of the organisation and the efficiency of physical 
health and safety supervision brought into play by the carrier. 
From the visits so far carried out in this respect (more than 20) 
it has been possible to note a discrete efficiency in the organi-
sational structure in the great majority of cases. 
At the time of technical assessment for renewal of permanent 
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authorisations, at an approximately annual rate, the on-
site visits take on a, more practical character. In particular, 
compliance of the carrier is found regarding the following points: 
a) Working capacity of the person responsible for physical super-
vision of health and safety; 
b) Control of physical supervision of personnel; 
c) Control of medical supervision of personnel (when necessary); 
d) Use of instrumentation; 
e) Contamination control on the motor vehicles; 
f) Quarterly reporting of transports undertaken; 
g) Instructions f or exposed personnel. 
Visits carried out for this purpose (more than 50) have 
always disclosed a high standard of protection^with insignificant 
doses taken up by the personnel employed. 
As a consequence of analysis of the situation, a substantial 
awareness has been obtained which, at any rate as regards authorised 
carriers, matches up with an efficient radiation protection struc-
ture to the point where it is possible to attain a greater time 
extension for the renewal of permanent authorisations. 
As regards road transport, on which direct control activity 
is carried out on those occasions where it is considered that 
transport should be undertaken with particular caution, practical 
experience obtained does not at the moment go beyond a brief 
casuistry regarding the transport of irradiated fuels or Co 
for large irradiation plants. The results in this respect appear 
however to counsel more direct control action. 
- 191 -
V-2. Research activity 
For the purpose of checking that, as the result of the 
transport of radioactive materials, certain individuals of the 
public or, in the more general case, the public as a whole, do not 
take up irradiation exceeding the limits fixed for them, the 
National Nuclear Energy Committee has systematically performed 
a series of research studies and activities for the purpose of 
estimating: 
a) The mean dose taken up by single individuals of the public, 
and particular nodal points where the radioactive traffic 
intensity is high; 
b) The mean dose taken up by personnel employed on transports; 
c) The implications of traffic intensity and route configuration 
on such accidents; 
d) Improvements in the international regulations governing the 
transport of radioactive materials. 
As regards point a) reference is made to the following 
works: 
1) Radiation protection in the transport of radioactive materials 
on railway crossings (P. Cagnetti and A. Susanna) ; 
2) Parcels containing radioactive materials at the Saluggia 
railway station and doses taken up by personnel employed 
N(2) (A. Susanna) ; 
3) Estimation of the ionization radiation dose taken up by 
airport personnel employed on operations connected with the 
air transport of parcels containing radioactive materials 
(3) (A. Perini and A. Susanna) ; 
As a consequence of these studies, it has been possible 
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to establish that regarding certain conditions, there is no 
risk of exceeding the dose for single individuals of the 
population; it should be noted, however, that in certain 
situations it has been necessary to impose certain limitations 
on the number of parcels in transit. 
As regards point b), reference is made in particular 
to the following works: 
1) On the Radiation Average Dose Absorbed by Truck Drivers in 
Italy (1967-1968> (C. Faloci and A. Susanna.)^ ^ ; 
2) On the Average Dose Absorbed by Truck Drivers in Italy 
(I969-I970) (M. Roberti, A. Roselli and A. Susanna)^). 
the results of which confirm what is generally recognised, in 
other words transport of radioactive materials, if suitable 
precautions are taken, does not present a substantial risk of 
exceeding the permissible doses, particularly since a reduction 
in the mean transport index is shoxm. 
As regards point c), reference is made to the following 
works : 
1) Experience in the transportation of radioactive materials 
in Italy (C. Faloci and A. Susanna) (on the general situation)^ ' 
2) Health Protection analysis of transportation of radioactive 
substances through tunnels, the Mont Blanc tunnel (C. Faloci, 
(7) 
F. Lucci and A. Susanna) (at a particular modal point) . 
These works attempt an analysis of protection, taking into 
account the characteristics of the route configuration and con-
ventional traffic intensity statistics, extrapolated.to radioactive 
materials, in order to evaluate the implications of accidents 
implicitly defined by the technical characteristics of the 
containers. 
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The conclusions reached appear to demonstrate, with certain 
reservations regarding the characteristics and the present volume 
of traffic, that the probability of a serious accident occurring 
is very slight and that the present situation is therefore 
broadly acceptable. 
As regards item d), reference is made to the following 
documents: 
1) Recent developments in the regulations governing the transport 
(8) of radioactive substances (L. Failla) ; 
2) A proposed presentation of the I97O draft IAEA transport 
regulations in schedule form (Draft II) (0'Sullivan and 
N (9) 
A. Susanna) . 
In the light of practical experience in Great Britain and 
Italy affecting the transport of radioactive materials, the 
latter document reformulates the IAEA recommendations, presenting 
them in the form of a"schedule", which appears greatly to simplify 
the tedium of consultation, to the benefit of the user. 
Research carried out so far, considering the extreme 
complexity in defining the parameters, appears to contribute 
significantly to the knowledge on problems connected with the 
transport of radioactive materials. It is to be hoped that similar 
research will be carried out in the other Community States, since 
improved conditions of transport should emerge from the comparison 
and from the various opinions. 
V-3. Accident activity 
The activity of the National Nuclear Energy Committee has 
developed along a third direction in relation to the accident 
possibility and for the purpose of ensuring a qualified technical, 
consultancy in such an event. 
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In this respect, the CNEN has set up a consultancy body 
(24 hours daily) grafted on to the peripheral structures 
(Prefettura, W.FF) and the departments of the Home Office. 
This organisation functions on the occasion of information 
from the central or peripheral authorities. Shift officials 
are able to establish,, at a very high speed from the Central 
Office files, the characteristics of the given transportband 
to malie this available to the authorities for necessary action. 
For this purpose, a number of orders of magnitude have been set 
up for the working levels of activity for xtfhich reference should 
be made to the article "Average "accident" in the transport of 
radioisotopes and reference doses for individuals of the popu­
lation" ( L. FaiIla and A. Susanna) 
The above consultancy body has been found necessary in 
relation to the possible disorientation, technical and in 
particular psychological, x^ hich could easily occur at the 
peripheral level in a field which displays features different 
from those of conventional accidents. 
This is confirmed by the rare casuistry so far witnessed 
(nearly always involving false alarms) xrhich has demonstrated 
how incidents involving radioisotopes still carry with them 
a marked burden of alarm on public opinion. 
It should not be forgotten, however, in this respect that 
any possible serious accident in the field of transport, such as 
for example, the failure of a type Β container on a. motorway, could 
result in closure to traffic for long periods with incalculable 
economic damage, apart from the serious risk for the persons 
involved and the rescue teams, while such eventualities could be 
prevented by prompt and competent consultancy action, such as the 
consultancy- bodv is able to orovide. 
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